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EVER since Comte proposed the new science of sociology, partly as a substitute for philosophic theories which discarded the influence of natural laws in the formation of social institutions, and partly as a study and explanation of phenomena that are social as opposed to individual, there have been repeated attempts to give the new science a clear definition — a habitation and a name. There has also been an enormous amount of confessed failure to attain this object, though probably universal confidence among its defenders in the possibility of defining it and giving it a distinctive place in the catalogue of the sciences. One would think that the controversy among the sociologists themselves about the nature and province of their science would be a discouragement of further efforts in that direction, just as political economists are coming to recognize certain difficulties in the conception and definition of their science. But so far is this doubt and dispute from being a discouragement that it seems to be a positive motive for continued efforts and confidence in favor of a sociological science. There are good reasons for this feeling, though there are equally good ones for skepticism in the matter, the difficulties and antagonisms involved in this opposition being due to certain intrinsic characteristics of the subject itself and the decidedly equivocal import of the term sociology, and not to any insoluble contradictions in the problem. This, I think, can be made apparent in the course of the present paper.

The excuse for considering the vexed question of sociological science is Professor Giddings' new work on *The Principles of Sociology* which promises to stand in the front rank, perhaps the very first position, among the books on this subject in America. I certainly recall no work of equal pretensions and seriousness on this side of the Atlantic and attempting also to lay the foundations of this much debated science. A man is in danger of being accused of audacity in undertaking the task, but he who reads the present work will not fail to discover all the modesty necessary to give weight to the discussion and all the mastery necessary to obtain or enforce an honorable hearing for a complicated problem. It is the frank admission of the author that the subject must be clearly defined and distinguished from the other sciences or be abandoned, which forbids the critic's use of controversy on the subject as a vantage ground for making reprisals and inspires confidence in the result without being held in any way to the acceptance of the definition and conception of the subject beyond its empirical import. Not that this statement implies any difference with the author on the matter of definition, but only that his profound appreciation of the difficulties of the subject, on the one hand, and his decided modification of the conception of sociology as a physical science, on the other, are facts which enable us to accept and value results without interpreting them in the light of the Comtean philosophy which, in its exaltation of the purely physical method, its dogmatism and negations, was about as bad as the false metaphysics which it so heartily, and perhaps successfully, opposed. Professor Giddings seems to be more thoroughly impressed with the difficulty of defining the subject than either Comte or Spencer, and evidently sympathizes with their adverse opinion of metaphysics, which I think is not necessary in the case — not because it is important to reconcile metaphysics and sociology, but because one needs neither to invoke its aid nor to excite its opposition in sociological matters considered from the "scientific" point of view. This is especially true after admitting "subjective explanations" to a place in the science, as Professor Giddings does. With this declaration that the objective method is insufficient or false there is hardly enough of Comte left to quarrel about, and the enormous power here attributed to consciousness as a motive force only paves the way for any amount of philosophy and metaphysics that the analysis of its content, meaning, and relations may suggest. No doubt it was the insufficiency of the Com-

tean method which created the difficulty with the conception of sociology maintained by him and his school, but while that fault is corrected by the admission of subjective principles and of an influence not ascribed to them by Comte the matter of definition is not thereby helped, but rather greatly complicated. But it is not the definition alone that gives trouble; this is produced fully as much by the basic principle and method involved in the investigation of the phenomena concerned. The definition may distinguish the subject from other sciences and determine whether sociology shall be an independent science among others connected with the same phenomena, but the principle and method will decide the manner in which social products shall be viewed; that is, whether the subject shall be classed as a "natural" or a "moral" science, and it is this question which is most interesting to the philosophic student.

I do not propose here to enter upon any extended examination of the contents of Professor Giddings' book. They will speak for themselves wherever the work is read, and will probably do for the whole circle of social organisms what Bryce's *American Commonwealth* has done for American institutions, and all this will be independent of the technical, scientific, and philosophical formulas upon which the discussion rests. My purpose is not criticism of the work before me. I intend mainly to examine the difficulties which attend the effort to fix the nature, limits, and method of sociology, using Professor Giddings' first chapters as a text for that purpose. It is the fundamental conceptions of the subject that possess the chief interest, because of their connection with the larger problems of the universe, while the practical value of results and subordinate details as truths will remain the same whatever the conclusion about principles and method. The subject of sociology was born in a conflict of empirical or positive science with philosophy and still perpetuates some of the antagonism which characterized its origin, and the question that remains today is not whether that hostility to metaphysics ever was or is still justifiable, because it is not necessary either to affirm or deny this opinion, but whether a definition of sociology, its nature and method, requires us to give Comte's position anything more than a historical value; that is, whether the subject may not be defined and circumscribed independently of all historical controversies. We think Professor Giddings actually accomplishes this, and it is his greatest merit that he has done so, though frequent references and remarks show that he has

not consciously or wholly emancipated himself from the associations and implications of the philosophic disputes in which sociological science took its rise. The fact or principle that secures this emancipation, for himself and those who follow in the same line, is the assertion that sociology is a branch of psychology, not of physics, or sustains the same relation to it as physiology sustains to physics. If psychology be reducible to physics, then the Comtean position returns, but there is no attempt in Professor Giddings' work to make this reduction and the consequence is that the differentiation introduces a new principle and changes the venue of the controversy. A few words, then, in regard to the contents of the work are all that is necessary before entering upon our main task.

The fundamental principle of sociology, according to Professor Giddings, is *the consciousness of kind.* This is a psychological datum, and introduces the subjective as opposed to the objective basis of the science. It is the attractive force which originates the groups of organic beings in social communities. Hence the products of this motive agency are called *voluntary associations.* The order of their development has been zoögenic, anthropogenic, ethnogenic, and demogenic. These associations constitute the field of sociological inquiry. By the consciousness of kind is meant the interest of the individual in other individuals of the same kind, an interest which quickly terminates in some form of coöperative effort, and so it represents an internal as opposed to an external principle of aggregation.[1]

[1] Some of the author's critics dispute the existence of the "consciousness of kind," and others its originality. But as the present discussion does not depend upon the issue of this question I do not feel called upon to decide regarding it one way or the other. I may, however, with propriety, allude to an equivocation in the phrase, common to all similar phrases in psychology, which may occasion misunderstanding on both sides, and which enables me to accept what I apprehend is Professor Giddings' intended meaning. This equivocation may arise in two ways and complicate very much the meaning of the expression. First, there is the difference of conception which may be occasioned now by the subjective and now by the objective interpretation of the "genitive" construction, "of kind." Second, there is the still more important difference between the conception that the "consciousness" is *instinctive or unreflective* and that it is *apperceptive or reflective.* Now, "consciousness of kind" may denote "*a consciousness in which the object* IS *of the same kind,*" where there is the instinctive distinction between objects and an aggregation or association of the same kind without any knowledge or perception that this conscious distinction exists. On the other hand, "consciousness of kind" may denote "*a consciousness* THAT *the object is of the same kind,*" where knowledge has reached the reflective and apperceptive stage. These two forms of consciousness are wholly different in nature, and the latter

The fundamental question with most thinkers has been, not whether there is any such a thing as sociology, but whether it is a science or not. The first supposition can be granted from any point of view, if only as a genus for the several branches of inquiry into the various institutions of political, economic, and ethical life. But the real controversy begins when the attempt is made to consider it as a science, by which is usually meant that it is either an exact science or is governed by the methods of the so-called "natural" sciences. Then, after it is defined, the next problem is to determine its place in the classification of the sciences, which also proceeds as a corollary from the definition of it. Professor Giddings is emphatic in regarding sociology as a science, but feels that this position requires justification, a feeling which is no doubt caused by the difficulties originating in that attitude of mind which contrasts science and metaphysics, on the one hand, and affiliates physics and morals on the other. The difficulties in the matter, it seems to me, are due wholly to the reflection from Comtean speculations and the impetus given to objective and exact methods (which so generally define "science") by the principles of mathematics and physics from the time of Descartes. I see no reason to defend or apologize for the definition of sociology as a science, except that conception of "science" which determines a method opposed to the psychological and moral sciences. Now it is quite noticeable that Professor Giddings does not unravel the equivocations lying in the term "science," and hence whatever controversy he may get into with the opponents of Comte will be due wholly to the questions that are begged in the multifarious uses of that term. There are statements where he speaks of "exact and positive" method, and where he affiliates scientific method with the principles regulating the physical and objective sciences, and these lead even his own speculations away

may not exist where the former does. The former conception may well describe the psychological principle which determines the unity of the social instincts, for this is all that the "consciousness of kind" is or pretends to be, so far as I understand it. Consequently, as a dynamic principle to explain social organisms, wherever found, I like the conception, though it must not be confused with the different conception implied in the rational stage of development where the association is *deliberatively* voluntary and precognitive of the remote object to be attained. It is not this principle, however, that gives the philosophic character to the author's book. This character comes from the attempt either to give unity to phenomena of different kind where the principle is not adequate for the purpose, or to discuss the phenomena of the same kind from points of view virtually excluded by the definition and the method to which the author limits himself.

from the psychological basis of his subject, though they do so unconsciously and create difficulties which might just as well have been treated as ghosts. But it is not the spirit of his doctrine that would confuse sociology with the purely physical sciences, and hence it is not this importation that determines my remarks. I have in view only the language which exposes the author to unfair criticism on the part of less philosophic readers who may not detect the implications of his psychological principle, but assimilate all too easily the associations of the general discussion with mechanical conceptions of "science." Hence I must think that the main difficulties in the way of determining the nature and method of sociology would be easily removed by an accurate definition of the various uses of the term science, which recognize the differentiation of method as we pass from one field of phenomena to another.

There has been a like difficulty in defining the subject of ethics. Many refuse to regard it as a science at all, especially those who take their conception of the term from physical science and its method. Others, who view the term as denoting any body of coördinated facts and generalizations, would readily call ethics a science. Hence, in deference to this dispute and the controversy connected with it, Professor Sidgwick, after stating the difference between the method of *explanation* characteristic of most sciences and the method of *validation* characteristic of certain philosophic studies, admirably remarks that "it is merely a verbal question whether we shall apply the name 'science' to such systematic studies as ethics and politics." It is precisely the same with sociology. It depends wholly upon our conception of "science" whether we shall define sociology under it, and the question is by no means a trifling one because it is verbal. Even logomachies may involve profound principles in their quarrels. The dispute is not so much about words as it is about the principles and methods that shall be assumed and denoted by them. If the term science were univocal this fact would be perfectly apparent, but its equivocal import seems to make the question *merely* verbal while concealing the seriousness of the problem of principle and method. Two of the several meanings of the term will suffice to prove this claim. First, it may denote any systematic knowledge which is the result of investigation and the coördination of facts, laws, or truths, no matter what the phenomena. This conception enables us to call logic, æsthetics, ethics, economics, politics,—as well as physics or chemistry,—

sciences. In this sense, even metaphysics, *pace* Comte, becomes a science. On the other hand, the second meaning is much more specific, and implies something about the kind of causes with which the subject deals. In this, science is the explanation of phenomena by their "natural" causes. Now it is certain that under this conception logic, ethics, and politics cannot be "sciences." What, then, of sociology? In which of these senses shall it be called a science?

Professor Giddings' recognition of a psychological principle at the basis of the subject leaves no doubt as to the answer, provided we admit that psychology must be distinguished from physics in its data and method. But the emphasis upon the continuity between sociological laws and the most general laws of the physical universe, the allusions to exact science and the defense of determinism against free will, at least as usually understood, show still the profound influence of physical science and its method upon the speculations of sociological inquiries. Though the objective method is criticised and either discarded or modified by the admission of subjective explanation, the influence of that method is exhibited throughout the discussion and affects the conception taken of psychology and the subjective principle assumed. Hence, in order to understand the issue involved and the effect of philosophic upon sociological theory it will be profitable to examine the growth of that conception of "science" which disparages philosophy and metaphysics, on the one hand, and subordinates sociology to the "natural" sciences, on the other. This will show us the source of present controversies and the extent of their legitimacy.

The conception of science during the Middle Ages was the same as that of philosophy: It was systematic knowledge of any kind, especially of the reasoned form, and took its cue from the Aristotelian logical method modified by the necessities of theology. But the rise of opposition to Aristotle introduced a change of this view which was not formulated and organized until Bacon. The tendency toward a new method of investigation showed itself long before Bacon and Descartes. Roger Bacon, Copernicus, Galileo and others showed by their additions to the positive knowledge of nature that scholastic methods and conceptions had to be abandoned Here the antagonism between scientific and philosophic method had its inception; but it did not take definite shape until Francis Bacon proposed induction for deduction and Descartes formulated so distinctly his system of dualism

in which the antithesis between the physical and mental was so clearly drawn. Descartes definitely handed over all phenomena except those of consciousness to mechanical law and the fatal necessity of its action. Now when we add the method of Galileo and the instaurators of science to the conception of physical law and causation with its rigid exclusion of variable and voluntary choice we find a field sharply drawn off by Cartesian dualism from the moral world, and the opposition between science and philosophy is made clear and distinct. Cartesianism did not feel this antithesis because it still had abundant confidence in philosophic method and the conquests of inductive method were few, while also the supposition of mind distinct from matter provided very clear limits to the principle of mechanical causation and there was no temptation to reduce all phenomena to a single type. Nevertheless a radical difference of method was fixed and only required that one department be called science and the other philosophy or metaphysics in order to change the conception of science from that of *any* systematic knowledge to the systematic knowledge of *necessary* events in the physical world. The consequences, both legitimate and illegitimate, of this generalization will be remarked again. For the present we have to watch the growth of that conception of science which makes it convertible with the method of mechanical causation. The system of Spinoza combined this conception with the method of philosophy and wholly eliminated man's personality and free will from consideration in the problem of speculation. The law of necessity was extended over all phenomena. But a reaction from this position shows itself in Leibnitz and Kant in favor of a territory for free will. In Kant, however, it is noticeable that there are only three general classes of phenomena to be dealt with, and these fall into logic, physics, and ethics. Logic he regards as purely a formal science, systematizing the laws of reasoning, but explaining nothing. Physics, however, deals with all phenomena coming under the law of necessary causation, and ethics with those coming under free causation. It is thus apparent that the freedom of the will is necessary, in his conception, for the existence of ethics at all, and this was most strenuously maintained by him. But Kant everywhere shows in his discussion a keen perception of the wide field abandoned to the physical sciences, and one might even detect or suspect an oppressive fear of them and a belief that they require to be restrained in their ambition to monopolize the explanation of the universe by mechanical

causes, all of which is accomplished by sustaining free will. Even psychology in his classification falls under the method of physical sciences in its empirical aspects, and we see not only a concession of necessary causation and its method to science as opposed to philosophy, but a thorough appreciation of the widely extended and extending field of phenomena which are determined by that method. With the triumph of the Baconian and inductive method as the organon of modern science, and the reduction of so many phenomena in the field of knowledge to the law of mechanical causation, especially under the guidance of evolution where both time and space pour their whole riches into the lap of physical science, we find the term science becoming convertible with objective, external, and mechanical causes, and hence wherever we seek an explanation of phenomena we naturally resort to its suppositions. Comte and Spencer only carry out this tendency in comprehending all phenomena under this one law, and leaving metaphysics, much after the example of Kant, to agnosticism.

Assuming, then, this antithesis between science and philosophy as the common conception, especially among scientists, and making science convertible with necessary and "natural" causes, it is clear what may be implied by calling sociology a "science." The natural implication would be that its phenomena are to be explained by the same laws as in all the physical sciences, modified in statement only, however, to conceal their absurdity. This is practically what Comte and Spencer do, and many others who repudiate free will and accept determinism. But Professor Giddings cuts out this extreme view by rejecting "objective explanations" as inadequate and supplementing them by "subjective explanations," though rejecting the freedom of the will with a peculiar qualification. Here he shows the influence of the school which founded sociology and the still greater influence of the uncritical conception of "science" as convertible only with necessary causes. He still conceives sociology as a "natural" science. He will not go so far as to call it in blank terms a physical science, but he assumes that the method determining this also determines sociology, and this is "natural" law.

Now it is just here that a most interesting illusion or fallacy occurs, which is found in nearly every scientist who talks about "natural" science. I concede the right of a man to define sociology as a science, also as a "natural" science, or even a physical science. All that I exact in the last alternative is that he be consistent and apply univer-

sally the law of mechanical and objective causation and only this. But when it seems too bold to call sociology a physical science the escape from certain difficulties seems to be assured if only we can call it a "natural" science and reduce its phenomena to laws which are supposed to exclude free will without being physical though necessary. But there are two distinct illusions here. The first is the assumption that action according to law, or action conforming to a uniform principle is not free, and the second is that "natural" science necessarily involves the same method as the physical. These require to be examined carefully with their bearing upon sociology, and I shall start with the second instance.

There is no excuse for the confusion of the sociologist in the matter of "natural" science; for even Hume reminded all of us of the ambiguities of the term. He calls attention to three different conceptions of the term to which we may add a fourth closely related to two of these. Hume remarks that we have the distinctions between the *natural* and the *supernatural*, the *natural* and the *moral*, and the *natural* and the *unnatural*. In the first of these "natural" denotes the absence of divine interference for exceptional ends. It may coincide with the physical, with the necessary whether physical or not, or with a regular order of events, but always excludes the idea of special interference denoted by the supernatural. In the second pair of contrasts the term denotes the physical, unconscious, or necessary as opposed to the moral, conscious, and volitional: or, that which is subordinated to objective as the moral is subordinated to subjective and free causation. The third distinction denotes that which harmonizes with the true order of things in contrast with violations of it. The fourth meaning of the term, developed out of the others, is the *uniform and expected* as opposed to the capricious and indeterminate or unexpected. This conception assumes nothing about causes, but is convertible with mere uniformity of coexistence and sequence or law. Now in which of these senses is sociology a "natural" science?

In the first place, no one claims that it is a "natural" as opposed to an "unnatural" science. It is not a science of the conformity to an ideal order or of moral adjustment unless it is to be identified with ethics, which is such a science, and excludes the legitimacy of the unnatural or irrational in the field of volition while the existence of the unnatural in any other field is denied, except as the sporadic and casual. But this implies another meaning for the term; so that in

reference to the distinction implied in the opposition of "natural" and "unnatural" all sciences are natural, including the moral sciences, and without in the least excluding the phenomena of free will. Nor, again, is it "natural" in the sense that it is a physical as opposed to a moral science because its own advocates have abandoned the notion that it is a branch of physics. The admission of "subjective explanation" as opposed to objective does this, unless they assume the theory of materialism, which is only to abandon in the last analysis the principle of "subjective explanation." But certainly there is no confessed determination to make physical and "natural" convertible conceptions, as the term physical is generally understood; so that again the description of sociology as a "natural" science cannot exclude moral phenomena with the implications of free will without admitting the physical and mechanical law of causation which is confessedly eliminated by "subjective explanation" and the abandonment of the term physical. There remains then to consider whether it is a science of "natural" as opposed to "supernatural" phenomena. This is certainly one of its meanings, but the question still remains to know what is implied by such phenomena. Are there two classes of phenomena in the universe, or only one. If there is only one class it must be wholly "natural," or wholly "supernatural." If wholly "supernatural" there can be no "natural" science at all, and this would not be granted by even the most strenuous advocates of the "supernatural." If wholly "natural," then not only are all sciences whatsoever "natural," but no "supernatural" exists, and this is the position of many, if not all scientists, except such as admit a field for metaphysics and theology. But all who believe in this field reject the reduction of all phenomena to one class while the opposing school has still to define what it means by the "natural." This we can determine indirectly by examining what limitations exist in regard to the meaning and implications of the term "supernatural."

Starting with the theological conception we have either a divine *causal* interposition in an order of events that is not divine, or a divine *purposive* adjustment of events within the limits of "natural" causation. In the former sense "supernatural" can only imply an order of causation that is not divine at all, and thus sets up a dualism inconsistent with monotheism which supposes a causal relation between God and the "natural," as well as the "supernatural." Consistency, then, will not allow theology to limit God's causal activity to the

"supernatural" if it is to be responsible for the "natural." *It must also permit the same causal or volitional, or causal and volitional, relation to both classes of phenomena.* But this is to abandon the qualitative difference between them and to reduce all phenomena to one class. The distinction may still remain, but only to denote a difference in the *law* of their action, and not of their *nature*. This is the second of the above alternatives where theological principles cannot be supposed to exclude the causal, but only to express adjustment to an end or purpose which may be either *constant* or *casual*. Hence the only distinction between the "natural" and the "supernatural" which can bear any criticism whatever is that one denotes the *constant* course or law of events, and the other the *occasional* or sporadic; the one denoting the frequent and common, and the other the infrequent and uncommon. This is only to say that metaphysics and science cannot ultimately be opposed to each other except on the terms that theology and philosophy adopt that system of metaphysical dualism which is expressed morally in Manicheism, but which it seems no one is prepared to assert. Theology may be the science of the uncommon, if you like, but it can never antagonize science on this basis, because it assumes the qualitative identity of the two fields of phenomena, and its sole object can be to determine either the teleological meaning of the world without antagonizing the ætiological explanation of it, or the evidential significance of exceptional, casual, or sporadic phenomena either for teleological purpose, or for an extension of ætiological principles. But in no case can it oppose the "natural" without virtually extinguishing itself or admitting a class of phenomena out of all causal relation to God. Sociology, then, may be a "natural" science in either alternative, though it will mean more in one case than the other. If the qualitative difference between the "natural" and the "supernatural" be granted and the "natural" be excluded from a causal relation to the absolute, then sociology as a "natural" science must exclude all reference or connection with theological assumptions and principles. But if this difference between the two classes of phenomena be not granted, then there is no necessary or logical opposition between the two modes of investigation, unless it be necessary to deny the existence of one or the other class of events. If there be no "supernatural" phenomena, then sociology must be of the "natural" along with all sciences; if there be no "natural" events, then sociology, like all science, must be of the "supernatural." In

either case the commonly assumed antithesis between science and philosophy breaks down, and the supposition that sociology is a "natural" science becomes a truism because the distinction between "natural" and "supernatural" phenomena cannot be drawn qualitatively without either denying the unity of the universe or the existence of one or the other class of events.

Assuming, therefore, that there is no qualitative difference between the "natural" and the "supernatural" respecting their relation to the law of causality, we come next to the three possible meanings of the term "natural," which will bring us to the only one that eliminates philosophic problems and difficulties. They are: (1) physical as opposed to mental phenomena; (2) necessary as opposed to moral causes; (3) uniformity of coexistence and sequence as opposed to irregularity and caprice.

It must be remarked that these three meanings show a growth in breadth and extension which it is important to consider. In the first, "natural" is synonymous with physical causes, and does not cover mental causes however independent of free agency they may be, but excludes moral causes. The second generalizes the term to include both physical or mechanical causation and the causes of mental phenomena supposed to be as far removed from volitions as physical events, and so is expressed by necessary laws. The only field left for freedom is volitions or moral phenomena. The first antithesis is between matter and mind; the second antithesis is between necessity and freedom. In the third case the generalization is still further widened to include the common characteristic of physical causation, necessary causation, and free rational causation. This is action according to law, or uniformity of coexistence and sequence. Here the antithesis is not between necessity and freedom, necessary and free causation, but between regularity and lawlessness. "Natural," then, may mean either the physical or the necessary (determined), or the uniform and regular.

In terms of the first antithesis sociology cannot be a "natural" science because of three facts. *First*, according to Professor Giddings it is a branch of psychology. *Second*, it must admit "subjective explanation" and method which physics does not. *Third*, the phenomena to be explained in social institutions are *voluntary* associations, phenomena of will, or volitions, and no physical phenomena are voluntary. In the second antithesis sociology can be a "natural"

science only on the condition that it deny the freedom of the will. It comprehends voluntary events, as we have seen, but these must be brought under determinism or the law of necessary causation in order, by the supposition, to be called "natural." This view simply denies the existence, not the conception, of free events. Now, it must be admitted that Spencer, Comte, Professor Giddings, and this school generally, are consistent at this point. They all deny the freedom of the will. One might ask why the last mentioned writer does so after admitting the inadequacy of objective methods and the fact that social associations are voluntary. But since it may not be objective, but subjective determinism that is maintained, we may readily grant his consistency in the premises, so far as the free-will controversy is concerned, but ask whether, in other connections, he has any right to the doctrine of necessary causation according to the terms of the empirical philosophy from which he starts. This is a most important question, and requires careful examination.

In answering the questions here proposed I must go back to the fundamental principles of the empirical philosophy, and state its development. A brief statement will suffice, and we begin with Locke who is the founder of the method. He traces all knowledge to experience, and our scientists and political philosophers are wont to reiterate this doctrine and its truth *ad nauseum*. I shall not dispute it. The doctrine is perfectly harmless until we come to state what is given in experience and what are its limitations. Now Locke made experience to consist of sensations and certain simple ideas of "reflection" (self-consciousness), and among them the ideas of *succession*. But among the "complex ideas" which were the products of the active understanding, and which were not given as such in experience, was that of *causality* and *necessary* connection. Locke had also said that "complex ideas" did not correspond with reality, but were "fictitious," that is, abstract creations of the mind. Now on the basis of these statements, Hume, in his inimitable way, played havoc with Locke's empiricism, and his followers and admirers have never known enough about philosophy to see it. What Hume did was this: *He showed that it was impossible on Locke's philosophy and on all empirical principles to admit a doctrine of causality or necessary connections.* He simply resolves the empirical philosophy of Locke into a contradiction, and this in the following manner:

Hume shows us that, at least according to Locke, experience can

give us only coexistence and sequence, that is, the fact of the uniformity of nature, and that the causal nexus or necessary connection is something more than and different from the mere fact or uniformity of coexistence and sequence. Now if the idea of causality, whose existence as a datum of consciousness is an admitted fact, be more than a fiction of the understanding or more than a pseud-idea, then, not being given in experience, the empirical philosophy is not adequate to the demands made upon it. It turns out that some of our ideas are not derived from experience. But if we stand by the principles of experience and limit them to the phenomena of coexistence and sequence, we must reject the legitimacy of all causality and necessary connection, and in this way our only data of knowledge would be the uniformity of nature. Its laws are only uniformities, not causes. The latter, whether necessary or free, are equally excluded from knowledge and from all consideration in the investigations of science. The empiricists have been consistent only when they have remained within the charmed circle of facts and have refused to talk about necessary connection, which, I am sorry to say, has not often occurred. To say nothing of Hume, who ought to be treated as a skeptic, not as an empiricist, Comte, Spencer, Mill, Huxley, and their compeers are emphatic in affirming that all knowledge is limited to experience, and experience to phenomena. Mill and Comte are careful to define phenomena as nothing more than invariable coexistence and sequence. Mill rejects necessity or necessary connection as a fiction if it means more than invariable relation, and Huxley admits that it cannot be deduced from experience. Spencer implies the same in his admission of the Comtean postulates, though he is always talking about causes and is not even aware of the problem proposed by his empirical foundation. With this limitation of knowledge to experience and phenomena or mere invariable law, not one of this school is entitled to suppose or to talk about causes. These are not given in their original data and method, and it is only bringing in by the back door the metaphysics which they had thrown out of the front door, when they introduce explanation of any kind by causes. Their whole philosophy makes them totally ignorant of causes, not only in the form of metaphysical entities but also in the form of *necessary* connection, because these cannot be deduced from mere fact or *actual* connection. They go beyond their premises when they suppose causal or necessary connection of any sort whatsoever. It will be apparent, therefore, from this that this

school of philosophers have no basis upon which to combat the freedom of the will, which they claim it is so necessary to do in order to make sociology a natural science. They are equally debarred from asserting or defending determinism, which is simply necessary as opposed to free causation. All that their own conception of the "natural" requires of them is invariable fact, and it is a work of metaphysical supererogation to affirm or deny either necessary or free causation. Sociological science must be independent of both of these doctrines if it be limited to the assumptions of the empirical philosophy. Comte, Spencer, and Mill, therefore, are wholly outside their province in basing sociology upon determinism. Not that they require to admit freedom as the alternative of denying them the right to determinism, but that they are not concerned with either of them unless they abandon their empirical principles.

The consequence of this argument is that in the second antithesis implied by the term "natural," as denoting necessary as opposed to free moral causation, this school has no right to regard sociology as a "natural" science, for the reason that their philosophical premises do not allow them to suppose the necessary causation which their term "natural" is assumed to express. They can call it a "natural" science only when the term consists with the fundamental principles of their doctrine and denotes nothing more than the uniformity of nature (which, according to Mill, is wholly distinct from the uniformity of causation). This eliminates the right and the obligation to discuss necessary or free causation and reduces the doctrine to a consistent one. The only question that remains is, whether Professor Giddings accepts the postulates of this philosophy. If he does not, his conception of sociology as a "natural" science, implying that it has to do with the necessary causes of social phenomena, is perfectly consistent with the denial of freedom. On the other hand, if he accept that philosophy, the discussion of both determinism and freedomism is wholly unnecessary and irrelevant.

Not to say anything of the many statements that imply an acceptance of Comte, Mill, and Spencer on this point, there is one passage (p. 145) defining the philosophy at the basis of science which commits Professor Giddings to the empirical conception of knowledge. "The scientific tradition," he says, after summarizing Comte's three stages of development and rejecting all but the positive, "is the sum of our actual knowledge of the world and of man, as distinguished from our

conjectures about them. It is the sifted record of observations, experiments, and classifications. Making an attempt to penetrate the final mystery of existence, it explains the constitution of the world only to the extent of showing how one thing is related to other things in sequence and in coexistence." Assuming then that this is an adoption of empirical conceptions regarding experience and phenomena, the introduction of determinism and opposition to freedom is exposed to the objection already indicated, so that the only way in which sociology can be called a "natural" *science* is to confine the meaning of "natural" and "science" to the uniformities of phenomena, their laws and not their causes. This is the meaning of the term in the third antithesis discussed, and excludes all obligations to consider the causes of volition, whether necessary or free. Any other conception of the case makes the subject a philosophy and metaphysics, not a "science," nor a "natural" science as limited to experience and phenomena.

But I shall not press the charge of inconsistency between Professor Giddings' acceptance of empiricism and his defense of determinism. This is a vantage ground to which we can always return when any opposition is taken to metaphysics and when causal connection is assumed upon a basis of nothing but phenomenal facts and their coexistent or sequential relation. Aside from this the consistency is more apparent, because, whether legitimate or not, the fact of causal connection is assumed and perpetually used as the sole principle of explanation, precisely as it is with Spencer, and this may justify the attempt to bring social phenomena under determinism and so to call the subject "natural" science with that implication in view. But then what is gained by this consistency is lost by another difficulty. What is gained by calling the subject "natural" is lost by calling it "science." The inclusion of causality among its data or rather principles, and the fact that there is no possibility of finding this conception among the primary elements of experience as limited to phenomena and mere matters of fact, only converts the subject into philosophy and makes sociology amenable to a method which was presumably excluded by the antithesis between "science" and metaphysics. "Science" in this way would again assume its older import of systematic knowledge and would not be convertible merely with the empirical laws of nature.

I may state now the main object of this careful historical and logical examination of the terms "science" and "natural." This object was

to point out the following facts: (1) That the only intelligible opposition that could be established between "science" and philosophy must construe "science" and *physical* causation as convertible and opposed to free causation. (2) That the only consistent conception of the positive sciences from the standpoint of empiricism is that they are concerned only with the uniformities of coexistence and sequence, and have no logical right to the principle of necessary connection expressed in causality. (3) That sociology, in so far as it is only a science, a positive and empirical science as distinct from philosophy, has nothing to do with either determinism or freedomism. (4) That the disposition of sociologists to carry the principles of physical science into social and moral phenomena originates from a very common fallacy on the part of scientific men; namely, to carry by association the principles and predicates of a narrower meaning in a term along with its generalization or growth in comprehension.

This last fact can be illustrated in a very simple manner. Take the term "animal." We cannot transfer all the predicates and implications of this term "animal" as distinguished from man over to the same term *including* man except by making the term "man" convertible with "animal." This could be very copiously illustrated from the classifications of science, but I shall be content with the one instance mentioned and proceed to show how these limitations have been transcended in the discussions of sociology. To do so I recur to the three meanings of the terms "natural science." They are: (1) physical or objective causation, opposed to subjective; (2) necessary causation, including both subjective and objective, but excluding free agency; (3) uniformity of sequence and coexistence, without reference to any form of causation whatever. The generalization of the conception "natural science" proceeds from the first to the third. Now when the differential feature of "natural science" in its first signification is physical or objective causation, this predicate cannot be carried over to subjective phenomena included in the wider meaning of the same term denoting necessary causation except by identifying objective and subjective causation, which even our sociologist refuses to do. Nevertheless he uses the language and associations of objective determinism when explaining social phenomena after excluding physical causes from the first place in his problem. When we come to the third meaning of the term this fallacy is still more apparent. When "natural science" denotes only the uniformity of events or the facts of expe-

rience in terms of general laws, we cannot transfer to these phenomena the predicates and principles which distinguished either physical or psychical determinism, because the generalization makes the conception indifferent to every form of causal agency whatsoever. Yet this is precisely the fallacy committed when carrying the principles of determinism over to the field of "natural science" limited by its very definition to the empirical laws and uniformities of all phenomena whatsoever. This would not be a fallacy, however, if all the phenomena were qualitatively alike. But in this case the sociologist admits the difference between the objective and the subjective, and yet carries his differentia along with him when increasing the extension and decreasing the intension of his conceptions. It is no wonder that he gets into difficulties about defining the province, principles, and method of his science. Playing with equivocations will always do this. Our first duty is always to know the limits placed upon the implications of our conceptions.

The principle of logical limitations which I have here announced is an absolutely fundamental one, and unless strictly observed would allow the proof of anything from anything. As illustrated it may be formulated as follows: *Differentiæ cannot follow the extension of the conferentiæ (common qualities) when the extension is connected with qualitative differences in the species.* But among our sociologists we have found that the growth of extension in the conception of "natural science," which assumes only the common qualities of phenomena differentially distinguished by them, and which is convertible with experience or mere matters of fact—that this growth of extension is nevertheless, in defiance of the law enunciated, accompanied by the connection of predicates that are excluded both by this growth and by the express distinction between the objective and the subjective. I have shown how this principle is violated in connection with the conceptions of causality and determinism, and I now refer to another illustration of it which implies the same conception. It is the appropriation of Spencer's doctrine attempting to reduce all phenomena to modes of physical motion and then using this general formula for the explanation of the highest stages of evolution.

In discussing the law and cause of the social process, Professor Giddings, adopting the conceptions of Spencer familiar to all of us, says: "Social evolution is but a phrase of cosmic evolution. All social energy is transmitted physical energy. The conversion of physical

into social energy is inevitable, and it necessarily occasions those orderly changes in groupings and relationships that constitute development" (p. 363). "Social phenomena then depend on the transformation and the equivalence of physical energies. The quantity and the intensity of social activity are proportional to the energy taken from the environment by the social body and transmitted into organic phenomena" (p. 366). Throughout the chapter stating the physical process incident to social evolution there is constant reference to said adoptions of Spencer's formulas which purport to lay down the primary causes of all subsequent development of the universe, one might almost say from star dust. Mr. Spencer's doctrine also that the persistence of force is a necessity of thought is accepted and reaffirmed.

Now I am not at present going to dispute the truth of these statements. For present purposes they can be assumed to be true. But what I want first to remark is that they are propositions that wholly transcend the limitations of empirical science, and they also wholly transcend every conception of "natural" science as universally defined and distinguished from philosophy. There are, therefore, six counts to be made against either the legitimacy or the necessity of this procedure, and made also without disputing the truth of the law of causality, though I reserve the right to question the existence of any such law whatever in the universe.

(1) There is one statement that takes a remarkably retrospective view of the universe looking to ultimate and first causes. This is the reduction of all phenomena to physical energy which in its elementary and undifferentiated form must have existed only at some remotely indefinite period, unquestionably rivaling in age and remoteness from the present order the theologian's God. This is simply a reinstatement of the "first" and "second causes" which Comte had so summarily kicked out of court. The tracing of the phenomena of existence to some ultimate unity, both in time and space, after the manner of Plato's search for "the idea," is nothing more nor less than the attempt to restore metaphysics under the name of "science," and it serves very well to dupe those whom we wish to divert from certain beliefs by saying that they are not scientific. It is certainly very strange, however, that so many people can be induced to reverence the same old idol, if only we change its name. But this hunting for the remote cause of all differentiated phenomena and organisms in a

single type of force is certainly the restoration of a first cause, minus certain theological implications, and is accomplished by precisely the same metaphysical method which empirical science has so long affected to despise. I do not dispute the right to do this, *but it is not science*, and certainly if we are going to explain social phenomena in terms of, or by reference to, this ultimate force, physical energy and the readjustment of matter and motion, we should give rise to about as queer a philosophy or "science" as we often remark in those naïve minds who can always discover the purposes of Providence in all the little trifles of life. This is precisely what Comte and his school would prevent and they are right. General abstract formulas, however true, are of little value in concrete cases, and should be eschewed by strict scientific method. They are legitimate enough in metaphysics where we are seeking the unity of the universe, but it is no part of a concrete science like sociology either to determine or to assert it. Ultimate causes are no part of its province or method and it is only arrogating the functions of philosophy to undertake this.

(2) There is also a prospective statement in the passage quoted which deserves a passing notice, because of its wide departure from everything that characterizes true scientific method and its philosophic use of causality. This is the statement that "the conversion of physical into social energy is inevitable." This is *a priori* and prophetic philosophy with a vengeance. This statement does not wait for experience, but places us at the beginning of evolution and enables us to predict its outcome in social energy. Tyndall's "promise and potency of life" in primordial matter is nothing to this. Here it also has the "promise and potency" of social institutions, and we have only to put ourselves at the point of the absolute physical energy and deduce from it all the particulars of existence after the manner of Spinoza and Hegel. Is it any wonder that President Patton once remarked that Spencer is Hegel upside down? From the truth of this formula it is very easy to determine the question whether the Moon and Mars are, ever were, or ever will be inhabited. We may not be able to say that they are now, but if not now inhabited, they either were so at one time or are certain to be in the future. Is this the way "natural" *science* goes to work, and is this to be the outcome of the study of sociology?

But this is hardly fair. It is chargeable with being caricature and it is not my purpose here to defend such an interpretation of this statement. I concede the author his right of interpretation and I sus-

pect I should wholly agree with him when that was given. But on the one hand I could not resist the temptation to indulge a little humor and exaggeration at the expense of Professor Giddings' language taken literally, and on the other I wished more seriously to emphasize the departure from scientific method and data involved in such general propositions, wholly unnecessary to the object which sociology as a science must propose to itself.

(3) There is one more clear departure from scientific method as based upon experience. This is the assumption of necessities of thought outside the laws of identity, contradiction, and sufficient reason. These being purely formal may be readily enough assumed by empiricism, though I shall not assert even this. But anything like the material law expressed in the persistence of force as a thought necessity ought to be extremely questionable when we look at history and find that large numbers of people, who accepted the law of identity and contradiction, have firmly believed in the destructibility of matter. But I shall not dispute the view that the persistence of force is a necessity of thought; for it may or may not be true so far as I am concerned here. It is certain, however, that this view transcends empiricism and "natural" science which awaits experience for its truths and generalizations. Nothing has been more widely accepted among the defenders of science, as distinguished from philosophy, than the antithesis between *a priori* and empirical principles and the limitation of true scientific method to the latter. An author is at liberty to reverse this belief at any time, but he can no longer refer invidiously to metaphysics and philosophy.

(4) I come now to the logical criticism which I set out to mention in taking up the passage which I have quoted. It is the contradiction between the distinction, on the one hand, of subjective and objective, and the transfer of physical implications to social phenomena, on the other. The statement that "social evolution is but a phase of cosmic evolution" may be true, and I admit that it is, but it is not legitimate to transfer the implications, as most persons do, of the general principle of physical energy to social phenomena, as is done in transmuting the former into the latter. "Cosmic evolution," "cosmic energy," and primordial physical energy are all but universally made convertible with *objective causation*, and when they are not they have no meaning whatever for the explanation of social phenomena. But when conceived as objective or physical causation they have decided interest

because of the antagonism to the freedom of the will and the simplicity of the principle with which to explain everything. Assuming then that "cosmic evolution" is convertible with objective and physical causation, we find that this is a specific and differential predicate involved in the conception of a certain class of phenomena, and hence that the transfer of this conception to social phenomena, another species, cannot be legitimately made unless we identify social with physical phenomena, which is not done in the work under notice. On the contrary, the distinction between objective and subjective causation is drawn so that social phenomena are distinguished from the physical, and hence the conception of "cosmic evolution" cannot be applied to both classes of phenomena except as a conception that is indifferent alike to objective and subjective causation. Put in terms of logic the fallacy in such a case is the attempt to argue from species to species, to transfer the differential predicate of one species to another as a conferentia. This is never allowable with a *qualitative*, but only with a *quantitative* difference between groups of phenomena. It may be true that social institutions are subject to the law of physical causation, but this position cannot be maintained with a qualitative distinction between objective and subjective methods of explanation. One or the other must be sacrificed.

(5) The next consideration is a most important one for this whole discussion. It is that this formula identifying cosmic and social evolution must get its meaning wholly from the solution of the controversy between the *monistic* and the *atomistic* philosophers; or if not the controversy, certainly the conception and antithesis between them. The force of the claim for their identification comes from the assumption of monism which Spencer so emphatically affirms; but then the difficulties that arise come from the assumption of atomism which he also makes, and there are certain conceptions of these two systems which make them absolutely incompatible with each other. Let us examine carefully the principles of these two systems.

Monism is the philosophy which asserts or supposes that there is only one force, or at least one kind of force in the universe, substance, reality, or whatever we choose to call it, and that all things and phenomena in time and space are forms of this ultimate reality. But as indicated in this statement there are two kinds of monism; one that this force is only one and continuous, or homogeneous, in time and space, and the other that though one in kind it may represent any

number of discrete units differing not in kind, but in form or quantity. The former is the Eleatic and Spinozistic type of monism, and the latter the Lucretian and Leibnitzian type. On the other hand, atomism is the philosophy which asserts or supposes that the ultimate forces of the world are discrete elements, and that all things are the result of various combinations of these elements. But there are also two forms of atomism: one that the units or atoms are the same in kind, homogeneous and qualitatively identical, but different in quantity, form, weight, etc., and the other that they are qualitatively different in kind, or heterogeneous. The former is the Lucretian and Leibnitzian type of atomism, and the latter either has no special historical representatives or is found among those scientists who hold to the intransmutability of the elements into each other, some seventy or more in number. Now the first thing to be observed in these divisions is that in conception of the ultimate reality one form of monism is identical with one form of atomism. A real difference arises only between the theory of homogeneity of kind and the theory of heterogeneity of kind. I shall call the former pantheistic or universalistic monism, and the latter individualistic or qualitatively differential atomism. Individualistic monism and monistic atomism will stand for the same thing, and must ultimately involve the same merits and the same difficulties. The two types, however, which are here opposed to each other, I shall distinguish, for brevity's sake, as monism and atomism.

Now the fundamental difficulty with pure monism of the Eleatic and Spinozistic type is that it has no principle of differentiation except the quantitative, so that all other differences or conceived differences must be interpreted as illusions. The supposed qualitative differences among organisms are simply illusory, they being identical in reality. On the other hand, atomism, as here defined and limited to the differential type can account for the supposed qualitative differences of phenomena and organism. The intermediate system of Leibnitz and the Greek atomists must struggle with the same problem as monism, and either deny the existence of qualitative differences, making such as appear to be these purely illusory and explainable by quantitative relations, or admit qualitative differences in the monads or atoms.[1] But

[1] Leibnitz differs from Lucretius and the Greek atomists in that he regards the monads from the idealistic point of view and anticipates Boscovitch's conception of points of force. But independently of this difference, which is epistemological, not metaphysical, his conception is the same as that of the atomists.

that pure monism is unable to explain differentiation, except by declaring it an illusion (and this must awaken suspicion in regard to the conviction of monism itself), is sustained by Clerk Maxwell within the field of physics, when he says that a theory of perfect homogeneity or continuity will not account for the properties of bodies as we know them.

Now Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the transmutation of physical into all other forms of energy is regarded by him as but an illustration of the persistency of force, this last being the universal formula of existence and an attempt to explain all phenomena in terms of monism. But when he comes to explain the differences which are found existing between phenomena or groups of them he resorts to a process of change from homogeneity into heterogeneity. How such a process is possible on the doctrine of continuity is not shown and may be seriously questioned. If he make heterogeneity an illusion (as Schopenhauer virtually does) he can make out his case. But he nowhere asserts such a fact. On the other hand, his doctrine explaining all phenomena, or organic and inorganic complexes, by a redistribution of matter and motion, assumes the atomic theory, and explains heterogeneity, or differentiation, by heterogeneity in the elements.

Now, according to the law of continuity, whether static or dynamic, there can be no transmutation of physical into social energy if the latter differs in kind from the former, and, according to the principle of differentiation, social energy, if qualitatively different from the physical, cannot be explained by it. The physical may be one of its component elements, but does not constitute the differentia. If the social be only quantitatively different from the physical, Spencer's system will be adequate. But the sociology under review insists upon the distinction between objective causes and subjective causes. Objective or physical determinism means causation outside of the subject in which the action occurs; subjective or psychical determinism means causation by the subject whose the action is. These two causes may coöperate, but they are absolutely distinct in kind, and there is nothing in the law of homogeneity or continuity to indicate the possible transmutation of the physical into the psychical, the mechanical into the voluntary. But if the principle of heterogeneity be admitted to be quite as primordial as that of homogeneity, there will be a means of explaining the admitted differences between physical and social action without either denying the law of continuity on the one hand

or affirming the transmutation of the physical into the psychical on the other. The only alternative to this will be to declare all qualitative differences in the universe to be illusions, and with them the falsity of the distinction between objective and subjective causes.

(6) This failure of pure monism to explain all phenomena without denying the fact of qualitative differentiation or heterogeneity raises the question why the temptation exists to seek such an ultimate explanation. The answer to this is that the tendency exists partly from an instinctive disposition to seek the unity of all phenomena and partly from the confusion of the unity of nature with its uniformity. Man is not content with mere facts, but wishes also to ascertain their causes, and once set a-going in this direction he will not stop short of an ultimate philosophy. But in the process he often forgets the distinction between science and metaphysics, between the laws of phenomena and their ultimate material cause. Now Mr. Spencer, with his philosophy, is in search of the unity of nature, and thus goes far beyond the limits of science, which require, not the transmutation of one force into another as its explanatory principle, but the uniformity of nature and causation without regard to material unity.

The unity and the uniformity of nature are not convertible conceptions, though they may be closely connected with each other. Uniformity might exist without unity. In fact, the uniformity of nature is perfectly compatible with chaos. Not so with its unity: this excludes chaos. There are, however, two forms of this unity. They are the ontological and the teleological. Ontological unity is the material sameness of the force at the basis of all phenomena; teleological unity is the coöperative adjustment of the parts of a whole to a single end. The uniformity of nature is merely the constancy of certain relations and qualities, and does not require any speculation in regard to metaphysical or moral unity in things. Now the study of the unity of nature belongs to metaphysics; the study of its uniformity belongs to science. When we attempt to reduce social to physical energy we are endeavoring to determine the unity of nature, and this is wholly unnecessary to our science. This is especially true after having admitted that the phenomena of social life are qualitatively different from the physical. The unity in that case will be indifferent to our purpose. Moreover, with the qualitative distinction there will be no necessary obligation to go beyond the limits of the *social* elements for the uniformity which we seek. The uniformity of nature at large would

not explain the differentia. But passing this by and assuming that this uniformity in nature at large has a value, as it may well have in genetic problems, the important fact to keep in view here is that sociology as a science is not concerned with any theory of metaphysical unity in existence, the ontology and teleology of phenomena, or the transmutation of energy, but only with their uniformities, their phenomenology, and possibly their ætiology. The former is not science, but metaphysics, and possesses all the dubiousness of such a system. It may be true, but it is not a part of scientific method and purpose, unless we break down the distinction between science and philosophy and abandon invidious reflections upon mediæval scholasticism, which it has been the habit of Comte's school to indulge.

Thus far I have not meant to question the fact of the transmutation of physical into social energy, but only to show that such a doctrine is no part of the *science* of sociology, and that we both transgress the distinction between objective and subjective causes and transcend the limits of empirical science when we affirm it. But I wish now to say that this doctrine is either not true or the statement is not an accurate one, and I think I can indicate very clearly the limitations under which it is entitled to legitimate scientific meaning.

I say that the statement that social energy is transmuted physical energy is not strictly accurate, and this can be affirmed on Spencer's own showing, when we understand his method rightly. What it may be meant to affirm I shall not only not question, but very readily admit. If we should say that the *law* governing social energy is the same as that which governs physical energy we should undoubtedly be correct; but this would not be affirming nor assuming the identity of their *cause*. All that we require for science in the case is the *uniformity* of nature, not necessarily its *unity*. Thus I may show that social phenomena illustrate the persistence of force, but this does not in the least imply that the force is physical. I can explain such phenomena by their reduction to law, and even to the same law as physical phenomena; but this procedure does not involve necessarily any identity in their ontological ground. For illustration let me take the French Revolution. We are all familiar with the causes of that social upheaval, and they may be summarized in the tyranny of the monarchy and the bigotry of the church. In the reaction this spirit was not destroyed. It preserved its character intact, but only changed the incidence and direction of its action. This is shown by the tyranny of

the commune on the one hand, and the bigotry of atheism on the other. The conception of sovereignty remained the same, but it was only transferred from the monarch to the people. All the ideas that governed the old régime in its method of using power were transferred intact to the new authorities, and the only change was in the victims of that power. It was the same with the religious order. In the old régime the bigotry of the church was directed against the atheists; in the new régime it was the bigotry of the atheists directed against the church. The only difference was that the immunity of one class was exchanged for that of the other.

Now we have in all this a beautiful example of the persistence of force, or the conservation of energy, but the fact is no evidence that the force is physical, or that it is the transmutation of a physical force. It is only an indication of the uniformity of nature, which may be called the *nomological* as distinct from the *ontological* unity of phenomena. Of course, if there are no differential qualities between the groups the transmutation, if the expression be legitimate at all, can be affirmed. But when the qualitative distinction between social and physical phenomena is affirmed or admitted it is as absurd to apply the doctrine of transmutation between the species as it would be to affirm it between wood and steam. I can weigh the ashes and smoke of burnt wood and find an example of the persistence of force, and I can find a similar example of it in the transformation of water into steam, but I do not see why I should infer from this uniformity of law that these aqueous phenomena were only a transformation of the ligneous. In fact nothing is better established in empirical science than the intransmutability of the elements. Nitrogen cannot be transmuted into hydrogen, nor hydrogen into oxygen, etc. We may combine differential elements to form a compound, oxygen and hydrogen to form one, and oxygen and carbon to form another, and in all these changes the law of persistence holds good, but we could not interpret it as showing the transmutability of one element into another. *It is the very constancy of the elements, the true continuity of force, which proves the impossibility of this transmutation; and hence to suppose the transmutation of one species into another is to contradict the law of the conservation of energy.* If at any time we find that the changes are of the same subject or force we may look for traces of identity in the result, but when we start with the admitted distinction between physical and social energy, Mr. Spencer's statement becomes just as absurd

as it would be to assert that cheap car fares are a transmutation of population, simply because we found that a large population is a condition of cheap car fare. The sense in which Mr. Spencer's doctrine is true, or perhaps rather the truth which he ought to have affirmed, namely, that there is a certain correlation between physical and social energy, can be accepted, and it expresses the true result and limits of scientific method, but it does not involve a philosophy. Taken as an absolutely universal principle it proves too much and makes impossible the conceptions necessary to distinguish between any and all of the sciences. It is an attempt to provide a basis for a monistic philosophy, while the distinctions drawn between phenomena imply an atomistic philosophy. Science may study the uniformities of nature without raising any of these questions. But the moment that it goes beyond the study of the relations of dependence it becomes amenable to standards which the empirical and scientific schools have generally rejected. Scientific method properly understood does not aim to *deduce* a phenomenon or its nature from the conditions which determine its existence, but only to show the uniformity of its connections; that is, to make events intelligible and predictable as occurrences, and not to fix their nature and functions in an ontological and teleological whole. When it undertakes this duty it has a larger problem on its hands than it set out to solve, and only succeeds in swallowing its own language against metaphysics.

But whether sociology is to be spoken of as a natural science or not, there is the problem of its province or territory, which is closely allied to the former, and may even be substituted for it after agreement has been made upon the fundamental conception to be expressed by the term "natural." At any rate as long as logomachical discussions proceed about the former question we may largely evade them and throw much light upon the nature of the subject by examining the province of sociology. The procedure is of the nature of a definition, though descriptive mainly, and either assumes or undertakes, as conditioning a clear idea of the matter, a more or less definite classification of the sciences. Professor Giddings follows this method, and his treatment of it, with the purpose of giving sociology independent standing, comes under our purview for examination. His classification of the sciences, though not agreeing with Spencer's, is largely influenced by that writer's views, and through affiliation with them presents a motive for beginning the discussion at that point.

It is not my purpose to enter into any elaborate criticism of Mr. Spencer on this point. It is not necessary. It would take more time and space than the results would justify. Neither the merits nor the faults of his classification, nor his criticisms of Comte's doctrine, are of sufficient importance to enter into a controversy. The reason for this view is a very simple one. Any classification of the sciences which is based upon a single principle and carried out with consistency will be true. It may not be very useful for the purpose which Mr. Spencer has in mind, but it may be true nevertheless, and throw much light upon other questions. It will be easy also to find fault with any classification proposed, and to make it appear full of contradictions. But this result may in all cases be due to either or both of two facts, first, the ambiguous conception of the several sciences, and, second, the differences of purpose in those who classify them. If, therefore, we could clear away equivocation and know the definite object of the classifier much controversy would be saved. This is perhaps a truism, but it involves a rule that is constantly violated by those who undertake to solve large problems by a scheme of classification, and hence it may be necessary to revert to fundamental principles as a condition of emerging from chaos in this matter.

Mr. Spencer objects to Comte's classification of the sciences on the ground that he attempts the impossible, namely, their arrangement in a *serial* order of development, and proposes one of his own, based upon the distinctions between the abstract, abstract concrete, and the concrete, sciences, which he thinks much better adapted to the requirements of evolution. Now I do not wish to defend Comte, nor to criticise Spencer, for I think both of them, and especially the latter, have done excellent service in this work. Mr. Spencer's observations and discussions in particular are clear, cogent, and instructive, though I should disagree with him wholly in considering prevision an essential element of science. Prevision is surely a corollary of explanation, and systematization, whether deductive (certitude) or inductive (probability), goes along with explanation to constitute the essence of science. But I shall not urge this, except as a circumstance which may serve as a vantage ground when we come to see what the implications would be in considering sociology under this conception. The main contention with which I wish to be employed is that both Spencer and Comte have missed the fundamental key to the classification of the sciences, as they want it done, though I confess that Comte seems to me to

have been nearer the truth for the purpose at which he should have aimed rather for than the purpose at which he did aim. Both, it seems, wanted to classify them in a way to coincide with the development of knowledge, but in making the attempt confused historical with purely logical problems, and hence found difficulties from which they could not extricate themselves, Mr. Spencer, however, in the end obtaining a better view of the complexities involved in the case, and preferring a classification proceeding upon a different principle. The main trouble with both of them, however, was in their attempt to produce an absolute classification which would serve as a means of rejecting all others. But as all classification is merely relative there is no necessity for repudiating any system as false unless it possesses internal contradictions and is irrelevant to a given purpose. Hence, without either adopting or repudiating the systems of these writers I can better discuss the problem by looking at the problems involved in all such attempts.

Comte evidently endeavored to construct a serial scheme of classification in which too many conditions were to be satisfied at once; namely, the advance from the simple to the complex, from the abstract to the concrete, and conformity to historical development. Whatever may be said of so large an undertaking, I think that if he had rightly comprehended his problem he would not have been exposed to Mr. Spencer's criticisms. What he should have striven for and perhaps what it was his purpose to strive for was a classification in which the relation between the sciences should be analogous to the relation between the different orders of existence proceeding from the simple to the complex, and ignore the whole question whether or not this coincides with the historical development of the sciences. This I believe is quite possible, though certain difficulties will arise from the equivocal conception attaching to the sciences concerned and to the confusion of the essential with the accidental properties of a science. On the other hand, Mr. Spencer aimed at a logical classification which would also coincide with the transition from the simple to the complex in the order of nature. This I think is also possible, though it has to contend with the same difficulties as the system of Comte, which may be overcome in both cases by adequate definition and proper attention to the principles of division. But in order to show how this may be done, it will be necessary to examine the principle of classification and the sources of confusion incident to it.

It appears from the controversy between Spencer and Comte that we have at least two kinds of classification to consider, the "serial," as Mr. Spencer calls that of Comte, and the ordinary classification into genera and species. But I hope to show that in reality there is only one *form* of classification, though there may be many classifications, and what are taken for two forms of it are but different relations of the terms composing it.

Classification is the arrangement of individuals or groups of individuals in the relation of genera and species. Now a twofold relation is observed in this order: (1) a relation between genus and species, and (2) a relation between different species. Genus and species are partly coincident in the qualities expressed, and any science which studies the species will have to study the genus (unless a fact to be observed later modifies this assertion), while a science which studies the genus will not have to study the species, as such. This gives them common as well as different territory. There is also a relation of common qualities between species (except as considered below) which provides them with a territory partly common, in so far as they are members of the same genus, but they are wholly distinct in respect to their differentia, and this cuts them off from interpenetration to that extent. Here is a situation that may easily create confusion. While the sciences that are related as genus to species will give no trouble because there is no pretense of their mutual independence, the sciences that are species of a higher genus may seem to be related in such a way as to throw doubt upon their distinction from each other. They will have some common territory, in so far as they are members of the same genus, and in this way the methods and results of one may be helpful to the other. But in respect of the absolutely differential qualities they will be distinct from each other, and no crossing of territory or dependence of one on the other will be possible. The conception of a "serial" classification, then, could arise either from the common territory between genus and species or from the common territory between the different species. But the consistency and satisfactory nature of such a classification will depend wholly upon two considerations: (1) the elimination of equivocal meanings from the general uses of the terms denoting the sciences, and (2) the completeness of the division, and its confinement to a single principle. But neither of these conditions can be fulfilled. In regard to the first of these considerations nothing is clearer or more certain than the

indefinite and equivocal conception of many of the sciences. This is caused either by disputed definitions, by interpenetration of territory, or by increments of object matter after a definitive conception has been adopted. For instance, take astronomy for an illustration. Its object matter distinguishes it from geology, botany, politics, etc. Nor would it be confused today with mathematics in any form. But it was not always so. At its inception, in so far as it was distinguished from astrology, it was merely a branch of mathematics. As an application of mensuration, geometry and astronomy simply divided existence among themselves as species of mathematics. But in the process of time astronomy assumes to determine other facts about celestial bodies besides their relations in space, of size and distance, motion, orbits, etc. The science of physics is applied to the planets and fixed stars, and astronomy also becomes a branch of that science, and it is no longer merely a special application of mathematics. Consequently the conception of it changes, though it is still occupied only with celestial bodies. Now if we conceive it merely as a branch of mathematics, a special application of geometrical truths, it will not stand in a serial classification with the implication that it is conditioned by mathematics in the same way in which biology is conditioned by embryology, psychology by physiology, ethics by psychology, etc. In a similar manner we might take up almost any of the sciences and show how its increment of territory has affected the place it would occupy in a serial scheme of classification, and no less would it make its position ambiguous in the logical system.

Again, the second consideration shows how interpenetration of territory may occur when the conception of the sciences is determined by the various fields with which any one may be occupied or by the point of view from which it is conceived. The principle of division determines where a species shall stand and how it shall be distinguished from some other species. According to one principle two species may appear closely related which are widely distinguished according to another principle. For instance, in Spencer's division of abstract sciences stand mathematics and logic, and from this we should never suspect that logic is a mental science. The fields of mathematics and logic are as distinct as those of astronomy and biology, and yet in comparison of abstraction they can be brought together as having a common quality. But on any other principle of division logic would not be a coördinate species with mathematics. It would stand among

the mental sciences. Similarly with other sciences. For instance, physiology may be a branch of anthropology and not coördinated with physics and chemistry as branches of physical science, though it remains this as a fact, but has to be put in a separate pigeon hole because it is coördinated with psychology, politics, sociology, etc., which are not physical sciences. And if we divide science according to its field into physical and mental, we find that physiology will fall under the former and will not be coördinated with any of the mental sciences at all. It is evident, therefore, that we can have any number of classifications of the sciences, according to our principle of division, and that if this is not consistently carried out there will be inconsistencies everywhere and constant interpenetration of territory, or what is known in logic as "cross division."

I have shown the inevitable existence of equivocation and cross division in the classification of the sciences, and it illustrates why there is so much difficulty in getting a system free from objection and that will not involve overlapping of territory. Most students speak of this incident as if it were an objection to all attempts at classification, but I cannot consider it so. It may give rise to difficulties in definition, but in most cases this will be caused by the incompleteness and imperfections of the classification, and not by the fact of it. We must not expect too much from a classification of the sciences in defining any one of them. *A classification cannot define a species any farther than the principle of division will permit.* A new principle of division and a new classification may be required to complete the definition and to show how the interpenetration of various territories takes place. A useful classification depends wholly upon what is to be brought out, and so far from conditioning a definition should be employed solely to explicate and unfold its meaning. Hence it is apparent that no single scheme of classification is likely to express all the relations of the sciences, and it was this fact which weakened the attempt of Comte.

Professor Giddings is conscious of the great difficulties of his problem, which is to determine both the distinction between sociology and certain other sciences, and their interconnection at the same time. But he is possessed still with the feeling that this classification must be a single one, and this may be a true ideal to strive for, if simplicity is to be attained. Notwithstanding this fact, however, it can be attained only by such elaboration in the principles of division and the separation of aspects of individual sciences that anyone may well ask whether it

is worth the effort. Professor Giddings attempts a classification which is neither of the ordinary kind nor serial in its nature after the manner of Comte. It does not undertake the same problem exactly as that of Comte, which was to exhibit the passage from the simple to the complex. But it undertakes to make clear one phase implied in Comte's system, and this is the interpenetration of territory among certain sciences, and it is not to be denied that the representation which he gives affords a very clear conception of the case. But there are two things not accomplished by it which are of capital importance in a discussion of this kind. *First*, the distinction between the sciences compared is not brought out as in the ordinary method of logical classification. There is no other way to make radical differences clear. *Second*, the abandonment of the main principle at the basis of a serial classification only unfits the classification given for an application of evolution to the problem, and evolution has determined the whole conception and scope of sociology in Professor Giddings' view of it.

Now, before taking up Professor Giddings' classification in detail, let us examine a number of possible systems regarding the relations between sociology and the group of admittedly allied sciences. We do not need for the present to go beyond the field of anthropology in its broader or narrower import for our starting point. Each system of classification will be indicated by its appropriate letter which we can use as an abbreviation for it in the discussion.



E

Anthropology	Phenomenological	Physiology
		Empirical Psychology
		History
	Ætiological	Rational Psychology
		Ethology
		Sociology
	Teleological	Economics (Political)
		Ethics
		Politics

Now a comparison of these classifications will bring out some instructive facts bearing upon the province of sociology and showing why there has been so much difficulty in defining its functions clearly. The only difference between *A* and *B* consists in the conception of ethics which is conceived in the one case as a branch of psychological, and in the other as a branch of sociological, inquiry. It may be conceived as representing the functions of the individual, and judged from the view of idealistic philosophy it consists mainly in psychological analysis, so that in this sense it must be put under psychology. But conceived from the standpoint of its objective content, the objective end which it investigates rather than motives, it may be made a branch of sociology. On the other hand, an interesting difficulty arises in both of the systems. This is the conception of sociology as compared with physiology and psychology. The content of the former is that of a *collective* whole, of the two latter, it is an *individual* whole, or if of a collective whole it is totally distinct in kind from that of sociology. Consequently the principle of division does not, in classification *A* and *B*, throw sufficient light upon the nature of sociology, nor do we get any hint of the radical distinction of method between sociology as ordinarily conceived and the subjects of politics and *political* economy. Classification *C* allows for this last point by making politics and economics coördinate species with sociology, or as Professor Giddings puts it, "differentiations *from* it rather than differentiations *of* it." It shows a much more limited conception of the functions of sociology. In *A* and *B* it is merely an abstract science serving as a genus for the method and content of politics and economics, and is not a "natural" but a "*moral*" science, unless politics be made a "natural" science. But in *C* sociology may be a "natural" as distinct from a "moral" science by being made *coördinate* with politics, ethics, and economics. Here its conception is evidently distinct

from that in *A* and *B*. Classification *D* has no value except to call attention to the narrower meaning of anthropology which sometimes prevails, as in Tylor's work with that title.

But it is classification *E* which has the most interest and which more clearly presents the nature and functions of sociology and its distinction from economics, politics, and ethics. We start with Professor Giddings' conception of the science both as "natural" and as based upon the consciousness of kind. How the term "natural" shall be understood when taken accurately will be discussed later. At present it will connote only that which is opposed to arbitrary convention and artifice, and represents something that is not always the object of a rational will. But to turn to the classification itself, the differentiation of anthropology gives us the *method* which determines the way we shall view the facts of human life and distinguishes one group of sciences from another. One of them determines the phenomena and their orderly relations in terms of law. This is the phenomenological group which need not go farther than systematize the facts of human life and their uniformities of coexistence. The second method, the ætiological, while considering the same facts, endeavors to assign the organic principle which gives them unity, or even existence. It investigates the causes or grounds of the phenomena. The former determines and analyzes the facts, the latter the reasons for their existence. The third group investigates the means to a preconceived end, or determines first that end itself, and then the means to it. It does not aim to explain facts by their cause, but to organize forces with reference to a given end, and so represents the teleological method and point of view. This enables us to draw clearly the distinction between sociology and politics, on the one hand, and between sociology and ethics, on the other, which has so generally been attempted, but without the desired success, because the principle by which it is to be done was not first made clear. We can see now why sociologists want to call their science "natural." They wish to distinguish it from the "moral" sciences, which is a correct aim, but they have not always, if ever, seized the principle which determines the distinction between "natural" and "moral." Aside from the long discussion which was undertaken to indicate the real meaning of the term "natural" as defining science and as opposed to voluntary events, the term is often used to describe phenomena which require to be explained by their causes and not by their utilities. The "natural" and the "moral"

are in this sense contrasted, as facts and goods, not as the necessary and the free. Hence those who are seeking to consider sociology as a "natural" science do so for the purpose of eliminating all questions of value and utility, or comparative importance among the system of facts to be considered. The aim is wholly to explain, not to estimate them, or to provide a system of rules for attaining an end. This procedure is entirely legitimate, and is entirely distinct from the function of "moral" science, which, whether based upon free will or not, is teleological and aims to differentiate values and to organize the means for attaining them in their proper place and way. The teleological sciences of politics and ethics exercise clearly this function and border very closely upon art. Economics is reckoned in this group, not in its recently developed meaning as describing the laws of wealth independently of government policy, but in its original meaning as defining the policy of the state toward individual enterprise. In this sense it might just as well be included in the general conception of politics, and we should then have only the individual and the social sides of the teleological sciences. But we have in our general principles the formula for distinguishing clearly, as the sociologist aims to do, between his science and certain others, at least in regard to method, and it is the most important of all the distinctions to be made. It may not coincide with the distinction which is founded upon supposed differences of territory, and which it is hard to make clear, but it affords a way of justifying a classification which recognizes a distinction though not conscious of the grounds of it.

One point in the discussion is cleared up. We have found the fields of sociology, politics, and ethics to be the same while they differ in their method and object. But the classification which effects this does not make clear the relation between sociology and psychology, and we shall have to resort to some other to accomplish this end. Professor Giddings tries to accomplish it, partly by his tabular review classifying the sciences in a way to take the place of Comte's serial system, and partly by distinguishing between the two sciences. He holds that they are closely related, but at the same time clearly distinguished from each other. But he does not and cannot make this distinction on the ground that sociology is one of the "natural" sciences and psychology one of the metaphysical sciences; for even all who differ with him would admit that psychology is a "natural" science in the same sense in which sociology is, and would maintain

that sociology, as "natural," would have to be a physical science pure and simple in order to make the distinction in this term. Hence Professor Giddings first draws the distinction between them while defining their affiliation by asserting that both have to do with associations, psychology having to deal with "the association of ideas," and sociology with "the association of minds." This is a very pretty comparison and might pass in literary parlance. But it is not a scientific or a philosophic conception of the problem. Strictly, it turns upon a pun with the word "association." Psychological and sociological association have no resemblance to each other. We might as well try to distinguish between water and a labor union by saying that one is a combination of gases and the other a combination of men. There is a chance for a pun here too, if we reflect on the character of labor leaders and their loquacity. But I am concerned only with indicating the mistaken character of Professor Giddings' comparison. He is stronger, however, on the real nature of their relation when he maintains that psychology treats of the genesis of all states of consciousness, and sociology of "the phenomena that are consequent upon one state in particular; namely, the consciousness of kind." This practically limits sociology to the social instincts and the institutions to which they give rise. In so far as it deals with the social instincts its territory overlaps that of psychology, but in so far as it deals with objective institutions, or what Professor Giddings calls "the social medium and environment," it is distinct from psychology and here there is no reason to disagree with his position, though we do not see that his classification makes the matter clear. Hence in order to make it plain I shall give another classification embracing the whole field of knowledge, and following, in a part of the system, the lines already laid down. The principle of division at the outset will be the kind of phenomena treated, and method will be subordinate. The classification will not be complete, but only such as will make clear the nature of psychology and of sociology. (See *F*, page 40.)

Here assuming the distinction that has already been drawn between sociology and politics as making one of them purely explanatory and the other practical, I may call more special attention to the fact that I have made them coördinate with each other, and not one of them a differentiation *of* the other, politics of sociology, as Professor Giddings states it. I have already shown that politics is not a "natural" science, as having explanation as an object, and so cannot be a species of soci-



ology without making this purely an abstract science with no content that would differentiate it *from* politics. This suffices for the one issue. But while we found in that classification no principle to distinguish rightly between psychology and sociology, we have in the last instance a clue to the difference. Both are of facts connected with consciousness. But in the present system psychology deals wholly with phenomena incident to *individual* wholes, sociology with phenomena incident to *collective* wholes. As a consequence of this distinction sociology must include more specific reference to *objective* facts, psychology more reference to *subjective* facts. Sociology will have its subjective side in so far as it has to take account of the individual's social instincts and forces, and psychology will always have some reference to the object of the processes which it studies. But sociology lays its stress upon the *institutions* which are the expression, object, and result of the psychological forces that it assumes, but does not investigate, and on the other hand psychology assumes the objective facts of the world and places its emphasis upon the *nature of the mental facts or processes* correlated with these objective facts. But in the course of his work Professor Giddings discusses a great many facts as bearing upon his science which are not phenomena of consciousness at all. They are rather external conditions which influence the kind of consciousness necessary to adjustment and development. In this way it is apparent

that sociology comprehends phenomena that are wholly outside of psychology, and the last classification we have just given does not bring this out at all; nor is it clear in the scheme given by Professor Giddings. It is this objective aspect of his subject that forces upon him his discussion of free will, and inasmuch as no adequate distinction is drawn between freedom as liberty; that is, exemption from external limitations or influence, and freedom as autonomy or self-initiative, the influence exercised by environment in determining the choice necessary for adjustment seems to militate against free will, which it does in the former sense, limiting responsibility, but without affecting autonomy. But since I have already said that the science of sociology requires neither to affirm nor deny freedom as autonomy, which is the freedom asserted by the philosopher, it is not necessary to discuss this feature of Professor Giddings' position further than to indicate the source of it in the recognization of facts within the purview of his science which are outside psychology and which affiliate sociology with physical, economic, and political sciences. Limited to the discussion of only the social instincts it would be an abstract science and might just as well be called *social psychology*. But it is evident from the phenomena that are coördinated, organized, and explained under it that it is a much more complex science than its appropriation of the social elements of psychology alone would imply. This I think can be brought out by a serial classification, which I present here for a very different purpose than any which is implied by Spencer's criticism of Comte.

G

1 Mathematics	4 Phytology
2 Physics	5 Physiology
3 Chemistry	6 Psychology

7 Sociology

I purposely leave out astronomy, biology, zoölogy, anthropology, logic, ethics, politics, and economics, because they do not represent the principle which I wish recognized in this scheme. What I wish to illustrate in this classification is a serial order of increasing complexity among the phenomena that determine the province of each specified science, while I also illustrate what I may call the law of the conditioned in them: namely, the dependence of each successive science upon the results and method of the preceding one for completing, or even

initiating, its own investigations. I do not say that results in the succeeding sciences do not return aid to the preceding; for they may do so, but it will not be in method. Moreover, I must emphasize the fact that this classification does not intend to represent the order of historical development among the sciences; nor is it intended to throw any light upon the relation between the functions of the sciences and the order of evolution. That is, I am not yet presenting a classification of the sciences which will coincide with the relation between the simpler and the more complex orders of creation. I am endeavoring only to effect one thing for the present, which is to establish a certain order of increasing complexity in the relation of certain sciences, which may aid us in understanding the province of sociology, and of dependence which will explain the interpenetration of territory in a way that the logical classifications from *A* to *F* inclusive do not make sufficiently clear.

The first thing to be observed about the classification is that the progress is not from genus to species, though it is somewhat like it. The species adds a differentia to the conferentia or common properties, while it retains the conferentia. But in the above serial order, while a differentia is added to each succeeding science, the conferentia, if any at all, is not such as to constitute the preceding a genus. This is an important fact to keep in mind when we come to consider a classification combining the serial and the logical for the sake of illustrating the evolutionary process in the orders of nature, and the complex phenomena and the interpenetration of territory among the sciences. But at present we wish only to remark the nature of the increment in each successive science. Mathematics is the simplest science of all. Its province is *number* and is based upon the units of time and space. Physics adds certain other properties of body to that of number for its study, elasticity, density, weight, motion, etc. Chemistry adds to these the properties and affinities of body ~~which enable its elements~~ to form compounds. It is the first science which looks upon objects as an aggregate of elements, and in this respect lies between physics and the simplest forms of organic life. It is in the inorganic world what biology is in the organic. Then next phytology or botany adds vitality to chemical properties, physiology motility to vital properties, psychology mental qualities to all the rest, and sociology social instincts, institutions and their correlated physical conditions to all that precedes.

We see in this statement of the case a considerable interpenetration

of territory and it is brought out by this method of classification much better than in the preceding instances. But there is one difference between the last science and the others, in regard to the nature of its province, which is not indicated by the classification and which must be considered in order to avoid implying a closer connection between it and others than really exists. This is the fact which has already been mentioned and is that sociology deals with phenomena incident to *collective* wholes, either of the species *homo*, or also of all organic beings capable of association, while the other sciences treat of *individual* wholes. It is possible, however, to maintain that chemistry, botany, physiology, and psychology also deal with collective or aggregate wholes as well as sociology. This can be admitted with qualifications, but the difference between the aggregates or organisms of which they treat and the social organism of which sociology treats is as great as before. For if we grant that both deal with collective wholes we can show the following striking differences. The organisms of which botany, physiology, and psychology treat, considered as collective wholes, show the following characteristics: (1) They are continuous in space, the numbers constituting them showing no individuation or independence of each other in the functions they are capable of exercising; (2) the members or organs composing the whole are not homogeneous, but heterogeneous. On the other hand, the social organism shows two characteristics which clearly distinguish it from the others: (1) The organism is not continuous in space, that is, is in no sense an individual, each unit being independent of all the others in all that concerns the main facts of its existence; (2) the units or members are homogeneous, that is, the same in kind. Now, whether we choose to call the objects of the other sciences individual or collective wholes, the fact still remains that sociology stands alone in the kind of organisms and institutions which it investigates. We may find interesting relations and analogies between the units of society as parts of the whole and the members of a physical organism, but the individuation of those members and the kind of collective whole which they constitute, widely separate it from those organisms usually called individual wholes, but which may be called collective wholes only by sufferance in comparison with such organisms as human or other societies. This fact then makes sociology a peculiar science, only more complex than others owing to the organic complexity of its individual units and to the double complexity of the whole which is

made such by independent units, the majority of which by their supremacy rule the policy of the whole. The distinction between it and psychology thus becomes most radical, and nothing but the fact of greater complexity than psychology and the other sciences determines its right to its position in the classification.

Consequently a more systematic classification will be necessary in which the attempt is made to define the sciences by their *method* rather than their *territory*. Mr. Spencer recognized the difficulty of distinguishing between sciences occupied with the same phenomena, but he did not see that the real distinction should be based upon their method or object and not upon subject-matter or territorial limits. I have therefore adopted as the principles of method the fields of phenomenology, ætiology, nomology, teleology, and ontology upon which to base a classification. By the phenomenological sciences I mean those which stop with the observation and classification of phenomena; by the ætiological those that investigate the causes and necessary connections of phenomena; by the nomological, those which seek to determine the valid, ideal, or normal among phenomena, or the sciences of values as distinct from conditions and causes; by the teleological, the sciences which endeavor to prescribe the means for the realization of an end, and by the ontological, the philosophical sciences proper (if "sciences" they can be called) which are occupied with the nature and unity of phenomena in some metaphysical ground. I arrange them also in a twofold relation after subordinating each science to its proper method. In the first place the vertical scale represents a serial order of dependence or conditioning influence after the conception of Comte. In the second place the horizontal scale represents the correspondent of each science in a different method so that we may study either another relation of dependence or influence, or observe the change of principle involved when we study the same phenomena in a new relation. The vacant lines indicate that current usage either does not recognize any corresponding science or tacitly allows this aspect of the phenomena to be studied under a name and conception which predominantly belongs to some other method. Whether this be objectionable or not may be considered after the classification has been given, as below.

The first thing that would probably be remarked by a critic of this classification is the absence of certain sciences which, it would appear, ought to be recognized. For example, why omit such sciences as

botany, geology, etc.? The answer to this is simple and clear. The former may be treated as a branch of physiology, and the latter as a branch of physics. But can we dispose of biology in the same way? The answer is in the negative, but then since I should treat biology as a *comparative* or generic, not a specific, science, I must omit it from this scheme and place it in the class of comparative sciences later on. What I am aiming to accomplish at present is to define the differential sciences by their method, and to make this clear and consistent the conferential sciences must be excluded, and in some cases an apparently arbitrary limitation placed upon some of the current uses of terms.

SCIENCE

PHENOMENOLOGICAL	ÆTIOLOGICAL	NOMOLOGICAL	TELEOLOGICAL	ONTOLOGICAL
———	———	Mathematics	———	Metaphysics
———	Physics	———	Mechanics	
———	Chemistry	———	Pharmacy	———
	Physiology	———	Therapeutics	———
Anthropology	Psychology	Epistemology, Logic, Æsthetics	Pedagogy	Pneumatology
	Ethology	Theoretical Ethics	Practical Ethics	———
History	Sociology	Jurisprudence	Politics	———
———	———	———	———	Theology

I imagine, however, that the first and important query would regard my reason for the omission of *economics*. This is an important question and the omission has been deliberate, and because there is a long-standing dispute about what kind of a science economics is. Some wish to treat it as a "historical" science, some as an "exact" science (natural), and others as a "moral" science. All this difference of opinion is simply evidence that economics as treated by its exponents is a *mixed* science, not amenable wholly to any one of the methods mentioned. Moreover, some would treat it as a department of sociology and others as a department of politics, while still others would make it complementary to ethics. But if we could devise terms for the three aspects under which economic problems are discussed we might place its ætiological aspect between ethology and sociology and its correspondents in their appropriate places. The usual distinction between *pure* and *applied* economics, or, as the latter might be called, political economy as distinguished from scientific economics, would

not recognize a nomological field, since this might be supplied by ethics. This peculiarity of economics reflects very clearly the difficulties to be encountered when we conceive sociology as a "natural" science, regulated by ætiological method, and yet discuss under it the practical questions of ethics and politics, as well as questions of economics which people usually exclude from it.

One more point requires mention in order to forestall any misunderstanding of the scheme. I do not pretend in all cases of this classification to eliminate the difficulties and objections which might be suggested by a real or apparent departure from current conceptions of the special sciences. An instance is the evidently narrow conception of anthropology which seems to be entertained here. It is true that as studied in many cases it comprehends more than mere history and description of phenomena discussed ætiologically in three other sciences. This is because most of the sciences in the scheme, as actually studied and taught, exhibit mental interests and methods outside that which characterizes its prevailing procedure. But since anthropology is predominantly a science of facts and only incidentally of causes we may treat it as *properly* phenomenological. The predominant functions and methods of the other sciences may also decide their place. This conclusion will recognize and enforce the important fact that current conceptions are not clear or distinctly defined, and that we only create difficulties for ourselves by a limited definition of a problem and then allow the associations and confused conceptions of current thought to admit the investigation of other problems. The correct procedure is to insist that the principle of our classification shall determine the *proper* conception of our science and then to refuse all compromises with unscientific conceptions of the problem in which we may be interested. On this assumption we can say that the classification, as given, represents the *theoretical* conception of the sciences which enables us to distinguish separate problems and not to confuse irrelevant issues. This would both save embarrassment and advance the cause of truth much better than lumping all the problems of the universe together under one science.[1]

[1] It may be interesting in a note to remark some peculiar features of the classification which are not important for the present paper, but which will strike the attention. For instance, there are no nomological sciences for the phenomena comprehended under the three sciences, physics, chemistry, and physiology. Is this because questions of validity, of rightness, of moral preference can never be raised regarding necessary or determined events? It is certain that we find no science of what is valid

It is apparent from the above classification that the province of sociology will be very extensive if it comprehends all the methods here recognized. But Comte's school rejects the ontological or metaphysical with contempt, and on this ground endeavors to regard sociology as a "natural" science. Now if it be a natural science it must be either phenomenological in its method or ætiological; for neither Professor Giddings nor sociologists generally regard it as either teleological or nomological in its method. If it is purely phenomenological it can get no farther than history, and the question of causes, whether free or necessary, cannot enter into its investigations. If it be ætiological in method and purpose, that is, if to be a "natural" science means that it shall be ætiological as well as phenomenological, then the question whether freedomism or determinism represents the causal basis of the science will depend upon the further question whether subjective or objective causes alone are the explanatory agent for the organism. But as both aspects of cause are admitted in defining the province of sociology, one of them serves to show the limitations of *liberty* and the other the possibility of *autonomy*, though Professor Giddings seems to sympathize with determinism in all but one paradoxical passage which speaks of "the free exercise of will," which is not "the exercise of free will," a statement which ought to be absolutely reversed according to his own recognition of the subjective and objective aspects of the science. Moreover, that he departs from its conception as a "natural" science, is evident when he makes politics, ethics, and economics differentiations *of* sociology. For politics and ethics, both theoretical and practical, are not "natural" sciences at all, as determining either the genesis or the causes of their appropriate phenomena. They are sciences of the end and of the means to the end of conduct, one individual and the other social. But being teleological, if they are merely species of sociology this science becomes

until we come to mental phenomena, where we recognize distinctions of true and false, beautiful and ugly, and right and wrong. In the physically determined field we recognize only facts and their causes, not what facts *ought* to occur. Again we have no ætiological equivalent of mathematics. Is this because the basis of quantity, time and space, is ideal, as Kant maintains, and so falls under epistemology? But most interesting of all is the fact that theology seems to have no correspondent in the other methods. The fact is, of course, that theology as at present developed and applied involves a decided application of ætiological method, and it is in this circumstance that it comes into conflict with the other sciences. If limited by the principle which is here used to define it, namely, the ontological method, it might escape unnecessary embarrassment.

teleological and is not ætiological, whether of free or determined events. Professor Giddings' classification then, in this respect, will have to be abandoned in order to save sociology as a "natural" science, if that term is to mean a search for causes exclusively. Now it is right here that the whole meaning of sociology as a "natural" science has to be determined. The sociologist is quite right in the claim that social phenomena require first to be *explained* before they are to be *estimated*. The first problem is the *raison d'être* (*ratio fiendi*) of their existence, and the next the *raison d'être* (*ratio agendi*) of their pursuit. This distinction is not only the ancient one between "natural" and "moral" sciences, except so far as this was also made to coincide with the distinction between physical and mental, but it is precisely the distinction at which Comte, Spencer, and their school aim when they exclude metaphysics from sociology. But this distinction cuts out politics and ethics from being differentiations *of* sociology, unless we change the whole conception of the latter subject, so that "natural" science will have only a phenomenological and not an ætiological import at all. But this would cut away the whole foundation of the sociologist's superstructure and his metaphysical speculation about freedom and necessity, while the retention of it leaves politics and ethics wholly outside the scheme with a right to independent postulates about freedom, a conclusion that is doubly enforced by the destinction between subjective and objective explanation within the province of sociology.

But while the discussion up to this point has thrown much light upon the relation between sociology and the other sciences, it has not touched the crux of the problem as Professor Giddings tries to present it. The classifications which I have presented conceive sociology as the science of social phenomena among *men* and do not include any conception of the social phenomena among animals, though I shall not say that these were consciously or purposely excluded. But the conception of sociology here represented is the ordinary one and is the only one which practical men care a picayune about. I do not say that their disregard of the border aspects of the question is right, but it reflects a totally different conception of both the problem and the method by which it is to be solved. Professor Giddings' discussion of the question fluctuates, without his knowing it, between two very different conceptions of sociology, the narrower and the broader. From his classification of the sciences the impres-

sion to be gained would be that he is using sociology in the Comtean sense as the science of *human* associations, but his treatment of it shows that he means also to include in the investigation the *animal* associations. This tendency even crops out in an occasional word while discussing the province and the method of sociology. But he does not seem adequately conscious of the important distinction between the narrower and the broader conceptions of his subject. The narrower conception, which is the ordinary one, limits its phenomena to human societies, and this is most distinctly implied by Professor Giddings' division of sociology into economics, politics, and ethics as differentiations *of* it, when as in the broader conception of the subject he has in view *comparative* sociology, of which "the economic, political, and cultured sciences" are not differentiations. There is such a thing as comparative politics, but this science is confined to human government and does not include anything of the kind among animals. That Professor Giddings conceives sociology as a *comparative* science is clear both from his specific treatment of social phenomena among the lower orders of creation and from his division of social organizations into zoögenic, anthropogenic, ethnogenic and demogenic. Hence there are two different conceptions of his problem without any clear idea of the way in which classification and the determination of its province are affected by the equivocation. Why is this?

The answer to this question is that Professor Giddings wishes to treat the whole problem from the standpoint of evolution, which is legitimate enough and perhaps most to be desired. But we should not on this account confuse two wholly distinct problems connected with the term sociology. The one is an explanation of the *structure*, the other an explanation of the *genesis* of social organisms. The former problem does not require to be genetic at all in the sense of tracing social organisms through the life of the lower orders of life. It can content itself with the causes that make intelligible and necessary associations of men as we find them, and it does not require for any practical purposes but one to hunt for zoögenic associations. But conceding the unimportance of this distinction, which I do not care to urge here, the main point to which I wish to call attention is the fact that the doctrine of evolution, which seems to be the basis of all present and future inquiry, had created the necessity for a new principle of classification; which I shall call the *genetic*, as distinct from the logical and the serio-conditional. Comte, of course, did not see this

because he had no established theory of evolution to deal with, but Spencer sees the need, though he does not see how it is to be supplied. The old logical classification of everything did not assume any doctrine of evolution after the type of Darwinism, which, in abandoning the doctrine of permanent species and substituting variation converted development from the conception of *parallel* to that of *convergent* series. A single original species became sufficient to account for all the later differentiations composing the classifications of existence. Though this conception does not necessitate the evolution of the present higher orders from the lower, but all of them from some simple being more closely resembling the lowest types, yet the classification of present species in a serial order representing a graduation from the simplest to the highest and most complex is the one which most nearly represents the probable order of development. Hence it is usually chosen to show the structural and functional relations of organic beings presumably corresponding to the process of differentiation represented by such a genetic classification. This with the real and supposed missing links gives a continuity in the orders of creation that the old logical classifications seem to ignore, and so give rise to a new classification of the sciences. The resemblances between the different species become the signs of a common origin and the differentiæ are left to be accounted for by environment, variation, and heredity. This is to say that the traditional lines of distinction, owing to the continuity of the species, are much modified, and in some cases wholly nullified, so that larger groups of organic beings are formed without reference to the old classifications, or if not larger groups, somewhat different principles of classification are required. Out of this new conception of nature the comparative sciences either arose or were strengthened in importance. They offered a new conception of the unity of creation and the relation of its orders, and a wholly new classification of organic life became necessary. It would be well if we could classify the sciences upon the same basis. But this is only approximately possible. The names and conceptions of the sciences, as we have them, have been determined for us beforehand by the philosophy of the past, and a philosophy dominated by other principles than a scientific classification of organic life. The line which scholasticism drew between man and the animal kingdom determined its whole conception of the territory of the sciences. No place was provided for a comparative science of man and lower orders. Each science, with a few exceptions, was sup-

posed to be limited by the species which determined it. Hence sciences like anthropology, sociology, psychology, politics, etc., have no comparative contents. It is interesting to remark, however, that zoölogy and probably phytology really were comparative sciences for the very reason that anthropology was not. The distinction between man and lower orders was the simple one that the latter were without a rational and immortal soul, and hence both for the purposes of science and practical uses were put into one general class without regard to differences between various species of them greater than between man and the class in question. The term zoölogy was chosen as the name for the study of the animal kingdom, and by necessity must be conceived as a comparative science without any divisions, having different names for the study of each species except perhaps ornithology, ichthyology, and a few others, unless we include all other species under zoölogy proper. Then also for the same reason biology must be regarded as a comparative science. It covers a whole order of existence, including both phytology and zoölogy in the broad sense, and also the physiological elements of anthropology. But the old classification of organized beings determined the conception of the several sciences until it is now very difficult to adjust those conceptions to the new classification necessitated by evolution. Indeed the difference between the historical evolution of the sciences and the arbitrary classifications of tradition created difficulties for any attempt at classifying the sciences either logically or serially, as we have already seen, various ambiguities and interpenetration of territory requiring us to explain the conditions under which the relation of a given science to another was assigned. But by distinguishing the general method of the various sciences we were able to produce a tolerably consistent system of classifications, which if elaborated more fully in the cases of logical classification might be improved. These classifications, however, do not serve the purpose of evolution, and the reason for this must be made clear.

As I have already shown, classification is the arrangement of things or phenomena in the order of genus and species. This is well enough understood to render farther explanation unnecessary. But there is an interesting fact connected with the logical law of classification that is very important, and yet seldom if ever considered as it should be when discussing the relations between the sciences in particular and the relations of phenomena in general. It is well to remark that this law is the same in logic as in nature. It is that the genus is a name

for only the common qualities of the species. The species contains the common qualities or conferentia and the differentia added to these. Now an ambiguity in terms denoting a species very easily arises here. Though the species connotes both the conferentia and the differentia as a fact, since the genus suffices to denote only the former, specific terms naturally come to denote the differentia. That is, their meaning is recognized by the qualities which distinguish their objects from those denoted by the genus. But as they imply or denote the genus at the same time they are often used in that abstract sense and implications asserted which are not involved in their full concrete import. The word "oak," for instance, stands for all the qualities of the term tree plus the added qualities that distinguish this species from the "elm," "ash," "pine," etc. In fact it comes to denote so definitely this differentia that its implication of the conferentia is concealed or disguised. Notice here also that we have the logical explanation of Professor Giddings' differentiations *of* the genus and differentiations *from* the species. In both the term places the emphasis upon the differentia and in one, the latter, it seems to denote the differentia alone. Now when it comes to classification of the logical kind the species stand for the differences between each other. Thus arithmetic will stand for the specific difference between that science and geometry, physics for the difference between itself and chemistry, physiology for the difference between itself and psychology, etc. *Hence as such these sciences never become comparative sciences.* Either a more generic term has to be adopted for the purpose, or a more generic meaning given to the old one, when an equivocation arises with all the difficulties incident to it.

We see then why the logical classification of the sciences will not suit the purposes of evolution. It is necessary for determining the method and results involved in phenomena that are fundamentally distinct from others, but it does not suggest, in the species, the common elements of the several classes, and hence generic terms have to be selected for indicating the common field. The comparative sciences do this. Physiology, for instance, at first and in the old classical systems of classification had human structure and functions as its territory, but the doctrine of evolution, by giving man and the animal a common origin, made it necessary to recognize the connection between the two species by regarding the common qualities, and comparative physiology is the result. Similarly with other sciences which

are either qualified by the term "comparative" for the purpose, or a new term coined to meet the contingency, as in the case of biology. Hence while the logical classification of the sciences is adapted to show the differential fields investigated and methods employed by them, what I shall call the *genetic* classification, consisting of the comparative sciences, is adapted to the investigation of their common territory and so is required by the evolutionary view of the phenomena. Consequently I shall attempt a genetic classification of the sciences which will bring out the interconnection of their several fields, the conditioning nature of the results in the preceding upon the following sciences, and the passage from the simpler to the more complex order of existence. The classification will represent the ætiological method:

H

- Comparative Physics, or Hylology
  - Physics
  - Chemistry
- Comparative Physiology, or Biology
  - Phytology
  - Zoölogy
  - Anthropology (Physical)
- Comparative Psychology
  - Animal
  - Human
- Comparative Sociology
  - Zoögenic
  - Anthropogenic
    - Ethnogenic
    - Demogenic

In this scheme I have combined serial and logical classification while representing a genetic order for the sciences mentioned. I treat biology as comparative physiology, considering physiology as dealing with function as well as structure. By hylology I mean a comprehensive science of inorganic matter including the branches of physics and chemistry, but studied along the line of their connections, and more particularly in the direction of a graded classification of the elements of matter, as represented in the periodic law of Newlands and Mendelejeff. Phytology, zoölogy, and physical anthropology are subdivisions of biology and do not stand in the serial order. I have given no divisions of comparative psychology because no importance attaches to them, though along with the distinction physiologically between zoölogy and physical anthropology we might recognize animal and human psychology. The divisions of comparative sociology are those of Professor Giddings, though I may not conceive their relations

exactly as he does. It is not my intention, however, to differ with him on this point, as I have nothing to contend for in it.

But the classification as a whole, based as it is upon the conception of *comparative* science, offers a system adapted to the scheme of evolution and is on that account a genetic system because the very conception of the sciences considered is based upon the *conferentia* of the fields considered while the logical classification lays its emphasis upon the *differentia*. The consequence of the latter principle is that the name of the sciences as distinguished *from* each other (differentiated *from* each other) concentrates attention upon the phenomena that are not common, and hence not being evolved the one from another requires different methods and objects for their investigation. Thus physics and psychology have totally distinct phenomena to deal with and equally distinct methods and objects. But in spite of this fact in so far as there is any unity of science at all there will be common points of interest and territory which in making a basis for comparative science fit in with the doctrine of evolution. Its field represents the conferential elements and qualities in the order of creation which renders evolution possible, showing how each new and more complex species has somehow been developed from the older and simpler organism.

In this scheme, then, we have the real conception of sociology as understood by Professor Giddings and by all who wish to apply evolution to the subject. Their conception is that of comparative sociology, though they call it only sociology. But the distinction between the two, sociology and comparative sociology, is as great as that between comparative and human psychology. It is the distinction between the conferentia and the differentia of phenomena, which is far more important than is supposed by the students of the problem under consideration. In fact, it is here that the whole confusion of sociologists occurs. It is this want of a clear distinction between sociology and comparative sociology, or, if you like, between the conferential and the differential elements of sociology, that creates half the difficulties which Professor Giddings and evolutionary sociologists have to face. They do not distinguish between the evolutionary or genetic and the differential or non-genetic side of their problem, and this is shown very clearly in their interchangeable use of conception; sociology at one time denoting the social institutions of man as different from those of the animals and at another the institutions common

to both species. Politics and ethics they include in their subject, when, as a matter of fact, they are wholly excluded in nature from comparative sociology. The moment, also, that we begin to consider political and ethical questions we not only go beyond the province of comparative sociology, but we introduce *teleological* as distinct from *ætiological* problems, and depart accordingly from the conception of "natural" science as usually distinguished from the "moral." It is apparent from this fact, therefore, that the sociologists must either give up their genetic conception of their science or restrict its territory much more than they have done. They cannot pass *ad libitum* from purely evolutionary problems to those which are not evolutionary in their method and object without admitting that they are transcending the boundaries of their science and studying phenomena by methods and with objects not included in their defined conception of comparative science. It is one thing to study the genesis of an organism in the light of its conferentia with another organism, and it is another problem to study the differentia of the two organisms. The former represents the unity and continuity, or homogeneity, of nature; the latter its diversity and variation, or heterogeneity. But a comparative science does not go beyond determining the unity of apparently distinct phenomena, and when it is necessary to explain the real or apparent differences it is necessary to invoke something else than the genetic principle of continuity, and this new principle is that of variation, which accounts for the differentia, not the conferentia, of an organism. If you like you may maintain that evolution has to do with both problems, and this may be granted on condition that you admit (1) that evolution has two meanings — now a process of explaining the unity, and again the process of explaining the diversity, of nature — and (2) that the cause which explains the unity of nature is like the effect, and that the cause which explains the differentia, or is assumed to explain it, is not like the effect. But I shall not go into the philosophic problem of causes which distinguishes between material (*ratio essendi*) and efficient causes (*ratio fiendi*). This is not necessary, because the actual differences between the sciences and the respective phenomena are admitted to be radical and to define facts which cannot be explained upon generic principles. They are admitted to be irreducible to the conferentia when certain sciences and phenomena are said to be differentiations *from* others. Hence it is not needful to enter into the whole philosophy of existence in order to show that the

genetic study of comparative sociology usurps its functions when it discusses as conferentially genetic phenomena that justify a logical and real distinction from common territory.

I have tried here not so much to controvert the application of genetic method to sociology as represented in the conception of comparative sociology as to supplement it by the recognition of principles and problems which fall outside either of evolutionary jurisdiction altogether or outside that method and principle of evolution which is limited to the consideration of the conferentia. I would certainly vie with anyone in recognizing the importance of applying evolution to social phenomena wherever found, though I might hold that genetic problems have less importance than those which the sociologist aims to solve outside the genetic and ætiological method. But this coöperation is not inconsistent with the attempt to clear up the confusion which confessedly exists about sociological science. This comes, as I have said, from the failure to distinguish between comparative or conferential and differential sociology — that is, between social phenomena common to the higher and lower orders and the social phenomena peculiar to the higher. This confusion of the two fields arises, perhaps pardonably, on the part of those who have no time to master the practical applications of philosophy and logic, from the failure to distinguish between the nature and objects of genetic and those of logical classification. Sociology in the traditional logical classification not only stands for a differentiation *from* other sciences, but also for the study of social phenomena specifically human. If, then, there are any decided differences between these and social phenomena in the zoölogical sphere, and if sociology, as a specific term, notes the differentia, it will create a source of equivocation to generalize it by interpreting its connotation generically or comparatively, whereby we simply eliminate all account of the differentia, and still continue to imagine that we are discussing the same problem as before.

This illusion is very clearly illustrated in the earlier discussed statement of Professor Giddings, where he maintains that social energy is transmuted physical energy. Besides what has already been said of this supposition, we can expose its difficulties upon the basis of the distinction we have drawn between the generic and specific connotation of terms. We have shown that a term as a species stands for qualities which mark off one thing from another — first from the genus denoting the common qualities or conferentia, and next from a coördinate spe-

cies. Let us see how this is related to the transmutation of physical into social energy, in which assertion we have Spencerian evolution in its most radical form.

Now physical and social energy are either coördinate species, one differentiated *from* the other, or one is a species of which the other is the genus, or both are identical phenomena. The paradoxical character of the assertion comes from the assumption that the two forms of energy are wholly different from each other in kind. But if this be true, how can one be transmuted into the other; how can one differentia become a differentia of another kind without laughing at nature for preserving continuity at all, and for the failure to make this transmutation universal; to realize the alchemist's dream, or to transmute one element into another. If one be a species of the other as a genus, as might seem to be implied by the asserted evolution of social from physical energy, how does the differentia or incremental quality arise from the others? If the conferentia can be transmuted into a differentia, what is the use of the law of continuity, and why, again, is not the transmutation not more general. On the other hand, if the differentia is not transmuted into another differentia, and if the conferentia is not transmuted into the differentia, this difference must either be a permanent quality unaccounted for by evolution, or it is an illusion. If the first of these alternatives be accepted the method of evolution is not applicable to all of the phenomena in the species, and if the difference be an illusion, physical and social energy are identical and evolution is applicable to the transition of one to the other by showing that the cases are merely an illustration of the law of continuity seen under circumstances that make qualitative heterogeneity an illusion. But this conclusion equally cuts us off from a classification of the sciences which supposes a real difference of field and method. How then does such a doctrine of transmutation arise that produces so many difficulties? The answer to this question is very simple.

In the logical classification of phenomena the physical and the social are *species*, which are differentiated from each other, and one cannot be transmuted into the other. But the same terms, in so far as they are in any case conceived as coördinate species, or conferentially connected with the same genus, no matter how remote, must connote common qualities at the same time, and this fact affords a clue to a common origin. If, then, when Professor Giddings asserts the transmutation of physical into social energy, he means that they have a

common lineage, we may admit the claim without reserve. But then the term "physical" in this case is used *conferentially* and does not denote the differentia. The method of evolution is applied at the expense of not accounting for the differentia, and so without regard to the logical classification of phenomena. But if the term "physical" be used in its specific sense as differentiated *from* the social, then the transmutation can and must be denied. The whole error of the doctrine lies in the failure to recognize that the doctrine of evolution either cannot be applied at all to explain the passage from conferentia to differentia, or the explanation of the differentia is not exactly the same as that of the conferentia. Hence the doctrine of transmutation, so boldly stated as in the above assertion, either creates insuperable difficulties or obtains its plausibility wholly from the equivocations which arise from confusing genetic with logical methods, both necessary, or the conferential with the differential import of specific terms.

This same illusion occurs in the perpetual interchange of the conceptions comparative sociology and sociology unqualified, and this fact is especially interesting because in all ordinary usage the addition of a qualifier to a term narrows its import. But in this case the species is sociology, when taken as commonly understood to denote the study of social phenomena in man. Generically it can also denote the wider field, but then it is just this tendency to interchange the generic and specific implications of the same term that produces so much confusion in the conception of a science, and on this account sociologists are apt to play fast and loose with the term between a comparative science whose object is the *evolution* of social institutions within the wider province of organic life and one whose object is the *conditions* of more highly developed institutions within the genus *homo*. This is occasioned by an equivocation in the word *genesis* which determines the method of Professor Giddings and modern sociologists generally. They apply evolution to social problems, as their comparative and historical methods show, and then introduce phenomena and influences in the solution of their problem which have nothing to do with "evolution" in either its broader sense to cover zoögenic associations or its narrower sense to exclude these. These phenomena are both subjective and objective conditions which determine the nature and existence of present social institutions without regard to the question of their remote genealogy. "Genesis" in meaning origin may denote two distinct things: (1) "origin" from that which is like the effect, from

antecedent phenomena that contain all the essential qualities to be accounted for, and (2) "origin" from causes which are external to and different from the effect, as environment may condition the form of volition necessary to rational adjustment. The former is the properly evolutional problem, and the latter the properly ætiological problem or problem without regard to merely historical genesis. The former of these problems has absolutely nothing to do with questions limited to existing conditions, but only with the discovery of nearer or remoter phenomena in time which show such resemblances to present social institutions as may justify the hypothesis of their being the germs of them. Its method is genealogical and does much to show the unity of nature, the law of continuity, while the second problem is ætiological and endeavors to explain the variation and heterogeneity amid this unity. I do not deny the right of the sociologist to discuss both of these problems at the same time, nor the right to call his investigation sociology. But I should insist upon the distinction between the method and function of comparative and differential sociology, the latter having less to do with historical genesis than with the subjective and objective conditions now determining the nature of social institutions in the life of the genus *homo*.

I do not urge this confusion of territory and method as the most important source of difficulty in defining the science of sociology, but only as the cause of the confusion between the determination of the conferential and the determination of the differential elements of social institutions. But the really important source of confusion in defining the science is the one already mentioned earlier in the discussion, and which is the habit of calling sociology a "natural" that is an ætiological science, and then including politics in it as a species of it when it is a "moral" or teleological, and not a "natural" science. This I regard as the most serious misunderstanding in regard to the nature and province of sociology, because it is not so easy to distinguish between genealogical and ætiological problems unless we confine the former conception to that of pure phenomenology, coexistences and sequences, without regarding questions of organic causal principles. But the distinction between phenomenology and teleology on the one hand, and ætiology and teleology on the other, is clear enough to justify the separation of the problems of sociology and politics, while not denying relations between the two fields when we come to consider the ultimate motives governing sociological investigation which point

to the utility of the results independently of the method of getting them. The psychological source of the difficulty is the sociologist's moral interest in certain practical results which are to follow the truth he expects to establish, but which are no part of his method or the direct object of his science ætiologically defined. That is to say, the sociologist is usually a moralist, while his science is not "moral" but "natural" or explanatory, and he allows his practical interests to influence his conception of the province of his science. But after having discredited metaphysics on the one hand, and eschewed ethical theories on the other, in order to evade the discussion of problems assumed to be obsolete, moral interests ought not to trouble the sociologist, for they do not in reality enter into his problem, especially if he makes it purely genetic, as Professor Giddings does. They can be nothing but bribes to the intellectual plebs who cannot be induced by any other means to pay much attention to sociological science. The demand for utility in scientific study is so great that the sociologist has to yield to it and to make every effort to show some practical results from his investigation in order that it may survive in the struggle for existence going on between the sciences as among all other things. But in thus pandering to a false conception of his subject, he contributes to the confusion about its province and functions. Professor Giddings, for instance, is struggling to maintain that sociology has a perfectly definite field, and that it can be made a science, and shows keen enough appreciation of the common feeling that the subject is as yet a vague one, but he does not see that the confusion comes from mixing up practical and moral questions with a method that is ætiological and not teleological. The puzzle about its being a science comes from just this fact, that the sociologist wants to call his subject a "science," which he conceives to be purely genetic and ætiological in its method and purpose, and yet he wants sociology to supplant politics and ethics in importance and method at the same time. But this is not only a usurpation which the teleological sciences must resent, but it is a procedure which wholly mistakes the limitations of the genetic method. The origin of a phenomenon, or the manner in which it came into existence, has nothing to do with its value, validity, or fitness to serve the ends of life. It simply establishes the reason for its being, and not the reason for its value. The craze over the importance of evolution comes, not from its method, which is precisely the same as that of the creationist theory which it supplants, namely, genetic, but from the mere incident of its

overthrowing that doctrine in its results and implications. The creationist and evolutionistic theories occupy exactly the same position in their method, and are capable of establishing nothing but the *fact of origin*, and the difference between them is only the *mode* of origin. The creationist theory was, of course, associated with a vast amount of dogmatism, intellectual intolerance, irrelevant speculation about the destiny of man, the ultimate authority for truth, etc., which were a part of a system, but by no means necessary correlates of the mode of origin ascribed to a given set of phenomena. All that evolution shows is that the theory of origin which asserts arbitrary or miraculous genesis to phenomena must be supplanted by one which asserts a continuity in nature not observed by the creationist, and which eliminates teleological anthropomorphism from the order of events. But it does nothing to fix the value of what it establishes genetically. Its method explains the origin of the good and the evil in the same way, and there is nothing in the science or its method to distinguish between them. Whatever importance it gets comes from associations and interests which are no part of its method as science, and the same is true of the creationist point of view. This theory is just as faulty, and for the same reason as its opposing doctrine, namely, that it contented itself with the gratuitous assumption that if only you have found how a phenomenon has originated you have established something about its validity. The creationist theory assumes to validate the fact or law by its doctrine, while the evolutionist doctrine, or empirical theory, assumes that if a fact or law has been "derived" or "developed" by experience it is somehow to be distrusted, as if the origin of a phenomenon in time involved the evanescence of its value. Evolutionists generally have encouraged this spirit in their constant insinuation or assertion that an institution is *only* a product of evolution and not necessarily a part of the system demanding our respect. But this pronunciation of judgment on values is no part of the method of genesis and cannot be predetermined by it unless we accompany our ætiological principle by nomological assumptions that are no part of "science" as usually understood. Sociology, as conceived by Spencer and Professor Giddings, is strictly concerned with causes, both efficient and material if you like; that is, both ætiological and ontological, but not with norms or criteria of value, nor with adjustments to a preconceived end. It is retrospective, not prospective. It explains existing facts, or *actual* phenomena by their necessary conditions, and neither validates them

nor determines ethical adjustments to ends which are simply *possible* phenomena. But if we insist upon feeding the popular demand that "science" be practical, while our conception of the subject shows or assumes that this expectation is an illusion, we simply play havoc with the genetic method and sell our birthright for a mess of pottage. For evolution and its method are equally consistent with degeneration and progress, and on this account provide no criterion of value. Consequently to define sociology by a conception which disguises from us the fact that it is limited to ætiological question in regard to social institutions and then to imagine that our "science" is still "exact and positive" after appropriating nomological and teleological territory, either assumes that the moral sciences are as positive as the natural, and so makes the labored attempt at definition by our author supererogatory and indefensible, or it deprives the genetic and ætiological method of its boasted character, whether or not we are dealing with phenomena that are necessarily determined. But if subjective principles, much more free agency, come into the question, not only does the obscurity increase, in spite of traditions which connect "exact science" with the clearness and certitude of mechanics, but we simply hug our definition as the last relic that connects us with the past and rush over the precipice with the hope that we may save ourselves by courting the favor of practical interests and that genetic methods may receive all the honors of the salvation. On this point I must confess that Mr. Spencer is far more consistent than later sociologists generally. He confines himself to the matter of genesis alone, and does not discuss the practical problems of the day. But our modern sociologist, under the infatuation of genetic method on the one hand, and condemned to invoke practical rather than scientific interests in his study on the other, usurps the functions of politics and ethics with the utmost naïveté, and then wonders why so many are reluctant to admit the definiteness of his science, or that it is "natural" and limited to genetic and ætiological method. In fact it is almost impossible to read a discussion on sociology without remarking that the whole system of motives determining it consists in the necessity of adding evolution to the old field of politics and ethics while subtracting the theological and philosophic problems so generally associated with them. It is then so easy to say that it does not belong to the sociologist to discuss certain questions of theology, philosophy, and theoretical ethics, while all the time a whole system of metaphysics

creeps in from the transmutation of physical into social energy. It is very convenient to appeal to genetic method when you wish to escape the discussion of disagreeable philosophic problems, but when you expect to call ethics and politics sociology, with no better immunities than this, you must also expect to be held to account for the desire still to call the subject a "natural" science, with nothing but an ætiological object. If you wish to discuss ethics, theoretical or practical, you must not shirk its problems under the cover of evolution which, so far from modifying anything that morality has ever taught, has simply repeated the formula of hedonism and substituted the question of genesis for that of analysis and justification.

I do not intend by these observations to say that the sociologist shall not discuss politics and ethics under the title of his science. I am only criticising the inconsistency between his conception of the subject and his method of treating it. The constant solicitude to call it a "science," implying or asserting that it is contrasted with philosophy, classing it with the sciences determined by genetic and ætiological methods alone, and eschewing whatever has been associated with speculative theology and ethics, only succeeds in importing the methods of the physical sciences into the conception of the subject, and we are made to believe that a new mode of treatment is to be introduced into sociology after its long servitude to philosophy, theology, and ethics. But when we find that the discussion only substitutes the metaphysics of Mr. Spencer for that of scholasticism under the name of "science," and introduces the teleological methods of politics and ethics into the subject, we have a right to demand that it be defined without direct or indirect prejudice to these larger questions. If the conception of "science" be made convertible with phenomenology and ætiology we can be consistent with this definition of sociology only by rigidly excluding all the problems of teleology, ortho-nomology, and ontology, and cease to bribe popular interest by usurping their functions. On the other hand, if the conception of "science" be systematic knowledge of any kind without invidious distinctions of method then we may well tolerate the form of discussion that we find pervading the work of Professor Giddings. But this conception of it, applied to sociology, forbids all allusions to the difficulties of defining that subject, and the discussion of it, as if it were only an evolutionistic problem. The whole confusion about the definition is self-created. It comes wholly from the attempt to conceive sociology as solely a

genetic and ætiological science, while at the same time importing into it the methods of the philosophical curricula. I agree most thoroughly with the policy of general discussion in regard to social phenomena, especially since we find the necessity of dealing with social environment as distinct from the purely individual problems of psychological analysis. It is important to comprehend in a general and mixed science the questions of origin, nature, utility, and practical method regarding social institutions. But then in this view of the subject it is not necessary to be puzzled about its definition. We can consider sociology loosely as the systematic knowledge of social phenomena and use whatever methods will satisfy our curiosity, and not seek to limit it to the narrow field of causes in order to escape a disagreeable philosophy while retaining its method. The importance of such a science will not consist in any newness of its mode of discussion, nor in its use of evolution, but in the general character of its subject-matter and the unity of theoretical and practical purposes which it effects. For this end we might well sacrifice much quibbling in regard to the definition. If the definition were merely a matter of *territory* there would be little to quarrel about, and if we look to Mr. Spencer's and Professor Giddings' statements we should suppose that the difficulty occurred in setting limits to the territory of sociology. But I do not regard this as in reality the case. The real crux in the definition is the matter of *method*, and Mr. Spencer and Professor Giddings make this wholly ætiological. The use of the term "science" and the formal rejection of metaphysics and its method, the strong reliance upon evolution and genetic principles, the emphasis upon the physical sciences and their associated conceptions, "natural," "determinism," "mechanical law," "physical conditions," etc., are indications of that view which regards the subject as wholly a department of mechanical physics and psychology, a field of pure "*Naturgesetze*," as Kant would call it, and consequently the discussion must be interpreted in the light of a doctrine which logically excludes a large portion of the very elements that are of interest and importance. The sociologist, then, must abandon either his conception of the science or his usurpation of philosophic method. But if he makes reprisals in the field of philosophy he becomes amenable to philosophical courts and his "science" may be challenged. On the other hand, if he claims the protection and honors of "exact and positive method," he must eschew ontological problems as of the devil. The wide general-

izations that endeavor to reduce social phenomena to illustrations of universal physical laws transcend the very basic principle of the science, namely, "the consciousness of kind," and are wholly unnecessary, not to say anything of their contradiction with "the subjective principle of explanation," which are not physical, unless "the consciousness of kind" be found in the inorganic world and the distinction between subjective and objective methods be abandoned. The whole conception of the genetic method in Mr. Spencer and his disciples is burdened with an equivocation that disguises the confusion of wholly distinct problems, namely, the ætiological and the ontological. It does not distinguish between *origin* and *evolution*. The term evolution, as used by the school, plays fast and loose between the ideas of *beginning in time* and *growth*, which is not a beginning in time, but an expansion of inherent capacities. "Science" as an ætiological method deals with the dynamic influences, subjective and objective, that initiate both origin and growth, but it does nothing with the ontological problem regarding the *deduction* or *derivation* of the nature or qualities of a product from its immediate antecedents. Whether "origin" and "evolution," or eventuation and growth, involve increments not found in the antecedent conditions of things, or are merely old conditions in a new dress, is not a problem of "science," but of a method which the positive school has cast out of court.

Nor is this criticism directed against the scientific merits of the work under review. For I recognize the many and excellent qualities of the book in this respect. The accumulation of facts from wide fields of reading and research, in so far as they bear upon sociological questions, makes an important contribution to the study of the subject which those who wish to understand the unity of the sciences may well cultivate, and so I have refrained from all animadversion upon that part of the subject, only to say that I think it the most important as well as the most excellent part of Professor Giddings' work. Indeed it is the purpose of preventing the neglect of this part of it that has tempted me to eliminate its philosophy and so to save the "science." The morbid interest which the majority of mankind show in transcendental metaphysics and wide generalizations about the universe will only lead them to swallow the philosophy of the book and to neglect the "science," which is by far the most important part of it. The popular mind always likes some special principle by which to explain everything, and fairly devours every attempt to supply this want.

"Vortex-atom theories," "ether vibrations," "readjustments of matter and motion," "Kharma," and in the religious world "special providence" are veritable instruments of magic for all who like wide generalizations and a simple philosophy. But whatever the truth in these doctrines, they are not science; they are only metaphysics in a new guise and so are easy substitutes for hard work. All this vast system of metaphysics, or better Spencerian physics, in the reduction of social phenomena, after limiting them to "the consciousness of kind," is only an embargo on a very dubious philosophy for the sake of feeding a false instinct, and hence is like expeditions to the North Pole. You never get there, and you return with few or no contributions to science or philosophy, while the public pays fabulous prices for your lectures and books. What the public needs is more science and less philosophy, and it only keeps it from seeing that part of Professor Giddings' book which is best, to promise us, by the ætiological method, an emancipation from metaphysical questions, when he does not free himself from the same shackles, thus invoking the very instinct that needs regulation, while the scientific and practical merits of the work go unnoticed. This is the invariable tendency of untrained minds, namely, to run after metaphysics and wide generalizations, and to neglect the careful study of facts. But it is not this kind of philosophy that is most needed; nor does practical life depend upon any dogmatic solution of ontological problems. Berkeley's idealism is just as compatible with practical conduct as is Scottish realism, or Cartesian dualism. It is the *law*, not the ontology of phenomena, the uniformity, not the unity of nature, that supplies the important condition of adjustment and conduct, while any conception of sociology that tempts us to digress into metaphysics and to depart from pure science both cuts off the consideration of politics and ethics and restores the methods of scholasticism.[1] I for one would like to see the scientific merits of the present work recognized for their full value and without any discount

[1] There is a good illustration of this in Professor Giddings' adoption of the German conception of the "social will." This is simply a return to Platonic realism which, in spite of its refutation by Aristotle, played so important a part in the philosophical controversies of the Middle Ages. One would have thought that "Occam's razor" had put an end to all that sort of thing. There is no such a thing as the "social will" except for mystical philosophers, and it is strange to find it repeated here after the limitation of the subject to scientific method. We understand what is meant by the individual will (not the abstract, but the concrete individual), but that a collective group of persons should have any personality or will, other than that of each

for metaphysical speculations. But in so far as I can see, there has been no way to place the praise where it belongs and to secure sociology, whether as a pure science, or as a combination of sciences, the decided attention which it needs in modern life, and especially in this country, except to confine the subject to the limits of its own method and to eliminate all the metaphysical and ontological problems that burden it with extreme dubiousness. Hence I cannot but regret that my task compels me to whip Mr. Spencer over Professor Giddings' shoulders; for I regard his work just as much better than Spencer's as it has departed from the latter's evolutionistic metaphysics and accumulated masses of facts pertinent to the practical problems of the day, though to accomplish this he has abandoned his own conception of the science.

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individual composing it, is wholly unintelligible and more confusing than the "duplex personality" of psychology. The votes of majorities and minorities are intelligible, but there is no determinate "social will" in the aggregate. If it does exist, it certainly has a freedom and capriciousness which is incompatible with Professor Giddings' determinism.

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INSURANCE AGAINST NON-EMPLOYMENT.

No social evil has assumed such acute form or such large proportions in so short a time as that of non-employment. The problem is not altogether recent. It seems to be a concomitant of the rapid changes incident to the present industrial system. The more rapid development of mechanical processes, the more extensive use of machine-made machinery, the tendency towards the elimination of the relatively inefficient workmen from industry, and the absorption of unoccupied lands, together with the recent commercial depression, have resulted in a really ominous condition. If it could be believed that the evil is due solely to the cause last mentioned, it need attract no particular attention, save to provide temporary palliatives. But this comforting explanation is hardly credible. It accounts for the present acuteness of the evil, but that which previous to the current depression was only sporadic promises to become chronic even when the epidemic has passed.

Much attention has been given to palliation of this evil, but little to its permanent removal. In previous forms of social organization such evils have been met by some application of the principle of mutual aid, as in the mediæval guilds, in their modern counterpart, the trade unions, and in benevolent societies. These alike fail to reach the difficulty. The functions performed by the mutual-aid principle in earlier forms of society are largely

undertaken in our present industrial system by insurance enterprises — commercialized applications of the social principle. The extensive application of the insurance principle by European governments, to provide for sickness, accident, old age, and other forms of invalidity, suggests the extension of the principle to meet the new evil. Certain experiments, five in all, have been inaugurated in Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, but time alone will give the experience upon which to found such a general system. Most of these attempts have either been instituted by the state or assisted by it. Two of the plans are compulsory, the remainder voluntary. In America any like application of the insurance principle must be upon the commercial basis.

It is argued by those who are opposed to the present tendency toward collective action that individual initiative will undertake all enterprises essential to social welfare and progress, and carry them on more advantageously both for the individual and the group. But there are certain burdens that can be borne and certain activities that can be maintained only by the group collectively. It has seemed that these could not be left to individual enterprise. Yet while such burdens must be borne collectively, the individualist has argued that the collective action should be initiated and voluntarily carried on by individuals. The most prominent of such forms of voluntary coöperation upon a purely individualistic basis are the various forms of insurance companies. It has seemed that non-employment was a form of disability that could not be relieved by an extension of this principle carried out by individual initiative, and that individual enterprise could never undertake to guarantee against it. This latter at least is not the case, for with the current year a private enterprise for insuring against non-employment was launched in Chicago. It is backed both by capital and by managerial ability. We offer no judgment upon the sufficiency of either factor. In many ways the advantages offered by this plan are more promising than those given by the collective undertakings of European localities, though they are inferior in other respects.

The following six attempts, then, are all that have become known outside the limited efforts of trade societies to provide for their own unfortunate. These are attempts to provide for the evil as an inherent one rather than as a temporary inconvenience. The city of Berne, Switzerland, took the initiative in January 1893. This system, which, with some modifications, is still continued, is upon a voluntary basis. The city of St. Gall, Switzerland, established the second in June 1895, in conformity with a law passed by the canton St. Gall the previous year. This was a compulsory state system and was in operation for almost two years. By a plebiscite on November 15, 1896, the system was abolished on and after January 1, 1897. This perhaps is the most instructive instance. In the early part of 1896 a system similar to that of Berne was established in Cologne, Germany, to operate during the winter of 1896–7. This was initiated by private philanthropic agencies, but worked in connection with municipal agencies, and received a large municipal subvention. In May 1896, under the auspices of the Bologna Savings Bank, a similar plan was adopted in Bologna, Italy, to become effective during the winter of 1896–7. In 1895 the grand council of the canton Bâle, Switzerland, appointed a committee to investigate the subject and submit a plan. The committee reported the following year and elaborated a plan in greater detail than any previous one. Though the plan was approved it has not yet been made compulsory as a governmental institution. Zurich and Lucerne have also taken steps towards formulation of similar systems. The Chicago enterprise above referred to, which began business with the current year, is the last of these, and is upon a radically different plan. It is a purely commercial venture similar to the many mutual-insurance companies of the United States.[1]

It will be seen from the above sketch that no comparison of results can be instituted. But a comparison of the features of

[1] This article is in no sense a commendation of the company whose scheme will be outlined below. We state such facts as appear, without presuming to pass judgment upon the responsibility of the organization operating the plan.

the plans may be profitable. A feature of initial importance is that of the forms of invalidity against which insurance is given. In this respect the American enterprise is much more comprehensive than any of the European. All the latter exclude non-employment caused by sickness or accident. These are covered in most cases by other associations to which the laborer belongs, at least if employed. This elimination removes a great burden from the association guaranteeing the indemnity. But the American workman is not so protected; and under normal conditions a large portion of non-employment is due to these causes. In 1892 more than one-third of the 7.7 million German workmen insured under their compulsory-insurance law received benefits for such invalidity. All of the systems except voluntary non-employment as a matter of course; also when due to negligence, incompetency, inebriety, and similar causes within the control of the individual insured. Strikes are similar exemptions, in the case of the Chicago company including all who are thrown out of employment on account of a strike, whether they voluntarily participate or not. The latter company makes one further possible exemption which is deemed "extra-hazardous." That is in case more than twenty-five persons, members of the association, employed by any one person or firm become unemployed at any one time by reason of a "shut down" or any other cause. Then the total number of beneficiaries is entitled to receive only so much indemnity as twenty beneficiaries would be entitled to receive, based on a salary of $40 per month, this being paid *pro rata*.

All other forms of involuntary non-employment entitle one to receipt of benefits, though a refusal to accept work when offered is an indication of voluntary non-employment. In the European systems departure from the locality invalidates all claims. A somewhat similar provision in the American system is that a change of occupation or location, without notification and approval, to an occupation or location more hazardous or uncertain as to permanency renders the contract voidable at the option of the association. Delinquencies in all cases forfeit the

right to benefits. In the Swiss cases the insured must have paid premiums for six months, in Cologne for eight months. In the latter case there are requirements for inspection and cancellation of stamps used in the payment of dues. In the American plan the applicant for insurance must have had regular employment for the previous six months. Insurance in anticipation of impending discharge is a similar bar to receipt of benefits.

The terms upon which the insurance is granted are of course much easier in European cases, where the government, private charity, or the employers contribute ; in some cases all three, in all cases at least two of these. The American system must be self-supporting and in the long run prove profitable to the promoters. In this association there is an initiation fee of $3, evidently to cover soliciting and incidental expenses. In Europe there is no initiation fee; but in Cologne payment of premiums for eight months and in Switzerland for six months is a prerequisite to participation. In all the European systems benefits begin to accrue only after from five to seven days' idleness. In the American case they begin immediately, one day's sickness entitling the insured to a proportionate benefit.

The size of the premium depends upon the amount of benefits given and upon the proportion of the support furnished by sources other than the premiums paid by the insured. From both reasons the premiums of the commercial enterprise are higher than those of the others. The commercial enterprise calls for a monthly payment of $1 by each insured on the basis of a monthly salary of $30 or less, and from those insured on a basis of a salary in excess of that sum an additional amount each month equal to 1 per cent. on the excess. The indemnity is proportioned to the premiums. While out of employment the beneficiary receives one-half of the amount taken as the basis of the monthly salary upon which the policy was issued, for a period of not more than four months out of each twelve, beginning with the date of his certificate of enrollment. Mention of the other benefits is postponed. In the Cologne Association, insured workmen pay a weekly premium of twenty-five pfennigs (about

six cents). This is done by purchasing stamps and affixing them in a cash book. There are further requirements as to presentation and cancellation of these and relating to reporting (twice a day) at the central office while out of work. These members are given first consideration by the General Labor Registry of the city, with which the association is connected. In case work cannot be secured members are entitled to draw a daily allowance from the insurance fund for a maximum period of eight weeks during the time elapsing between December 15th and March 15th. The daily allowance is as follows: For the first twenty days on which no work can be obtained a workman with a family receives two marks (about forty-eight cents); an unmarried workman receives one mark twenty pfennigs (about twenty-eight cents). For the remainder of the eight weeks the allowance is one-half this sum.

In the system as first adopted at Berne the dues were forty centimes (eight cents) per month. The benefits amounted to one franc fifty centimes (about thirty cents) per day for workmen with families, and one franc for those unmarried. This was given only in the winter months and never for more than two months out of the three. As modified in 1895 the dues were raised to fifty centimes per month and the benefits raised fifty centimes for each class.

The St. Gall plan called for a contribution varying from fifteen to thirty centimes per week according to the wages earned, and the benefits varied accordingly. The following table gives the plan adopted, though the cantonal law permitted considerable variation.

	Earnings per day	Premiums per week	Benefits per day
First class,	3 fr. or less	15 centimes	1 fr. 80 cent.
Second class,	from 3 to 4 fr.	20 centimes	2 fr. 10 cent.
Third class,	from 4 to 5 fr.	30 centimes	2 fr. 40 cent.

Benefits could be drawn for a maximum period of sixty days per year.

The plan elaborated at Bâle was as follows: All workmen receiving an annual wage of less than 2000 francs ($400) were

to be divided into three groups and each group into three classes. Their weekly contributions were as follows:

	1st class: earning less than 15 fr. per week	2d class: earning from 15 to 24 fr. per week	3d class: earning more than 24 fr. per week
First group: those engaged in mfg. industries,	10 centimes	15 centimes	20 centimes
Second group: those engaged in building trades not subject to irregularities,	20 centimes	30 centimes	50 centimes
Third group: those engaged in building trades exposed to climatic conditions,	30 centimes	45 centimes	60 centimes

The benefits vary from a minimum of eighty centimes (sixteen cents) per day for the unmarried man of the first class to a maximum of two francs (forty cents) per day for the married man of the third class having more than one child younger than fourteen years of age. The details are quite complex. Relief is given for no more than ninety-one days.

The case at Bologna is quite simple and relatively unimportant. The annual dues are one dollar for those over twenty-one years of age, and sixty-six cents for those younger. This must be paid between June 1st and October 18th. After this date the insured is entitled to relief, for not more than forty days beginning with the sixth day out of work, amounting to twenty cents per day if over twenty-one years of age and twelve cents per day if younger.

So far as the insured are concerned these constitute all the financial obligations save in one instance. The Chicago association provides that beneficiaries shall be further bound to pay upon demand a special assessment of such an amount as may be needed to pay the indemnities, benefits, or expenses of conducting the business, provided that such total additional assessment shall not aggregate, during the period of one year, more than one-fourth of the total amount agreed by the beneficiary to be paid during such year. It is specified that such assessment shall be made, if at all, only in the event of special and unforeseen necessity, such as epidemics, disastrous fires, or unusual dis-

turbances affecting earners of salaries. The explanation of this is that with all the other risks there are sufficient data in the experience of other insurance companies to furnish a basis of calculation, but there being none for the causes affecting the stability of employment, such an elastic clause must be included. This, however, is a matter of no little importance to the insured, and must be given full consideration in estimating the advantages and disadvantages of the plan.

The table on page 779 gives a comparative view of the advantages and disadvantages of all the systems from the standpoint of the insured workman, taking the maximum premium and benefit as a basis.

It appears that the Swiss systems, which are much more scientifically elaborated, afford the greatest advantages to the insured, so far as the ratio of premiums to benefits is concerned. While with the highest paid laborers the ratio rises above 10 per cent., yet as a rule it falls below that figure. With the Bologna system the ratio is above that figure, while with the Cologne system it is far above it. In fact it is considerably higher than with the American commercial system. With the former the variation is from 19.1 per cent. to 31.6 per cent.; while with the latter, even including the possible assessment, the variation is from 11 per cent. to 25 per cent., or without the assessment from 8.8 per cent. to 20 per cent. In respect to the American laborer it is evident that a well organized and conducted system of mutual aid would accomplish the same result with less sacrifice, but experience has demonstrated the futility or at least the insufficiency of these for the present at least. Systems such as those adopted in Europe are even more inadequate. It is true that the practical point to be considered in each case is not so much the advantages relative to foreign systems as the advantage compared with that which actually or potentially exists in the same society. Yet this consideration is one aside from our present purpose.

One point of difference is to be noted, and it is characteristic of the different principles upon which the institutions are founded. The American plan, based upon commercial principles,

	Dues	Benefits	Maximum duration of benefits	Annual premiums	Annual premiums plus possible assessments	Maximum annual benefits	Ratio of dues to benefits	
							Premiums (per cent.)	Total premiums and assessments (per cent.)
Chicago	$1.00 per month	$15.00 per mo.	4 months out of 12	$12.00	$15.00	$ 60.00	20	25
	1.20 per month	25.00 per mo.		14.20	17.75	100.00	14.2	17.75
	1.30 per month	30.00 per mo.		15.60	19.50	120.00	13	16.25
	2.20 per month	75.00 per mo.		26.40	33.00	300.00	8.8	11
Cologne	25 pfennigs per week	2 marks for first 20 days; 1 mark for 28 days[1] 1 mark 20 pf. for first 20 days, 60 pf. for 28 days[2]	8 weeks	13 marks		68 marks[1] 40.8 marks[2]	19.1[1] 31.6[2]	
Berne 1893–5	40 centimes per week	1 fr. per day[2] 1½ fr. per day[1]	8 weeks	4 fr. 80 cent.		48 fr.[2] 72 fr.[1]	10 [2] 6.6[1]	
Berne 1895–7	50 centimes per week	1½ fr. per day[2] 2 fr. per day[1]	8 weeks	6 fr.		72 fr.[2] 96 fr.[1]	8.3 [2] 6.25[1]	
St. Gall	15 cent. per w.	1 fr. 80 cent. per d.	60 days	7 fr. 80		108 fr.	7.2	
	20 cent. per w.	2 fr. 10 cent. per d.	60 days	10 fr. 40		126 fr.	8.2	
	30 cent. per w.	2 fr. 40 cent. per d.	60 days	15 fr. 60		144 fr.	10.12	
Bâle	10 cent. per w. (minimum)	80 cent. per day (minimum)	91 days	5 fr. 20		72 fr. 80	7.1	
	60 cent. per w. (maximum)	2 francs per day (maximum)	91 days	31 fr. 20		182 fr.	17.1	
Bologna	$0.66 per year (minimum)	$0.12 per day (minimum)	40 days	$0.66		$4.80	13.7	
	$1.00 per year (maximum)	$0.20 per day (maximum)	40 days	$1.00		$8.00	12.5	

[1] Married men.

[2] Single men.

offers greater advantages as one is in receipt of higher salary and pays a larger premium. With the European systems the reverse is invariably true. In Berne and Cologne, to be sure, the distinction is that of being married or not, yet the premium being the same it is equivalent to a distinction in the amount of income. As might be expected there is a great divergence as to the absolute size of both premiums and benefits, in the American case both being far larger. As to the ratio of premiums to wages the relation can be determined only in three cases. In the Chicago system the ratio varies from 1.4 per cent. to 3.3 per cent.; in the St. Gall system from .8 per cent. to 1.2 per cent.; in the Bâle system from .66 per cent. to 2.5 per cent. The relative merits in this respect are quite similar to those elaborated above. And, as with the above, the American system discriminates in favor of the one with the larger income, while with the European systems the reverse is the case.

Such a comparative study is quite misleading without consideration of the sources of the funds. The commercial company, as a matter of course, has no source of support save the contributions of members, though guaranteed by private capital as an investment. The Cologne Insurance Society receives funds from four sources. First, the contributions of those insured. Second, from subscriptions of members of the society. This membership is acquired by the annual payment of five marks. Workmen not desiring insurance are allowed to become members upon the payment of three marks in twenty-five pfennig monthly installments. Third, from the subscriptions of employers, societies, clubs, etc., which may become honorary members upon the payment of any sum not less than 300 marks. Fourth, from the city of Cologne. In this way 40,000 marks were accumulated before the payments of benefits were begun. Since the first period of operation (December 15, 1896, to March 15, 1897) has not expired, no comparison of contributions of the insured with contributions from all other sources can be made.

As stated above, the Bologna system was instituted by the Bologna Savings Bank, which appropriated the interest upon

$40,000 of government bonds. No data for further comparison are at hand. The Swiss systems all receive state aid. The contributions at Berne were as follows: for 1893–4, membership fees, 1125 francs; employers' contributions, 949 francs; donations, 1005 francs; canton Berne, 4735 francs; total, 7815 francs; or only 15 per cent. from the insured. In 1894–5, membership fees, 1366 francs; employers' contributions, 1703 francs; donations, 2970 francs; canton Berne, 5000 francs; other sources, 616 francs; or a total of 11,665 francs, of which less than 12 per cent. was contributed by the insured. Under the new plan, while the contributions from the insured were increased, so also were the benefits, necessitating a further increase of the state subsidy. This amounted to 7000 francs in 1895–6. The proportionate size of the contributions was not materially changed.

In 1895–6 (July to July) the St. Gall system received about 21,000 francs from premiums, about 28,300 francs from the state, then leaving a deficit of about 1750 francs. The premiums here amounted to 42.6 per cent. of the total contributions. The final report for the remainder of the year 1896 is not at hand. At Bâle the employers are compelled to contribute for each person insured in the first, second, and third group respectively 10, 15, and 20 centimes per week. The city bears all the expense of administration and contributes 25,000 francs in addition.

The Swiss systems thus have the guarantee of the local governments, which take the initiative and bear the burden of the financial support. The Cologne system has the partial support of the local government and is entirely guaranteed by public organization. The Bologna bank is the sole guarantor of that system and only to the extent specified. It is especially provided that the assistance is to continue forty days only in case of sufficient income from the funds appropriated. The Chicago company has the guarantee of the promoters of the enterprise based on private contract. That is, the association is a limited copartnership. The laws of incorporation in their existing form do not permit of its incorporation in any state. No better

evidence of its novelty could be adduced. The special guarantee in this case is a guarantee fund as in the case of many insurance companies.

A further comparison of advantages reveals points of interest. In the first place all of the systems make some provision for securing employment for insured members when thrown out of work. The German and Swiss systems do this by means of local government bureaus. The Chicago association will work at first through several local employment bureaus and in time will organize a special department of its own to serve this purpose. In all such cases there is no additional expense to the workman insured, though refusal of suitable employment renders void further claims. Thus an important social as well as private function is performed.

The superior advantages offered by the Chicago association in regard to sickness and accident have been mentioned. In case of death it also provides that the heirs of the insured are entitled to the total amount of monthly payments which have been paid in up to the date of the death. The only similar provision is in case of the Cologne society, where, if a person dies or becomes permanently disabled before he is entitled to draw an allowance, he or his heirs shall be entitled to the subscriptions paid during the current year—a provision of much less advantage than the previous one. In regard to permanent disability, provided for in the Cologne plan as above, the Chicago plan provides that for total disability from any cause not his own fault such beneficiary shall be entitled to the indemnity for a term of twelve months following the date of the beginning of the disability; provided further that all monthly payments due during that twelve-month period, and any sum which he may have before received as indemnity, shall be deducted therefrom. At the end of this twelve-month period the contract is to be considered dissolved.

There is a savings feature in the Chicago plan which offers great financial advantage to the insured over and above those given in the European systems. It is provided that at the end

of ten years from the date of his certificate of enrollment any beneficiary may cease payments, and after sixty days' notice to this effect may receive one-half the face value of all the money he has paid in as monthly payments, less any sum he may have received as indemnity. Upon similar conditions at the end of twenty years he is entitled to the entire sum paid in as monthly premiums. While this is less than the endowment life insurance companies agree to do, yet, considering the risks covered by the company, it is an additional feature of great attractiveness.

The stipulations in regard to payment of dues are quite similar. Delinquencies incur a forfeiture of all claims. The Chicago association provides for a system of fines as penalties for delinquencies of less than thirty days, after which all further claims are forfeited.

There are certain other conditions of eligibility not yet mentioned, such as age, previous period of employment, etc. At Berne any citizen of Switzerland, resident of Berne, was eligible to membership. At St. Gall all resident workmen receiving daily wages less than five francs, and not insured in other societies offering equivalent advantages, were compelled to join. The system at Bâle applied to resident workmen, native or foreign, over fourteen years of age, not receiving more than 2000 francs annually. Apprentices under eighteen years of age receiving less than 200 francs annually were also exempted. The law applied to all industries subject to the Federal Factory Laws, and to the building trades. At Cologne, workmen eighteen years of age, domiciled at Cologne for at least two years, and not incapacitated for work, were eligible. Any workman more than fourteen years old was eligible at Bologna. The American association insures only those who have been employed for the previous six months and are between the ages of eighteen and fifty The arrival at this latter age is sufficient to terminate the contract. The plan thus fails to deal with one of the most potent causes of this form of invalidity. The internal organization of the systems presents many other points of interest, but further elaboration must be omitted.

As to experience, three societies alone furnish any data. Under the Berne plan 404 persons were insured during 1893–4. Fifty of these became delinquent, 216 claimed benefits. For fifty-one of these employment was provided. The remainder drew benefits to the sum of 6835 francs, an average of 41 francs. In 1894–5 there were 390 insured, 226 applying for relief. Seven of these were given work. The remainder were given aid to the sum of almost 10,000 francs, an average of 45 francs apiece. In the following winter there were (in January) 768 insured, and 248 drawing relief. The St. Gall system was more extensive in its application. In 1895–6 there were 3430 men insured, 2412 upon a wage basis of three francs a day, 920 upon a wage basis of four francs a day, and ninety-eight upon a wage basis of five francs a day. There were more than 1100 delinquencies, to the sum of 4000 francs. There were 387 applicants for relief; twenty-eight found work, and 359 drew benefits amounting to almost 20,000 francs. The average was fifty-four francs sixty centimes. The results of the experience for the portion of the current year are not at hand. At Cologne 229 applied for insurance, nine of these being rejected as ineligible; ninety-three claimed benefits, fifty-five of whom were given work. There were on February 10th thirty-eight in receipt of benefit. During the entire winter relief to the amount of $445 was distributed among seventy-three beneficiaries.

These results are hardly sufficient to afford a basis of generalization; results of further experience will be awaited with interest. In time no doubt these organizations will have many imitators, in Europe based upon governmental aid, in America upon private enterprise. These pioneer efforts are certainly deserving of great credit and appreciative consideration.

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SOME ECONOMIC LOSSES IN THE BUILDING TRADES.

ALL who cling to the *a priori* method of economic investigation base their reasoning on the tendency of labor to seek the point of least resistance, or, as it is more frequently set forth, on the tendency of man to satisfy his desires with the least possible exertion. The "economic man," always seeking the greatest returns for the least effort, seems to control the directorate of every important industrial and commercial establishment. His influence gives assurance that in every department of trade and industry the most productive and least wasteful methods will be adopted; that with the progress of invention and discovery the direct and indirect waste of effort will be lessened; and that the results, in proportion to labor or effort, will be increased to the greatest possible extent. Every machine which inventive genius produces is carefully tested, and the relation of its cost to its efficiency in increasing the productiveness of labor is anxiously computed. Whenever a new invention, whether of a machine or a method, promises a gain, however slight, in the net products of labor, it rapidly displaces old devices. It is no exaggeration to say that in the resulting industrial revolution of recent years the productiveness of labor in some lines has been increased many fold. But in some cases these changes, though apparently increasing the results of human effort, have surrounded that effort with adverse economic conditions, thus neutralizing the supposed economic gain or even turning it into a loss. This has occurred under circumstances which render a return to the method of greatest effectiveness impossible.

These unexpected or overlooked results are chiefly noticeable in the building trades, to a few of the branches of which the following observations will be confined. In carpentry labor-saving machinery has accomplished remarkable changes during the past three decades. Only the older generation of house

carpenters, and a few younger men who learned their trade under more conservative conditions, can now make doors, shutters, sashes or frames with any fair degree of dexterity. The introduction of machinery has transferred that work to the planing mills, and the work of the house carpenter is limited to fitting the products of the mills together. When the change was first extensively introduced twenty-five or thirty years ago it effected a great reduction in the cost of building operations. The steam planer, shaper, and mortising machine began to turn out work at a cost that seemed phenomenal. The skilled carpenter, who used to test the strength of his antiquated seven-by-nine sashes by standing on the cross bars, was displaced for a great part of the year by the "machine hand," who having less knowledge and training could be secured at lower wages. The carpenter had been earning wages ranging from one to two dollars per day according to the locality. A "steady job" was the natural condition of his trade. In winter he made sashes, doors, frames and other articles, and in summer he was out on the buildings under construction. With the introduction of the new methods his winter work disappeared and the increased competition for what may be called the remainder of his trade lessened the wages obtainable during the working season. There was in consequence a great reduction in the cost of carpentry. But the carpenter showed his relationship to the "economic man." His services could not be dispensed with entirely. They were absolutely necessary during a part of the year, and to that end (in an economic sense) he must live during the idle interval. For a time that living must have been a serious problem. But the condition of the trade warned young men from learning it, and conditions for those remaining gradually improved. In time the trade adjusted itself to the new conditions, and the house carpenter became able to obtain quite as much wages for the "working months" as was previously paid for the entire year. The friction of supply and demand in the labor market now gives him pay for the idle time which results from the introduction of machinery. Estimated by the hour, his wage, while working, is from twice to three

times as much as it was three decades ago, and the consequent increase in what may be called the skilled part of his work goes a long way toward counterbalancing the cheapness secured by the more extended use of machinery.

It is impossible to make an approach toward accuracy in estimating the ratio of profit and loss. But it is evident that, even if the natural and gradual increase in time wages should change the gain from the use of machinery into a loss, it would be impossible for even the "economic man" to return to what would be really the cheaper method of production. The house carpenter will not accept the old wages during the working season on the strength of a promise of steady work at sash and door making during the otherwise idle months. He has little faith in any such promise. The condition of every trade is unstable, and an employer would be equally unwilling to substitute hand work for machinery during the period of indoor work, on the expectation of securing the services of the workman at cheaper rates during the building season.

Another obstacle is found in the fact that planing-mill work and house carpentry have become different lines of business. Waste occurs through the payment for idle time, and although the loss is not a natural necessity it is rendered unavoidable by the commercial relations of the trade.

In steam fitting a similar change has taken place within a shorter period. It was a natural condition in the seventies for a steam fitter to have steady work, and his wages varied from $1.50 per day upward. During the latter part of winter and through the spring months he built radiating coils of iron pipe and engaged in lines of work which have since passed to the blacksmith shop and the foundry. With the introduction of the cast-iron radiator and boiler came a decided fall in the cost of steam and hot-water heating. The new radiators were found to be not only cheaper but more open and cleanly. There was no more work for the steam fitter building coils "in the shop," his service being required only for connecting boilers and radiators in buildings. For a time the working mechanics in the trade suf-

fered through the change. Work was limited to half the year, and wages were still lower. But the natural result was a drifting away from the trade, until the scarcity of men during the working season had a compensating influence. Time wages in the trade have more than doubled during the past twenty years, the workmen being now able to secure their yearly maintenance, according to recognized standards of living, by working during the shortened period of employment. The change caused by the introduction of cast-iron radiators lessened the cost of heating apparatus, but necessitated a period of idleness for steam fitters each year. Now that they are able to secure sufficient wages during the working months to compensate for the idle period the cost of fitting up a heating plant is greater than under the old conditions of steady work and lower wages. Had the progress of invention done away entirely with the work of the journeyman steam fitter the cheapening would have been permanent. But, as the changes have made a period of enforced idleness which must be paid for, the reduction of cost was merely temporary. A return to the old methods, though it would give greater product in proportion to outlay, is not at present possible. Industrial forces are prevented from reaching their natural level by the same forces that are noticeable in the carpenters' trade. Architects, too, have accepted the new conditions, and specify the new fixtures in all contracts.

The much abused plumber is not generally regarded as subject to the ordinary laws of economics, yet recent changes in his work closely resemble those which have taken place in other building trades. The change from steady to temporary employment has been perhaps less marked, owing to the "jobbing" and repairing in which he has won or lost his reputation. But innovations have caused an idle period in his yearly work, and the law of supply and demand has given him compensation in the form of higher wages during the working months. While the time between outside "jobs" was occupied in making lead traps and bends, and in work which has passed to the brass finisher, employment was steady and wages ranged low compared with

present rates. But there are now only a few plumbers of the old school who can make lead traps, and their services are never required for that work. When the old methods were in vogue the making of three four-inch traps was regarded as a fair day's work. A man sitting beside a modern machine can turn out many score in the time formerly allotted to three. Contrary to the general rule the product of the machine is superior in many ways to the handmade article. The work of connecting fixtures in buildings has also been materially lessened by more recent inventions. The slow, skillful handling of lead has been superseded to a great extent by new methods, but is still an essential part of the work. The lead trap machines and other innovations made a marked reduction in the cost of work. But a few years of partial idleness brought about conditions which enabled mechanics to secure proportionately higher time wages, thus neutralizing the economic gain temporarily secured by the labor-saving inventions.

In bricklaying and masonry the contrast between British and American conditions illustrates the change from old to new conditions in other building trades. In Great Britain employment is far more steady on account of the general use of fireplaces, grates, and other adjuncts requiring the work of the bricklayer and mason. In the United States and Canada the bricklayer leaves the ordinary building after finishing the walls and chimneys, his work being, in consequence, less steady than in Great Britain. The natural force of competition enables him to obtain proportionately higher rates for the time of actual employment, the consumers being forced virtually to remunerate him for lost time. Stoves, furnaces, and various systems of artificial heating are adopted on account of climatic conditions, and the nature of the western fuel supply, rather than through a desire for cheapness. But the effect has been similar to that of the cheapening inventions alluded to above. Employment has been rendered less continuous in certain necessary branches of the building trades, with a consequent increase in the cost of their products.

It is evident that when a labor-saving or cheapening invention dispenses to a limited extent with any particular trade or calling, and the essential work remaining is crowded into a certain season, there must be economic waste through intervals of enforced idleness. Although the result may be an immediate lessening of the cost of production, the advantage may subsequently disappear or be changed into an actual loss through the necessity of remunerating the partially displaced workers for their lost or idle time. When such a situation arises no way at present appears by which the pressure of competition can force labor back to its more productive channels.

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THE PRESENT STATUS OF SOCIOLOGY IN GERMANY. III.

IV.

A SIGN of the relation between socialism and individualism appears in the fact that wherever the former is found, the latter immediately shows itself in force. In Germany, where socialism is advancing toward victory, individualistic tendencies of every sort are more and more vigorous. Fifty years ago, when socialism was not so strong, and had less place in the consciousness of the population, Max Stirner's powerful book, *Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum* attracted little notice. On the other hand Friedrich Nietzsche has given our own time a violent electric shock. His ideas, much more subtile than Stirner's, quickly appeared in all branches of literature. Our polite letters are full of "blonde beasts," and in social thought individualism again raises its hand obstinately and with confidence of success.

Nietzsche has revived Stirner, and in him he contends with a whole series of social theorems. First anarchy. Nietzsche's own philosophy is neither socialistic nor anarchistic. He knows only the strong, sovereign, self-contained individual. The masses, for whom social philosophy is usually concerned, are for Nietzsche the "much-too-many." They are for the amusement and service of the "superior man" (*Uebermensch*)—"beyond that let them go to the devil and statistics." His "superior men" are ends unto themselves, not for the "guidance" of the masses. He has no place for an institutionalized aristocracy. Whoever has subdued man so as to become a "superior man" *is* an aristocrat, and he does not trouble himself about the worm beneath.

No more does Nietzsche teach anarchism in the social sense. On the contrary, his "superior men," his "blonde beasts," are the most rigorous despots. For them alone, the select, there is no law, because they stand above the law. For the masses

"slave morals" must prevail. Stirner teaches anarchism of an individualistic sort, not the communistic anarchism so well known today. His theory is also more objective than Nietzsche's, not merely in its form of presentation, but also in its entire conception. In distinction from Nietzsche's individualism he fastens upon "egoism" as an objective psychical factor, and makes unlimited egoism an objective social postulate.

Anarchism finds Stirner a support, but both he and Nietzsche give aid and comfort to the most recent movement in social philosophy, which is turning from social democracy to social aristocracy. The bent toward aristocracy is supposed to be toward satisfaction of individualistic wishes and inclinations.

There is an anonymous writer[1] who attempts to unite his social instincts with his individualistic inclinations so as to construct an objective social system. The title of the book betrays the author's social instincts. The individual has for him no independent value. He is worth considering and entitled to existence only in so far as he is of service to the whole. Of the era of civilization which his book is to introduce, the author declares: "It recognizes the individual only as an aristocrat, *i.e.*, in so far as he is actually better than the rest by virtue of his personal qualities" (p. 109). These qualities appear only in social services, in work for the people. An aristocrat is therefore only he who performs useful and valuable labors for his nation.

The essential doctrines of this author may be condensed into a few sentences. He recognizes two forces which hold a society — primarily, a nation — together, and make it great; first, industrial force, and, second, procreative force. The latter is the more important. If natural increase of population is so great that there is overcrowding, colonization is necessary and salutary, for among other things war will cease, because national boundaries will come to include more than the territories of the fatherland.

The author's attitude toward private property further shows his way of mediation between socialistic and individualistic

[1] *Volksdienst.* Von einem Socialaristokraten. Berlin und Leipzig, 1893.

tendencies. On the one hand he urges that with private property the "joy of life" begins; on the other hand he recommends the abolition of hereditary rights. The state should be the sole heir of all decedents. Only what one has himself earned he should be allowed to retain for life.

The only possible form of government in his social-aristocratic state is thought by the author to be a republic, for under such a government the most deserving will always be placed at the head of affairs by their grateful fellows. He reduces his social-aristocratic ethics to the following code: 1) Thou shalt labor. 2) No work, no pay! 3) No duty, no right! 4) The sexual command—Thou shalt not sell thy person! We see that the decalogue is here compressed into four articles, of which 2) and 3) are identical, and are not commands but perceived facts Thus the new ethic has but two commandments and these were in principle familiar to every philistine in the eighteenth century.

Still briefer is the ethic of the anarchist Bruno Wille,[1] for he has none at all. Wille is a *communistic* anarchist, yet he cannot free himself from Nietzsche. He cannot keep from glorifying the individual, although he has society for the most part in mind. In his essential ideas, however, he is dependent upon Eugene Dühring, although he confesses with touching modesty that he has not quite clearly comprehended this thinker's philosophy. We need only to recall a few of Dühring's sentences to show the dependence. For example: "Free socialization can never end in lordship of one over others."[2] "Force as such is an evil even when it serves righteousness" (p. 270). "If natural political socialization had anywhere been able to develop itself without serious interference from the robber system, the great powers with their weak supports would never have existed" (p. 279).

Bruno Wille starts with an abstract free "man of reason" (*Vernunftmensch*). This assumed being, without hindrance from

[1] *Philosophie der Befreiung durch das reine Mittel.* Beiträge zur Pädagogik des Menschengeschlechts. Berlin, 1894.

[2] *Cursus der Philosophie*, p. 265.

the "robber system," without "violence, which ought to be used only in behalf of righteousness," begins socialization. Wille assures us that his "man of reason" will never hit upon "a lordship of one over another."

Wille's "free man of reason" is of course one of Nietzsche's "blonde beasts." "The free man of reason is conscienceless" (p. 103). He is selfish, otherwise he would be no "lord" (*Herr*), but a "slave." But all these lordly qualities do not hinder the "free man of reason" from being a very civil member of any society. Wille thinks that in the men of today, particularly in the "free men of reason," "judgment and sympathy are sufficiently developed so that they may be told that it is possible for them to live better in agreement and order than in chaotic strife" (p. 204). If we would only leave people to themselves, after abolition of all violence and removal of all compulsion, they would get along among themselves quite well. There would no longer be any trace of Hobbes' *bellum omnium contra omnes*.

Wille pictures the society of the future somewhat after this fashion. Free competition in the most unrestricted form, and private property remain. To be sure private property amounts to an exclusion on one side, a limitation, and in anarchic society there should be no right of exclusion or limitation. Wille cannot construct a social order without private property and must consequently adopt this trivial contradiction into his system. For the guardianship of this private property a "protective alliance" (*Schutzbündnis*) will be formed which, however, as Wille assures us, will never develop into a sovereign state. It is essentially a "free union" which besides insures to the members the greatest advantages. Moreover the protection will not be secured by forcible means, but by "empirical correction." By this barbarous phrase Wille means, with T. G. Vogt, the improvement of men through public opinion and injurious reactions of their conduct upon themselves. It will thus be "a human society free from *moral* authority and lordship, free from moral demands, from duties, from servile compunctions of conscience" (p. 275).

Nietzsche wants the same, but he will have no such society. He posits all this only for the sovereign individual who is great and solitary and stands beyond all society. Here is the difference between the genial poet philosopher and his poor imitator.

Wille does not see that everything which he drives out—morality, law, force, etc.—he admits again through a rear door There will be no morality, but in its place there will be "reason seeking and recognizing advantage." Now the coördination of morality and reason is as old as human thought, yet Wille thinks he is teaching something entirely new. There will be no "force," no "police," but the individual will be thrown upon his own reason—that is, whatever opposes the reason of the large majority will undergo "empirical correction" through social indignation. How far removed is regulated punishment by flagellation?

Wille and all his anarchistic sympathizers entirely lack not only logical clearness and precision but the use of sociological methods of thought. They have not grasped the central thought of our science, viz., evolution. If they possessed this thought they could never arrive at the absurd conceit of dissolving society in order to enable men, without any bond of union or regulation of their relations, to pursue their several ways alongside of each other. They would then know that our social order has developed itself on the basis of eternal physical and psychical laws, and that wherever men live together some form of authority and therewith of "force" must be developed.

It cannot be inferred from this thought, to be sure, that our social order neither needs nor is susceptible of improvement, nor that a social reform is equivalent to an assault upon eternal natural laws. By the idea of evolution we are by no means forced to that stupid satisfaction at which Otto Ammon[1] has arrived, who counts himself happy to have been born into "this best of all worlds."

[1] *Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natürlichen Grundlagen.* Entwurf einer socialen Anthropologie zum Gebrauche für alle Gebildete, die sich mit socialen Fragen befassen. Jena, 1895.

When Ammon speaks of the "natural basis" of social order, he thinks he has found that unalterable law of nature which neither may nor can be shaken. In his social-aristocratic loftiness he misunderstands the socialistic theory when he attributes to it the view that our present social order is "unnatural," or when he makes it disregard the law of evolution. Theoretical socialism stands, foremost of all social theories, on the ground of evolutionary conceptions. To that extent—*i. e.*, in respect of the theory of evolution—Darwinism is no recourse against social-democratic conceptions. Only when it comes to the discussion whether the Darwinian doctrine of selection is compatible with the socialistic doctrine of equality can Ammon assert that the theory of selection points clearly to an aristocracy. If only those individuals survive that are strong and best fitted for the conditions of life, while the weak are destroyed in the struggle for existence, there is little room for the idea that equality is to be attributed to all individuals. Nature does not treat all alike; she makes strict and severe selections.

But the consequence that Ammon draws by no means follows, viz., that the social system of today with its abrupt class distinctions is essentially without need of improvement, and that improvements in the sense of social reform are impossible. Ammon repeats the old blunder, which social theorists have frequently committed, of taking a natural law—not to say a mere hypothesis—bodily over into social theory. We may think what we please about the metaphysical question of the freedom of the will; a certain conscious teleology, in the individual and social psychological sense, cannot be denied. It at least constitutes a recourse, which must not be undervalued, against the decisive application of a blind natural law to social life. Moreover, the whole of practical physics is nothing but the conquest of natural laws by natural laws. Why shall it not be possible in social life, assuming the validity of the law of selection here also, to modify its operation by the force of other laws?

Ammon constructs, after the model of Galton, a so-called "curve of intelligence," and hereupon a "curve of welfare," both

according to the same scheme, and he is highly gratified to find that they correspond. The conclusion is—the higher classes are also of higher intelligence. And now he wishes—out of pure pity for the lower classes—that they should remain at their present level, without offering to the more capable among them opportunity and help to work themselves up to a higher level. "For," says he, "if the best talents are constantly withdrawn from the lower class and added to the higher, the lower class will represent only the *soil* from which the most valuable components are drained away" (p. 65).

A consistent Darwinist must arrive at the conclusion that separation of classes is an evil. Since the lower classes are actually on a lower intellectual level—to show this the elaborate apparatus which Ammon employs is surely superfluous—it is a demand of social interest that there should be a crossing of classes, in order that somehow a better sort of men should result. Ammon, on the other hand, is enamored of class divisions because they prevent intermixture.

Again he finds another justification of class barriers in the superior opportunities thus secured to the higher classes for the nurture and education of their children, a condition of things conducive to the development of highly talented individuals. For the lower classes it has the advantage that it rouses and encourages their emulation. Ammon calculates with mathematical exactness the probability that a man will find a wife who is his intellectual equal. The wider the room for choice the smaller the probability, and therewith the diminished probability, of mentally well-endowed descendants. He comes to this conclusion: "There is a provision of nature by which it comes about that two individuals who are adapted to each other are oftener united than would occur according to the law of probability. The provision in question is the *separation of the higher classes from the great mass of the population*" (p. 89). I imagine that an experienced anthropologist would oppose to this theory the fact that degeneracy in the higher, and especially in the highest, classes is today alarmingly advanced, and is still progressing. He

might also assign as the cause constant intermarriage within restricted groups.

Ammon might have learned from Galton that the intellectual aristocracy does not perpetuate itself through many generations That the social aristocracy remains so long in control is perhaps due rather to the slowness of social development than to a "fortunate" natural law. At all events it is impossible to join in the naïve optimism of Ammon: "We have found reason for the assumption that in most cases the right man comes to the fitting place, and to the right place comes the fitting man" (p. 179). The world is as yet far from such harmony and will doubtless long remain so.

In one respect I fully agree with Ammon, namely, in the demand that chairs of ethnology, anthropology, and sociology should be founded in the German universities (*Hochschulen*). These disciplines are in point of fact sadly neglected. There are no special chairs of sociology, and in only a few universities are there even docents who treat this discipline more or less exclusively. So far as I know there are, in Berlin, Georg Simmel, in Freiburg, E. Grosse, and in Leipsic, Paul Barth.

Simmel has an audience that is increasing in numbers each semester. For several years he has read in the summer semester on social psychology, and in the winter semester a special course on sociology. Everyone who knows his *Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaften* will guess that in his lectures on ethics he introduces and suggests many sociological ideas and points of view. Besides this he conducts a seminar for sociological practice. Here reports are made on sociological books and independent dissertations are read. Simmel himself usually conducts the discussions. This is for the moment very agreeable to the listeners, but it is pedagogically by no means advantageous. A seminar is solely for the purpose of accustoming the members to independent work through their own elaborations of subjects, and especially through active participation in

discussion. If the members only hear the words of the teacher the seminar fails to fulfill its mission.

In Freiburg, as I am privately informed, Herr Grosse reads partly on sociology in general, and partly on special sociological problems, such as "The Origin of the Family," "The Sociology of Art," "The Forms of Ethical Conception," etc. In addition he conducts seminar studies in ethnology. The attendance is considerable, in proportion to the total number at the University.

Herr Barth, in Leipsic, understands by sociology, as he kindly informs me in a private letter, the philosophy of history. This is the "dynamics" of which "statics" is only a special case. He reads there before a moderate number of hearers, on the philosophy of history, but conducts no seminar.

How the case may be in the two last mentioned universities, I cannot say, because I am not directly acquainted with them. In Berlin, however, I have observed a continual growth of interest in sociology among the students. Three or four years ago a sociological course was attended by four or five students. Today about one hundred attend the sociological lectures. It appears, then, that it rests with the lecture and the lecturer to rouse in students an interest in any science.[1]

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[1] Translated by ALBION W. SMALL.

COLLECTIVE TELESIS.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. XII.

(*Concluding paper.*)

THE more we study the facts, phenomena, and laws of the sentient world the more thoroughly do we find them permeated with the idea of utility. Metaphysics asks the question, Why? pure science asks the question, How? applied science asks the question, What for? The first inquires after the causes of things, the second inquires after their laws, the third inquires after their uses. The last of these is the standpoint of all feeling beings, while the others are confined to beings endowed with high reasoning or speculative powers. The nature of utility as the term is used in both economics and sociology was considered in the fifth paper, and in the ninth paper it was shown that both these sciences are utilitarian in their character, and, indeed, that all science is necessarily so. It is true that pure science takes no account of this fact and pursues truth for its own sake, but as there shown, the chief defense of this method has always rested on the essential utility of all truth, and although the sciences differ widely in this respect, still it is true that every pure science has or may have its applied stage, and although sociology can perhaps afford to wait a long time yet before it attempts to justify its existence by showing what it exists for, still, sooner or later, this attempt will be made In view of the fact that its claim to the qualities of a true science has been widely disputed, there is the more reason for it to justify that claim as early as possible, and the true test of a science is the application of its principles to some useful purpose.

The subdivision of systematic knowledge into a plurality of sciences is based on the existence of as many so-called forces,

i. e., so many somewhat distinct modes of manifestation of the universal force. Each science deals with a particular one of these forces, or, at least, with a group or class of more or less similar ones. Sociology, as I understand it, differs in no essential respect from other sciences except that it deals with the social forces. The telic progress of society, as reviewed in the last paper, does not to any marked extent involve the control of the social forces. In so far as it does relate to them it is only from the standpoint of the individual who seeks to subject everything to his purposes. It was seen that the progress thus attained resulted from the intelligent direction by man of the various natural forces. This does not exclude the social forces, but the efforts described were chiefly expended upon physical, biotic, and psychic forces, the last mainly in relation to animal domestication. The phenomena were all social in the sense of their mutual utility to the members of society, but the acts were mainly individual, each member or small group seeking personal satisfaction. They were only in a limited degree collective.

Now while, in so far as even individual action really utilizes the social forces, this constitutes an application of sociological principles, still this is not what I have intended to include under the head of collective telesis. I propose to restrict that term to the collective action of society in the direction of restraining, controlling, directing, and utilizing in any manner the natural forces of society. It is obvious, therefore, that, however much we may dislike the term (and it is a very offensive one to me), we are essentially dealing with the phenomena of *government*, since this word in a philosophical sense simply implies the organization through which society expresses and enforces its collective will. It is true that, owing to the great differences that exist among human races, due to differences of language and the vicissitudes of human history, the population of the world is now, and is long destined to remain, divided into a great number of distinct nations (not to speak of savage and barbaric tribes), each with a government of its own, so that collective social action cannot generally extend beyond the territorial limits

of each national autonomy. Still, international action of certain kinds is already becoming quite extensive and is destined to increase with the progress of civilization. Hence, when I speak of collective social action it is to be taken in the sense of national action, or at least of action on the part of nations, although a considerable number may have taken the same action. Thus defined and restricted, there remains no other essential difference between individual and social action. It also includes, however, the action of subordinate governing bodies, states, municipalities, towns, etc., deriving their powers from the general government.

It was seen that telic progress consists essentially in the process called invention, which presupposes the perception of the relations of objects and a knowledge of their properties, *i. e.*, of the uniform laws of the phenomena they present. Invention materializes itself immediately in art, and art is the basis of civilization. It is customary to say, and most people believe, that art precedes science, but this is because altogether too narrow and special a meaning is given to the word science. Science is simply a *knowing*, and this is all that the word etymologically implies. Art is exclusively the product of the knowing faculty. It is wholly telic. As I have shown, the simplest of all arts, that of wielding a stick, is impossible without a knowledge of the physical principle which makes it effective. To judge from some of the discussions of this question it might be supposed that most of the simpler arts were the result of pure accident; that they had merely been blundered upon without any thought or knowledge. If this were so we should find animals in the possession of arts. But this is not the case. Every art is the product of thinking, knowing, reasoning, no matter how feeble these powers may be. Between empiricism and science there is only a difference of degree. The faintest exercise of the telic or intellectual faculty is, in so far, science.

The exactly intermediate step between individual telesis and social telesis is an organization of individuals into a limited body. Such organizations are always for some specific purpose,

and the word *purpose* sufficiently indicates their telic character. It shows that there may be a thought common to a number of persons, and that several individuals can, as well as a single one, act teleologically towards a desired end. In modern society there is scarcely any limit to the variety in such organizations. These bodies may in a very just sense be regarded as conscious and intelligent, and they conduct their operations in all essential respects in the same way that individuals conduct theirs. Even if we were to suppose such an organization to embrace all the individuals of a nation and no others, it would still differ from the government of that nation in its specific object. The supposition is, however, inadmissible, since a limited organization must be voluntary, and the inhabitants of a country include minors and infants who have no intelligent ideas of the purposes of association. If a very large and powerful limited organization were to coerce its members or other persons to perform certain acts, it would be usurping the sphere of government, and if this were acquiesced in it would become, in so far, *the* government. Such was the case when the Church of Rome assumed such powers.

If a small number of individuals may think and act for a common purpose a larger number may, and there is no necessary limit until the totality of a people is embraced in the number. If such a universal organization has for its sole object the good of its members in general it thereby virtually becomes the government. To justify this title, however, and accomplish its purpose it must assume full power, and this single act deprives it of the character of a purely voluntary association. No government can be such, although, so long as the right of voluntary expatriation exists, as it almost always has done, it is virtually a voluntary association.

Now there is a sense in which the very existence of government implies a consensus of intelligent purpose. Mr. Spencer, the severest critic of the acts of government that we have ever had, admits that all governments roughly represent the general sentiment and will of the people, and cites the failure of the

commonwealth under Cromwell as an illustration.[1] He also admits that intelligence conduces to association,[2] and says that "the chief prompter is experience of the advantages derived from coöperation."[3] The same idea was also expressed much earlier by him in his *Data of Ethics*,[4] and need not be further insisted upon. What specially concerns us here is the fact that even the rudest forms of government constitute a sort of collective intelligence devoted to the object of protecting society and advancing its interests. The mere circumstance that the personnel of government is made up of human beings, members of the same society, and possessing the imperfections of mankind in general, and the fact that these favored individuals often use the power which society has conferred upon them to further their own egoistic ends at the expense and to the injury of society, should not, as it so often does, cause us to lose sight of the principle and turn aside to combat the accident. Any other set of men would do the same thing, as our own political tergiversations have shown, and the only remedy is the general improvement of human character and the "eternal vigilance" of society.

On any "social organism" theory government must be regarded as the *brain* or organ of consciousness of society, and the small amount of "brains" shown by government is simply in confirmation of the conclusion reached in the third paper that society represents an organism of low degree. Whatever purpose government attempts to accomplish, it has to deal with the social forces, to direct and control them on the same principles that the individual applies to the other natural forces. When treating of the latter in the last paper mention was made of the distinction between the exercise of the telic faculty on animate and on inanimate objects, and of the moral quality that enters in when the feelings, especially of men, are the objects of egoistic

[1] *Westminster Review*, Vol. LXXIII (new series, Vol. XVII), January 1, 1860, p. 93. *Essays, Scientific, Political, and Speculative*, New York, 1891, p. 268.

[2] *Principles of Ethics*, Vol. II, New York, 1893, p. 31.

[3] "The Great Political Superstition," in *Social Statics*, abridged and revised; together with *The Man versus the State*, New York, 1892, p. 401.

[4] New York, 1879, p. 134.

exploitation. This feature was not dwelt upon, as properly belonging to the present paper, but attention was called to the fact that so great a power directed into so delicate a field became a menace to society which would become intolerable if not antagonized by the same power wielded by the collective body of society itself. This is really the strongest reason for the existence of government, and it cannot be said to have grown less with the progress of civilization. In a certain way it has grown stronger, for with the increase of intelligence the inequality in the degree to which the telic power is possessed by the individual members of society has greatly increased, and this has correspondingly augmented the ability of some to exploit others. Moreover, with this same advance in intellectual acumen the methods have changed, and open warfare, even mental, has given way to the most subtle arts of deceiving the unwary and "making the worse appear the better reason," until the less favored members of society require to be not merely "wide awake" to their interests and perpetually on their guard, but they must be keen analyzers of human motives and philosophic students of "human nature" if they would avoid being ensnared in the sophistries of the cunning leaders and makers of public opinion. The self-seeking class, which formerly feared government which they knew existed to foil their plans, is today striving with Machiavellian diplomacy, and, it must be admitted, with considerable success, to enlist government itself in its service and thus to multiply its powers.

The individual teleology hitherto considered may be regarded as unconscious. The social benefits that it achieves are not thought of. They are as much accidental and unintended as are those that result from purely genetic or spontaneous activity. On the other hand, the social teleology now under consideration —the action of the central body which society creates to look after its interests—is conscious in the sense that, as a body, it always aims to benefit society, which is a conscious good. Most such action, it is true, involves very little exercise of the higher powers of mind. The decrees of a monarch are always for some

purpose, but they rarely aim to accomplish that purpose indirectly. They are usually not only mandatory—thou shalt—but negatively so—thou shalt not. Little more can be said for the great body of laws enacted by the legislatures of representative governments. That is, legislators usually employ the direct method. This is more or less successful, but always requires a physical power behind it. It is the purely empirical stage of government. As government is an application of what society knows about the nature of the social forces, it is a true art, but the condition in which we now find this art corresponds to that in which all other arts are prior to the application to them of the wider principles of systematic science, and society may be considered to occupy the place, relatively to what it will ultimately attain, that art occupied before the era of science.

This brings us to the kernel of our subject. It may be called *the social art.* The science of society must produce the art of society. *True legislation is invention.* Government is the art that results from the science of society through the legislative application of sociological principles. In every domain of natural forces there are the four steps: First, the discovery of the laws governing phenomena; second, perception of the utilities (modes in which the phenomena can be modified to serve man); third, the necessary adjustments to secure the useful end; and, fourth, the application of all this in producing the result. The first of these steps is that of pure science; the second and third are involved in invention, and properly constitute applied science; the fourth is art in its proper sense. In taking these successive steps there has usually been considerable division of labor. Scientific discoverers are not often inventors, and inventors rarely make the products they invent. Still, two or more of the steps are often taken by the same individual.

Now, looking at society as a domain of natural forces, we may see how readily it admits of being subjected to this series of processes. Discovery of the laws of society is the natural province of the sociologist. He should also be looked to for the detection of utilities, but this work also belongs in a still

higher degree to the legislator. Adjustment is the exclusive province of legislation, and laws, when framed according to these principles, would be such adjustments and nothing else. The execution of the laws is the resultant social art. It requires no great stretch of the imagination to see how widely this scheme would differ from the corresponding features of the present régime. It is still easier to see its immense superiority. As was shown in the last paper, the essence of telic action consists at bottom in making natural forces do the desired work instead of doing it ourselves. This is exactly what is needed in society. The desires, passions, and propensities of men are bad only in the sense that fire and lightning are bad. They are perennial natural forces, and, whether good or bad, they exist, cannot be removed, and must be reckoned with. But if society only knew how, it could utilize these forces, and their very strength would be the measure of their power for good. Society is now spending vast energies and incalculable treasure in trying to check and curb these forces without receiving any benefit from them in return. The greater part of this could be saved, and a much larger amount transferred to the other side of the account.

The principle that underlies all this is what I have called "attractive legislation."[1] But it is nothing new or peculiar to society. It is nothing else than the universal method of science, invention, and art that has always been used and must be used to attain telic results. No one tries to drive back, arrest, curb, and suppress the physical forces. The discoverer tells the inventor what their laws are; the inventor sees how they may be made useful and contrives the appropriate apparatus; the man of business organizes the machinery on a gigantic scale, and what was a hostile element becomes an agent of civilization. The effort is not to diminish the force, but usually to increase it, at least to concentrate and focalize it so as to bring the maximum amount to bear on a given point. This is true direction and control of natural powers. So it should be in society. The healthy affections and emotions of men should not be curbed but should be

[1] *Dynamic Sociology* (see index); *Psychic Factors*, p. 306.

directed into useful channels. Zeal and ardor are precious gifts if only they tend in the right direction, and society may profit by every human attribute if only it has the wisdom to utilize it.

The principle involved in attraction, when applied to social affairs, is simply that of *inducing* men to act for the good of society. It is that of harmonizing the interests of the individual with those of society, of making it advantageous to the individual to do that which is socially beneficial; not merely in a negative form, as an alternative of two evils, as is done when a penalty is attached to an action, but positively, in such a manner that he will exert himself to do those things that society most needs to have done. The sociologist and the statesman should coöperate in discovering the laws of society and the methods of utilizing them so as to let the social forces flow freely and strongly, untrammeled by penal statutes, mandatory laws, irritating prohibitions, and annoying obstacles. And here it is important to draw the line sharply between sociology and ethics; between social action and social friction.

All desire is for the exercise of some function, and the objects of desire are such only by virtue of making such exercise possible. Happiness therefore can only be increased by increasing either the number or the intensity of satisfiable desires . . . . The highest ideal of happiness, therefore, is the freest exercise of the greatest number and most energetic faculties. This must also be the highest ethical ideal. But it is clear that its realization would abolish moral conduct altogether and remove the very field of ethics from a scheme of philosophy. To remove the obstacles to free social activity is to abolish the so-called science of ethics. The avowed purpose of ethics is to abolish itself. The highest ethics is no ethics. Ideally moral conduct is wholly unmoral conduct. Or more correctly stated, the highest ideal of a moral state is one in which there will exist nothing that can be called moral.

Whether we look at the subject from the standpoint of social progress or from that of individual welfare the liberation of social energy is the desideratum. The sociologist demands it because it increases the progressive power of society. The moralist should demand it because it increases happiness. For activity means both, and therefore the more activity the better. True morality not less than true progress consists in the emancipation of social energy and the free exercise of power. Evil is merely the friction which is to be overcome or at least minimized . . . . The tendencies that produce evil are not in themselves evil. There is no absolute evil. None of the

propensities which now cause evil are essentially bad. They are all in themselves good, must necessarily be so, since they have been developed for the sole purpose of enabling man to exist, survive, and progress. All evil is relative. Any power may do harm. The forces of nature are good or bad according to where they are permitted to expend themselves. The wind is evil when it dashes the vessel on the rocks; it is good when it fills the sail and speeds it on its way. Fire is evil when it rages through a great city and destroys life and property; it is good when it warms human dwellings or creates the wondrous power of steam. Electricity is evil when in the thunderbolt it descends from the cloud and scatters death and destruction; it is good when it transmits messages of love to distant friends. And so it is with the passions of men as they surge through society. Left to themselves, like the physical elements, they find vent in all manner of ways and constantly dash against the interests of those who chance to be in their way. But, like the elements, they readily yield to the touch of true science, which directs them into harmless, nay, useful channels, and makes them instruments for good. In fact, human desires, seeking their satisfaction through appropriate activity, constitute the only good from the standpoint of sociology.[1]

Few, of course, will be satisfied with these generalities, and many will doubtless ask for some concrete illustrations of scientific legislation. Even those who accept the general conclusions that thus logically flow from the facts of genetic and telic progress will still find themselves at a loss to conceive what definite steps can be taken to accelerate the latter, or how the central ganglion of society can inaugurate a system of social machinery that will produce the required results. This is quite natural, and the only answer that can be made is that, owing to the undeveloped state of the social intellect, very few examples of true ingenuity on the part of legislators exist. Society, as I have shown, if comparable to an organism at all, must take rank among creatures of a very low order. The brain of society has scarcely reached the stage of development at which in the animal world the germs of an intellectual faculty are perceptible. Only when spurred on by the most intense egoistic impulses have nations exhibited any marked indications of the telic power. This has developed in proportion to the extent to which the national will has coincided with the will of some

[1] *Psychic Factors*, pp. 113–115.

influential individual. Great generals in war, inspired by personal ambition, have often expressed the social will of their own country by brilliant feats of strategy and generalship, and famous statesmen like Richelieu have represented a whole nation by strokes of diplomacy that called out the same class of talents in a high degree. Even monarchs like Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, and Charles XII, not to mention Cæsar and Alexander, have made their own genius in a sense the genius of their country. In fact a ruling class in times when the people were supposed to exist for them, when a king could say "I am the state," and when revenues were collected for their personal use, often devised very cunning schemes of a national application for their own aggrandizement. But as the world threw off these yokes, and nations grew more and more democratic, the telic element declined, and the most democratic governments have proved the most stupid. They have to rely upon brute force. They are shortsighted and only know how to lock the door after the horse is stolen. They are swayed by impulse. They swarm and "enthuse," and then lapse into a state of torpor, losing all that was gained, and again surge in another direction, wasting their energies. In fact they act precisely like animals devoid of intelligence.

All this is what we ought to expect if the principles I have enunciated are sound, and is, indeed, one of the clearest proofs of their soundness. And yet republics have not proved wholly devoid of a directive agent. Under exceptional circumstances they have displayed signs of collective intelligence. But most of the cases that can be cited have either concerned their national independence or the equally vital question of raising revenue. Nearly all the examples cited in *Dynamic Sociology* and *Psychic Factors* belong to these classes in which, in a literal sense, necessity has been the mother of invention. Anyone who watches the inane flounderings of a large "deliberative" (!) body like the American house of representatives, working at cross purposes and swayed by a thousand conflicting motives, can see how little reason has to do with democratic legislation.

But for the committee system by which, to a certain extent, the various public questions become the subject of scientific investigation, it is doubtful whether the business of the country could be transacted at all. And it is only by a much greater extension of this system, perhaps to the extent of dispensing entirely with the often disgraceful, and always stupid, "deliberations" of the full House, that scientific legislation can ever be realized.

The other important direction in which there is hope of similar results is the gradual assumption of legislative powers, at least advisory, by the administrative branch, which always feels the popular pulse much more sensitively than the legislature, and to which is entrusted not merely the execution of the public will (the art of government), but also in the main the devising of means to accomplish this—the strictly inventive function of government. If the legislature will enact the measures that the administrative branch recommends as the result of direct experience with the business world it will rarely go astray.[1]

The examples given, in which military chieftains, diplomats, monarchs, and ruling families have employed design in national affairs, do not indicate the growth of the social intelligence or the integration of the social organism. They are merely instances of the usurpation of the powers of society by individual members. On the other hand, the tendencies in the direction of democratic government do mark progress in social integration, however feeble may be the telic power displayed. Crude and imperfect as such governments may be, they are better than the wisest of autocracies. Stupidity joined with benevolence is better than brilliancy joined with rapacity, and not only is autocracy always rapacious, but democracy is always benevolent. The first of these propositions can be disputed only by citing isolated exceptions. The second may not be so clear, yet it admits of ready demonstration. It is not necessary to

[1] The principles of scientific legislation were set forth in *Dynamic Sociology*. See especially Vol. I, pp. 36–38; Vol. II, pp. 249 ff., 395 ff., 573 ff.; and for examples of attractive legislation, see Vol. I, p. 44; Vol. II, p. 392; also, *Psychic Factors*, p. 306.

postulate a different nature for the democratic legislator from that of the autocratic ruler. However self-seeking the former may be, social service turns his egoism to the good of society. It is an example of the truth that what are called bad motives are only relatively so, and that the social forces only need to be directed to render them all good. For in seeking his own interests the representative of the people must obey their will. The will of the people must be good, at least for them. Constituencies have the same nature as representatives or kings, but whatever they will must be right from their standpoint. The good consists in the satisfaction of desire, and this can only become bad when it is secured at the expense of others. But where a constituency is in question this is not possible except in very sectional questions which cannot be discussed here. *A fortiori* must obedience to the will of a whole people be right, and therefore the representative of the people, whatever may be his personal character, is constrained by his office to do only what is right. If he fails another is put in his place. It is thus that it comes about that representative governments are essentially benevolent, *i. e.*, they always *wish well* for the people, or, as the more common phrase expresses it, they *mean well*. And anyone not prejudiced against government must see that, whatever their faults of the head, they are right at heart.

Democracy has therefore been a great step forward, and has practically solved the moral side of the question of government. Reform in the future must come from the mind side, and surely there is great need of it. How can it be brought about? This is the problem of sociology. I have wrestled with it for many years, not in the hope of doing anything in this direction myself, but with the object of discovering, if possible, a theoretical solution to propose to the world for its consideration. The result of my reflections on this subject is given in the second volume of *Dynamic Sociology*, and although I have not ceased to revolve these matters in my mind during the fourteen years that have elapsed since the first edition of that work appeared, I cannot say that my conclusions have undergone any

essential modification. I would now lay more stress upon certain parts of the general argument, and somewhat less on others, but the argument as a whole still stands as worked out in that volume. As democratic governments must be representative I see no way to increase their intellectual status except by increasing that of constituencies, and I still regard this as the one great desideratum. If the social consciousness can be so far quickened as to awake to the full realization of this truth in such vivid manner as to induce general action in the direction of devising means for the universal equalization of intelligence, all other social problems will be put in the way of gradual but certain solution.

But there are some who will say that if this little is all there is to sustain the claim that society is one day destined to take its affairs into its own hands and conduct its business like a rational being, it would be as well to abandon it. If the long period of human history has shown so little advance in the direction of a social intelligence we might better leave matters entirely to the two spontaneous methods described in the two preceding papers. The first answer to this is that the sociologist does not profess to be a reformer, and is not advocating any course of social action. All he feels called upon to do is to point out what the effect of a certain course of action would be as deduced from the fundamental principles of the science, and to state what he conceives the tendencies to be as judged from the history of development.

The second answer to this objection is that it is the one that is always raised whenever anything is mentioned which is different from that which now exists, that it is based on the natural error that things are stationary because they seem to be so, and grows out of the difficulty of conceiving a state of things widely different from the actual state. If we were to indulge in fable, a lump of inert matter would be laughed at by the other lumps if it should assert that it would one day become a graceful tree-fern, and shade the earth with its feathery foliage; a plant that should declare its intention to break away from its attachments

to the soil and move about in space on four legs, feeding on other plants instead of air, would be called a vain boaster by the surrounding vegetation; a barnacle that should insist that it would one day have a backbone would be utterly discredited by other barnacles; a bat that should fly into a dark corner of a room and escape through an opening known to be there would be called a fool by the bee that was vainly buzzing against a pane of glass in the hope of accomplishing the same object.[1] It is the "impossible" that happens. We can look backward more easily than we can look forward. Science teaches us that something has happened. Evolution proves that immense changes have taken place, and now that we can see what they were and according to what principles they were brought about there is nothing so startling in the facts. It is only when we try to imagine ourselves as present before an event and striving to forecast it that we realize the folly of raising such objections as we are considering. Yet this is our real attitude with respect to future events. It may be logical, admitting that progress is to go on and that great changes are to take place, to question whether any particular change that anyone may describe is to be the one that will actually occur. There is no probability that anyone can foretell what the real condition of society is to be in the future. But it is illogical, in the light of the past, of history, and especially of natural history, and of what we actually know of evolution, cosmic, organic, and social, to say that any condition to which this knowledge points as a normal result of the continued action of the laws of evolution is impossible.

In treating the relations of sociology to the various other sciences — cosmology, biology, anthropology, psychology — in the second, third, fourth, and fifth papers of this series, and in the more general discussion of the position and affinities of soci-

[1] This point of view was never so admirably stated as in the remarkable poem by Charlotte Perkins Stetson entitled "Similar Cases," now familiar to nearly everybody, having gone the complete rounds of the press. Also to be found in her collection of poems entitled *In This Our World and Other Poems*, San Francisco (Barry & Marble, publishers), 1895, p. 72.

ology in the first and sixth, I would have been glad to institute a thorough comparison of sociology with economics, from which to many it seems so difficult to separate it. My failure to do this was not at all due to any such difficulty in my own mind, but wholly to the fact that before a comparison could be properly made it was absolutely necessary that the principles to be set forth in later papers, and especially in the eighth and eleventh of this series, as well as in the present one, be first laid down as the basis of any real distinction. We are now fully prepared to consider this question, but the limits of space will necessarily render its treatment brief. It is therefore best to come directly to the point.

The fundamental distinction between sociology and economics is based on the difference in their respective beneficiaries. Both have utility[1] for their end, but the recipients of the utility that sociology aims to confer belong to a different class from those of the utility which economics aims to confer. Broadly stated economics may be said to benefit the producer while sociology benefits the consumer. But the term producer must here be taken in its widest and really proper sense of anyone who by any form of labor adds anything to the value, *i. e.*, to the utility, of a product. The term consumer, on the contrary, must be taken in the narrower sense of the enjoyer of a product irrespective of whether he is also a producer or not. It will add to the clearness of the distinction, and will at the same time be approximately correct, if we identify the producing class with the business world in general, or the industrial world as a whole, and the consuming class with the public in general or society as a whole. The latter class of course includes the former, but, disregarding parasites, the former includes all of the latter except the helpless, whether from age, disease, or physical and mental defectiveness. It is not the relative size or quality of these two classes that constitutes the distinction in question, but the direction given to the utility by economics and sociology respectively. In short, economics, as so many economists have

[1] As defined in the fifth paper, this JOURNAL, Vol. I, p. 627.

insisted, concerns itself with the creation of wealth irrespective of who shall receive this wealth, though this is properly assumed to be those who create it. It narrows down therefore to the question of *earnings* and *profits*. It deals with wages, salaries, dividends, receipts and expenditures as related to each other, and marginal values. The class considered is the earner in the widest sense of the term. It is the makers, those who increase the value, and the sellers or disposers of goods, with whom economics has to do. The primary question in each case is: Is the business a success? If it is not it must go down. The buyer, the user, the enjoyer, the consumer, is left out of the account. "Political economy . . . . has nothing to do with the consumption of wealth, further than as the consideration of it is inseparable from that of production, or from that of distribution."[1] In sharp contrast to this, sociology is exclusively concerned with the *destination* of wealth, in so far as it deals with wealth. It is no more interested in the benefit that the producer receives than in that which it confers on any other class. If a business, no matter how "successful," is injurious, it is a *failure* from the standpoint of sociology. And in broader national affairs it is not a question whether a policy is or is not a source of revenue to the state, but whether it is a benefit to the public. Thus in the question of taxation, of whatever kind, sociology is not concerned with its "fiscal" effects, but with its "social" effects. A tariff, if defended, is so not because it proves a successful and easy way to raise revenue, but because it diversifies and elevates population.[2]

It is true that certain modern economists have insisted more or less that consumption should be regarded as a legitimate subject of economic study. I gave a brief history of this movement in economic thought in a former paper,[3] treating it as an advance

[1] JOHN STUART MILL, *Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy*, London, 1844, p. 132, footnote.

[2] I once made a study of this question which appeared under the title: "The Sociological Position of Protection and Free Trade," *American Anthropologist*, Washington, Vol. II, No. 4, October 1889, pp. 289–299.

[3] *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. X, No. 2, June 1895, pp. 215–217.

in economics which I called "social economics." That paper was specially addressed to economists, and no attempt was made to harmonize it with the present series of papers, which, however, were at that time for the most part written, and began to appear a month later. It is only necessary to say now that social economics as thus defined is simply sociology, and those economists who proceed from the standpoint of consumption, whether they realize it or not, whether they desire it or not, are in so far sociologists.

One or two examples of the two distinct points of view of economics and sociology will make them clearer. Prior to the year 1881, in the capacity of librarian of the United States Bureau of Statistics, I had occasion to study the statistics of railroads of various countries. Many foreign countries had commenced the assumption of their control by the state as their charters expired, and already a large number of important lines in France, Italy, Austria, Germany, and other countries on the continent had passed out of corporate management and were administered by the state either as owner or for the companies. The agitation of state ownership had begun both in Great Britain and in the United States. The railroad journals were filled with the discussion of this question, and I had it as a part of my official duty to keep abreast of the movement and to compile statistics bearing upon it. The tone of the railroad press was of course uniformly hostile to the movement, and I observed that all the arguments were directed to showing that the companies "managed" the lines with greater economy than the state "administered" them. I was required to prepare tables demonstrating this, which was an easy matter, and there really was no room for a difference of opinion. As a pastime I had devoted considerable of my unofficial time for the preceding fifteen years to writing and rewriting my *Dynamic Sociology*, which was then nearly ready for publication, and I could not avoid occasionally taking the sociological point of view as distinguished from the economic one, alone taken by the railroad press, and I took home some of the elaborate Prussian statistical reports (*Statis-*

tische Nachrichten von den preussischen Eisenbahnen), usually several years behind date, and searched carefully through their complicated columns for all possible facts bearing on the sociological side. The year 1874 was well adapted to this, the state management having then extended to about as large a number of lines as were still in the hands of the companies. I selected the columns for freight and passenger rates, happily, given and wanting in the statistics of nearly or quite all other countries. I worked these up for that year and gave the result in a footnote to page 581 of the second volume of my book. The general result, as there shown, was that "while the roads owned and worked by companies yielded 13.7 per cent. greater profits than those owned and worked by the state, the latter carried passengers 9.4 and freight 15 per cent. cheaper than the former."

One other example will be merely referred to, because its elaboration would occupy too much space. The Bulletin of the Department of Labor, No. 7, for November 1896 contains a most important study by Ethelbert Stewart on "Rates of Wages Paid under Public and Private Contract." The title, however, is misleading, because in addition to rates paid under contract it includes those paid by municipalities themselves. It is a comparison of these, where they exist, with those paid by contractors, whether public or private, that furnishes interesting matter for the sociologist. A glance at the tables given for Baltimore, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia is sufficient to show that in nearly all the leading industries the municipalities pay higher wages than either contractors or private companies. These and similar investigations are being conducted by the Bureau of Labor and by the census. In scarcely any other way could they be made, since private enterprise has no incentive to conduct strictly sociological investigations such as this one preeminently is. They can afford to study only the economic side to ascertain whether any enterprise is profitable to its managers. Public considerations are wholly foreign to their interests. But the state, as already remarked, is essentially benevolent, and all its operations, however shortsighted and fruitless, aim at least

to benefit the people. In the hands of wise and humane officers, such as the present head of these great bureaus, they are certain to be productive of immense public good.

It was the great Descartes who first enunciated the truth that all questions of quality are reducible to those of quantity. This mathematical axiom finds its economic expression in the corresponding truth that all questions of principle are at bottom questions of interest. The object of all science is to create art which will assist nature in furthering progress. Art has its highest expression in machinery. Art and machinery belong to economics because they are economical. They consist in the enlistment of the forces of nature in man's service. The physical forces have already been so enlisted until the power of production has become next to unlimited. This has brought about a state of things in which there is a constant tendency to what is called "overproduction." What is meant is the production of more than can, in the present state of society, be consumed. But the inability to consume is not due to incapacity for consumption itself, except in a few articles. It is due to the inability to *obtain*. The fact that there are thousands in want even of the necessaries of life that are thus overproduced shows clearly enough that there is no more produced than would be eagerly consumed if it could be obtained. The problem of the age is to put what is produced into the hands of those who desire to consume it, and to do this in harmony with economic laws, and not as a gift or charity, which violates economic laws.

While no one is wise enough at the present day to formulate a plan for securing this result, the general principle underlying the problem may even now be stated. It is this: The progress made in economic art and machinery is far in advance of that made in social art and machinery. Production is essentially an individual enterprise and comparatively simple, while distribution, not in the economic but in the sociological sense, is highly complex. Production is the result of individual ingenuity applied to the physical and vital forces of nature. Distribution must be the result of collective ingenuity applied to the social

forces. There are physical forces that will secure it to a certain extent, but they are subject to the law of competition, which sets a limit to their action and soon chokes up the avenues of distribution. The kind of ingenuity needed to secure free circulation of products is social ingenuity, *i. e.*, *collective telesis*. A social machinery of free distribution must be invented and perfected by social ingenuity. The machinery of production is a product of physical science. The machinery of distribution will be a product of social science. Sociology stands in the same relation to the distribution of wealth that economics stands to its production. Most of the so-called overproduction is simply the choking of the avenues of distribution. It is the problem of social science to clear these avenues and let the products flow freely wherever they are attracted by human wants. The sociologist believes this possible through social ingenuity and social machinery.

This general social art, the scientific control of the social forces by the collective mind of society for its advantage, in strict homology with the practical arts of the industrial world, is what I have hitherto given the name *Sociocracy*. It has sometimes been confounded with *socialism*, and I cannot perhaps better conclude this series of papers than by briefly pointing out wherein, so far as I understand what socialism is, this differs from it, and also from the prevailing competitive régime or individualism. This can only be done at this stage by a few antithetical propositions whose elaboration is for the present postponed:

1. Individualism has created artificial inequalities.

2. Socialism seeks to create artificial equalities.

3. Sociocracy recognizes natural inequalities and aims to abolish artificial inequalities.

4. Individualism confers benefits on those only who have the ability to obtain them, by superior power, cunning, intelligence, or the accident of position.

5. Socialism would confer the same benefits on all alike, and aims to secure equality of fruition.

6. Sociocracy would confer benefits in strict proportion to merit, but insists upon *equality of opportunity* as the only means of determining the degree of merit.

A cycle is thus completed. Sociocracy is a return to nature from which society has departed. Individualism was the original and natural method recognizing natural inequalities and apportioning benefits according to natural ability. Individual telesis has completely abolished this method. Socialism recognizes this, and would remedy it by an equally wide departure from the natural. Collective telesis can alone remove the artificial barriers raised by individual telesis and place society once more in the free current of natural law.

LESTER F. WARD.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SOCIAL CONTROL.[1] VII.

ASSEMBLAGE.

I.

Two methods of molding the feelings to social conduct and endeavor have been pointed out—*religion* and *ideals*. A third way is *assemblage*.

As this series of studies goes on it becomes plain to the writer that the study of social control needs to be prefaced by a study of the spontaneous influences that socialize men. Prior to *cultivated* goodness should be considered *natural* goodness, both that which comes from inborn power of sympathy and that which springs up from men having their lives much in common. Before describing the methods of forcing or cultivation by which, in the orderly social garden, the human plant is caused to bring forth abundant fruits of righteousness, we should glance at the fruit, mean and meager though it be, which that plant can bring forth in its uncultivated state ere its nurture has become the object of social art.

So doing we should find that, just as the gardener does little else than strengthen, regulate, or apply with system, those forces and elements that cause growth in the natural state, so society makes righteousness to abound chiefly by supplying the natural conditions of goodness. Few of its instruments of control are peculiarly its own; for the most part it strengthens or adapts those fellowship forces that are found at work in any group of human beings. Thus the restraints of law, public opinion, and social suggestion have their prototypes in individual vengeance, resentment, and suggestion. Religion which society uses to call forth fellow feeling was originally the mystic interpretation of a

[1] Errata for No. VI in January issue of JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY. In note to p. 554, for "History of" read "Studies in." On p. 565, line 2, omit "not." On p. 566, line 6, for "sociology" read "sociality."

fellow feeling already existing. Ideals, I shall sometime show, begin in the propitiation between man and man.

As natural promoters of altruism we may distinguish language, likeness, presence, companionship, imitation, play, social pleasure, mutual aid, community of interests and feelings, comprehension and intelligence. Of these *presence* is not the least. There is no doubt that being together is essential to the natural development of interest in and love for others. Contact and dealings favor that power of putting one's self in another's place, that interpenetration of consciousnesses, which is the native soil of good conduct. Sociability is the forerunner of sociality. The enemy is the stranger, the friend is the housemate, and *kindness*, as the word itself hints, is the feeling that grows up among kindred. Whatever be the pitch of self-devotion that may be reached by the proud and lonely soul dwelling apart with its ideals, it is certain that early altruism was concrete, and meant regard for known people, for intimates and fellows.

When the camp or village is the social unit the natural occasions of meeting suffice. But when the conditions of getting a living scatter people, or when one society includes many bands or settlements, the meetings will be too few to keep alive the flame of interest or regard. The sense of being knit up in a common life fades when paths lie too much apart. Differentiation sets in, local peculiarities spring up, and unlikeness, rather than likeness, prevails. In time estrangement supervenes and the society falls apart into its component clusters. It is to avoid this disintegration that *institutions of assemblage* are developed and maintained in the larger societies.

The value of assemblage in the way of social control is the sense of unity it is able to inspire. In mere contact there is no virtue, for contact is quite as apt to breed antagonism as liking. Nor is social intercourse the main thing. This presupposes liking, and, moreover, cannot operate on so vast a scale as to bring a man into closer relations with some thousands of his fellows. The efficacy of assemblage lies in this: that many indi-

viduals in each other's presence are brought to have the same feeling at the same moment, *and to perceive this identity of feeling*. With this perceived convergence of sentiment the hostility, distrust, or indifference that accompanies strangeness fades away; the sense of separateness is blunted, and the consciousness of kind becomes more vivid. The self, which is not, as metaphysicians fancy, a mathematical point, but a sphere of varying diameter, is enlarged. In Professor Patten's happy phrase it becomes "synthetic." The ordinary round of feelings is broken in upon, and more of the man comes to reside outside of himself, his family, or his neighborhood.

There is needed a master emotion that shall orient the minds of all assembled in one direction. This may be love or hate, rapture or reverence, defiance or admiration. Its object may be a god, a hero, an event, or another people. *What* it is is not so important as that it be powerful and common to many. When many participate in the same emotion at the same moment, and each is aware of this participation, we get three effects: (1) The emotion spreads by contagion till the unanimity is perfect; (2) the feeling is intensified in each because shared by all; (3) the unison perceived inspires a sympathy that may survive the original emotion.

When the assembly is broken up and its members are again scattered, the disintegrating forces resume their work. Slowly the newly formed bond relaxes, the recent cement ceases to bind, antagonisms reappear, and the self contracts. Then the sense of a common life must be renewed again in the same way. Hence assemblage in order to meet the needs of society must be *periodical*.

The *raison d'être* of the periodical assemblage is its power to harmonize. But this supplies no motive to the individual. He cares nothing for spiritual enlargement. He will make no pilgrimage at heavy expense in order to have his sympathies quickened. To him, therefore, the feast wears a different aspect. It comes at a natural season of festivity—harvest or vintage. It is to him an occasion of feasting, dancing, and merrymaking,

where customary restraints are laid aside and license prevails, where caste lines are broken down and fellowship reigns. To get him to come, all manner of attractions will be provided for him. Dignitaries and rulers usually invisible to the multitude will show themselves, processions will march, pomps and pageants can be seen. If the assemblage is religious, mysteries are unveiled, wonders are promised, the blessings of the gods will descend, and benefits, both public and private, will be reaped. The private gratifications afforded will, therefore, seem fully able to account for the festival, and no other end will be thought of. The social meaning of it will be unacknowledged and unapparent.

II.

How much light can this interpretation throw on history?

It is likely that many assemblages we have looked upon as meetings for social pleasure should be regarded in this light. Among hunting peoples, when the tribe has to scatter, or when confederation takes place, the regular festivals and dances that reunite the members of the tribe on one spot probably have this function. The eating together that characterizes early assemblage, aside from the mystic bond established between commensals, favors an expansive and fraternal frame of mind. Even to the present day eating or drinking together is everywhere the source of fellowship and the seal of amity. Hence, also, the deliberate intoxication on such occasions. Well does Professor Giddings say: "Deplorable as are the consequences of both gambling and drunkenness, the truthful scientific observer is forced to admit that in the early stages of social development these vices have served a useful function . . . ."[1]

That the unit for feasting should so often be larger than the unit for coöperation may be due to the peculiar socializing power of festivity. People can get along together under festal excitement who cannot bring themselves to work together. Joint festivity, therefore, often keeps the way open for mutual

[1] *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 119, 120.

aid in conflict and pioneers the way for economic coöperation. Those who regard these festivals as spontaneous gatherings for merrymaking must be at a loss to account for their scope and regularity. Why, if they have no deeper social meaning, should they bring together people from such a distance and at such regular intervals. They seem akin rather to those formal celebrations that among primitive people mark the close of hostilities, the conclusion of a treaty, or the forming of an alliance.

But it is inevitable that assemblage directed to public and not to private ends should in time lose somewhat the aspect of spontaneity that befits gatherings for mere hilarity, and become more religious. Like all those early institutions that have in charge far-reaching common interests, they will seek to establish themselves not on the shifting inclinations but on the rooted beliefs of men. The core of assemblage, therefore, becomes *worship*.

Hitherto worship has not been accounted for as a social institution. The religious gathering before the days of faiths that had a message to deliver was certainly not educational. "The antique religions had for the most part no creed; they consisted entirely of institutions and practices."[1] Here, then, where there is no appeal to ethical feelings, no moral teaching, and no service calling up tender sentiments, what social value is there? What utility had those innumerable cults of the ages before morality, when religion was rite, not belief or conduct or aspiration? They would seem to be so much burning of flesh, so much waste of good oil and wine, so much time, trouble, and expense, all to propitiate gods that are phantoms! Sacrifices to the senseless flame, libations to the indifferent ground, and invocations to the unlistening air—how useless! And so all this segment of ancient life has no place in social development, but is mere aberration and delusion!

It would indeed be a marvel if institutions of worship so carefully perfected and so enduring have no real function in the economy of society. All things human tend to "sag" unless

[1] ROBERTSON SMITH, *Religion of the Semites*, p. 18.

they have a basis in reality. Domestic arrangements, political institutions, and professional customs last, in the long run, because of their usefulness. Is it likely that feasts and cults should prove an exception to this rule?[1]

The true meaning of public worship has been well stated by Tarde: "What is a fête? It is that sovereign process by which the social logic of the sentiments overrules and resolves all partial discords, private enmities, envies, contempts, jealousies, moral oppositions of all sorts into an immense unison formed by the periodical convergence of all these secondary sentiments into a greater and stronger sentiment of collective hate or love for some great object which gives the tone to all hearts and transfigures their dissonances into a higher harmony."[2]

This interpretation accounts for certain peculiar features of worship. Why else should worship be so universally *public?* "The sacrificial meal had preëminently the character of the public feast."[3] "The ordinary type of Hebrew worship was essentially social, for in antiquity all religion was an affair of the community rather than of the individual."[4] "Every complete act of worship—for a mere vow was not complete till it was fulfilled by presenting a sacrifice—had a public or quasi-public character. Most sacrifices were offered on fixed occasions, at the great communal or national feasts, but even a private offering was not complete without guests."[5] Private worship, far from being the prototype, is the parody of public worship. "All over the world these private cults are modeled on, derived from, and later than the established worship of the gods of the community."[6] "Ancestor worship is steadily assimilated in form, in its rites and ceremonies, to the public worship of the gods."[7]

Why, if worship be mere propitiation, should *emotional stress*

[1] For a striking instance of how apparently meaningless observances disclose to the sage observer the hidden utility that keeps them alive, see "Bhowani, the Cholera Goddess" in the *Nineteenth Century* for October 1896.

[2] *La logique sociale*, p. 325.

[3] *Religion of the Semites*, p. 234.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 236.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 247.

[6] JEVONS, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 175.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 195.

be so marked? "The most important functions of ancient worship were reserved for public occasions, when the whole community was stirred by a common emotion."[1] "Universal hilarity prevailed; men ate, drank, and were merry together, rejoicing before their god."[2] Feasting, dancing, song, and music were present.[3] We read of "orgiastic gladness," "intoxication of the senses," "physical excitement of religion," and "hilarious revelry" as characterizing the later religious gatherings in contrast with the natural exhilaration of the primitive feasts. In these features we see that emotional stress and mutual hypnotism which leads to mob mind, the acme of collective consciousness.

To our glib rationalism it seems childish to connect national prosperity with national worship. But look below the surface. In the early expansion of society many of the forces that unite the scattered members of a modern state are wanting. A people without letters, arts, or trade, living in scattered agricultural communities, without communication, movement, or central authority, has little to keep alive mutual interest. The ties created by education, travel, intercourse, trade, news, common literature and central administration are unknown. Were it not for the far reverberation of those periodical feasts where a common emotion lifts the people to a common consciousness, the society would surely crumble.

With the religion of doctrine and precept assemblage comes to have a value for instruction, but its old virtue does not cease. The weekly union of the Christian community in a service fitted to give a common direction to all thoughts and to call forth strong emotions must have been a precious "social filament" in the Dark Ages, and even now, when the occasions for assemblage have so multiplied, it plays no mean part in moral education.

It is perhaps an instinctive recognition of this, as much as

[1] *Religion of the Semites*, p. 243. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

[3] DYER, *The Gods of Greece*, p. 103. See also BANCROFT, *Native Races*, Vol. II, chapters ix and xxii.

mere impatience with nonconformity, that has attached to churchgoing an unmistakable social sanction. It is vaguely felt that worship is a social tie, and that the average man cannot neglect it without loss of fraternal feeling. Though now the efficacy of private devotion is acknowledged, and though the best religious thought is no longer to be got from sermons, there seems little disposition to let religion become merely a private and home affair. No sect, however high its conception of deity, neglects frequent assemblage ostensibly for worship. May there not be here an intimation that, however much the theory of religion may change, religious association and religious gatherings will continue to play a prominent part in the life of society?[1]

When religion, ceasing to be national, becomes universal, it no longer avails to preserve the special solidarity needed in the political group. Hence the institution of the patriotic festival to supplement the religious festival. It is significant that none of the modern secular states has neglected to provide national holidays giving occasion for assemblage. While the memories of national dangers, struggles, and triumphs revived at such meetings give them a peculiar value, it is not to be doubted that the spectacle of innumerable simultaneous gatherings of one's fellow citizens dominated by a single sentiment is of itself able to thrill the soul with a sense of the common life.

But while here and there we can detect society promoting assemblage for the sake of its harmonizing effect, it is certain that this form of control is on the wane. Though the diameter of societies lengthens, the means of communication and meeting grow still faster. The intellectual and emotional contacts of men are become so numerous that it is no longer lack of comprehension that threatens the permanence of the social order. The natural occasions for meeting are now so many that it is not necessary for society to supply artificial occasions. It is

[1] Ominous, however, is the increasing resort to "attractive" features in order to get people to assemble. See "Another Year of Church Entertainments," by W. B. Hale in *Forum* for December 1896.

not the estrangement that grows up between the different local groups in a society that is nowadays to be provided against, but rather a certain attitude of the individual toward the *impersonal* arrangements and institutions by which he is surrounded.

CEREMONY.

I.

To many the nature of ceremonial control will seem too well set forth by Mr. Spencer to be in need of any restatement. In truth, however, his "ceremonial government" is not a *means* of government, but a *kind* of government. With him obeisances and respects are the pale shadow of social, political, or religious subordination. They are not means of winning ascendency, but the sign and symptom of ascendency already won. However indebted is sociology to Mr. Spencer for tracing the derivation of ceremonies from natural acts of propitiation, it is now necessary to supplement his study of forms by a study of motives and effects. If it can be shown that a ceremony is not only a social practice but also a social institution, and that it is not simply a *control*, but that it is a *means of control* whereby society can impress the feelings of individuals advantageously to itself, the reopening of this subject will be justified.

II.

Two views may be taken of the forms observed in intercourse. From one standpoint the essence of ceremony is *propitiation*. The force impelling people to these tiresome and precise actions is *fear*. The practice is adopted by the inferior either as the instinctive expression of submission or because such signs of subordination will please and mollify the superior. These formalities, then, observed from purely private motives, mark the militant state of society with its numerous personal and class ascendencies. When the leveling influences of the industrial state cause the government of one man by another to disappear, they become rarer. Ceremony, therefore,

does not approach the dignity of a social institution playing some part in the life of society. It is a procedure generalized by imitation, but no more significant in the social economy than are those uniformities called fashion, and deemed by Mr. Spencer to be of a kind with ceremony.

Significant details, however, suggest another point of view. Often formality does not proceed from the inferior, but from the would-be superior. Ceremoniousness is, we know, well suited to curb over-familiarity and keep others at a distance. There are forms characterized by obsequiousness, but there are other forms which are, so to speak, the weapons by which one man subdues another. "Amongst a man's peers," says Bacon, "a man shall be sure of familiarity; and therefore it is good a little to keep state."[1] "In early society," says Bagehot, "a dignified manner is of essential importance . . . ." "The habitual ascendency of grave manner was a primary force in winning and calming mankind."[2] Everywhere we must distinguish from the ascendency gained by force the ascendency gained by demeanor. The obedience due to awe was no less real than the obedience due to fear. The stately bearing no less than the strong arm was a means of control in early society.

But why should demeanor give one man the upper hand of another? It is likely that the soul of manner is to show forth a sense of confidence and power. This suggests a respect for one's own person, doings, or opinions which powerfully affects the minds of beholders. For there is no reason why this state of mind should not as readily pass from one to another in way of imitation as any other feeling or judgment. The man of impressive manner simply reiterates in gesture language his high sense of his own worth till others are irresistibly led to share it.

Formality in personal intercourse, then, can be traced down to two roots—servility and self-respect. These feelings, working in the sphere of human contacts, give rise to two contrasted efforts—the effort of the servile to control others by propitia-

[1] "Of Ceremonies and Respects."

[2] *Physics and Politics*, p. 151.

ting them, and the effort of the self-respecting to control others by impressing them. These, if successful, inspire graciousness in the one case and deference in the other.

Undoubtedly the forms that become stereotyped are those originally used to propitiate. But it would be rash to conclude that ceremony is an endeavor at mutual propitiation. Nothing is more certain than that manners, far from growing up spontaneously, early get the social sanction behind them and are forced into vogue. Propriety gets codified as soon as morality. Society, far from letting alone, actively interferes in order to get certain forms observed by men in their intercourse. Children are taught them, art lauds them, religion endorses them, and in every way society behaves as if its interests were bound up with them.

Would it be safe to infer that society is concerned in propagating a system of mutual propitiation tending to develop graciousness? Manifestly not, for such a sentiment is of little use to it. On the other hand, nothing could more conduce to social order, with its equilibrium of interests and balance of activities, than a respect of each for others. And forms of intercourse that exert a mutual restraint, and cause each to set a value upon the personality of another, will very likely win the support of society. Of the stiff manners of the Colonials Dr. Eggleston says: "Perhaps it was the partial default of refined feeling that made stately and ceremonious manners seem so proper to the upper class of that day; such usages were a fence by which society protected itself against itself."[1] How well this tallies with the saying of Confucius: "The ceremonial usages serve as dykes to the people against bad excesses to which they are prone."

The society that has relied most on ceremony to preserve order and harmonize men in their dealings is China. Let us see what virtue is found in it by the sages who helped to frame that wonderful and enduring fabric. "They [ceremonies] are the bond that holds the multitude together; and if the bond be

[1] "Social Life in the Colonies," *Century*, Vol. XXX, p. 391.

removed, those multitudes fall into confusion."[1] "For securing the repose of superiors and the good order of the people, there is nothing better than the Rules of Propriety. The Rules of Propriety are simply the development of the principle of reverence."[2] "The sages knew that the rules of ceremony could not be dispensed with,'while the ruin of states, the destruction of families, and the perishing of individuals are always preceded by the abandonment of the Rules of Propriety."[3]

"Therefore the sage kings cultivated and fashioned the lever of righteousness and the ordering of ceremonial usages, in order to regulate the feelings of men. These feelings were the field to be cultivated by the sage kings. They fashioned the rules of ceremony to plow it. They set forth the principles of righteousness with which to plant it."[4]

We find men beginning with no ceremonious forms in personal intercourse, then developing them into a luxuriance so great as almost to smother social life, and finally allowing them to lapse almost to disappearance. Is this but the shadow of that personal ascendency, which, starting at zero, rose to its zenith in the military state, and now sinks again towards zero? Or does this *crescendo* and *diminuendo* not indicate rather that society finding cermony efficacious used it in controlling men in their dealings with one another until the coming to hand of new and finer modes of control enabled it increasingly to dispense with an instrument so clumsy? Even Mr. Spencer confesses that "established observances have the function of educating, in respect of its minor actions, the anti-social nature into a form fitted for social life."[5]

This interpretation accords with numerous facts. Prescribed forms are not used in the family or between intimates, where affection insures self-restraint. But as distance increases the sway of formality grows, till it reaches its climax in the inter-

[1] *Sacred Books of the East*, Li Ki, bk. viii, § i.

[2] Hsaio King, chap. xii in Vol. III, *Sacred Books of the East.*

[3] Li Ki, bk. vii, § iv, par. 6.

[4] *Ibid.*, par. 8.

[5] *Ceremonial Institutions*, § 431.

course of belligerents or the negotiations of ambassadors. It flourishes in militant societies, but not solely as suggested by the obsequiousness of inferiors. It is most observed by the members of a military class, and by those who command rather than by those who obey. In caste societies, while the lower orders may practice humble obeisances, it is in the highest caste that ceremony grows most rankly. The forms of politeness have passed from above downwards and not from below upwards. The courtesy of chivalry was for warriors, not for burghers. It is noble or courtier, not peasant, that feels most the yoke of etiquette. In other words, wherever place or pursuit has fostered excessive self-assertion, there society imposes its rules of behavior designed to check arrogance and suggest the sacredness of another's personality.

But why does society later allow this code to lapse? Is it, as Mr. Spencer asserts, due to the increase of sympathy and social feeling? Partly, but not wholly. While granting that industrialism develops a pacific temper that does not need a rigid ceremonial discipline, let us not overlook the finer type of control that has come in. What now curbs men in their intercourse is not formality, but idea. Ideas of "human dignity," "equality before God," "divine sonship," "value of the undying soul," etc., which saturate the culture we are bathed in till everyone is more or less affected by them, are the moderating influences of today. These notions, partly implicit in Christianity, partly drawn from Greek thought at the Renaissance, and partly struck out by the humanitarian idealism of the last two centuries, inspire in us that reverence for the personality of another which in Persia, Arabia, or China was bound up with ceremonial observance.

III.

Passing now from the ceremony of intercourse to the ceremony of occasions[1] new problems appear. It is a feature of

[1] On this topic I am glad to acknowledge valuable help from an able paper on Ceremony by a student of mine, Mr. B. M. Palmer.

early society that all important occasions in the life of the individual are solemnized by the public performance of rites. The great mass of these are probably intended to impress rather than to control. The formalities connected with the transfer of real estate, the contracting and paying of debts, the making of wills, marriage, adoption, disinheritance, succession, the emancipation of slaves, etc, suited as they are to make vivid and lasting impressions on the minds of witnesses, are necessary to authenticate transactions in days before document and record were possible. They call attention to the fact that something important is taking place, and by their mysterious and unusual character grave deeply on the memory of spectators that which now we trust to deed and note and register.[1]

But in many cases the ceremony of occasion is something more than means of record. We find that the occasions most scrupulously accentuated by public formalities are just those which mark a change in the relations of the individual which involves the acceptance of new responsibilities. The recognition of a new-born child, the attainment of manhood or womanhood, the coming of age, the inheritance of family property, the succession to the headship, marriage, adoption, initiation, confirmation, naturalization, the promise of allegiance, enlistment, installation in office, ordination, compact and treaty—these, though they are events of very different importance, have this in common, that they bind somebody to do for others, for his family, or for the group at large, what hitherto has not been laid upon him. Sometimes, as at christening or enlistment, the obligation is one-sided; sometimes, as in marriage or adoption, it is mutual upon two parties; and again, as in baptism, ordination, or coronation, it embraces the beholding public.

On the other hand, when obligation narrows instead of widens, the event, though certainly as important, is not signal-

[1] Of the Sumatran *bimbangs*, or noisy public festivals, we read: "To give authority to their contracts and other deeds, whether of a public or a private nature, they always make one of these feasts. Writing, they say, may be altered or counterfeited, but the memory of what is transacted and concluded in the presence of a thousand witnesses must remain sacred."

ized by ceremony. Thus divorce is less formal than marriage, withdrawal from association or church than initiation or confirmation, expatriation than naturalization, mustering out of service than enlistment, the adjournment of court than its opening. By the gateway of ceremony is the *entrance* to duties, not the *exit* from them. Is it not, therefore, clear that rite marks not all changes in status, but chiefly those which involve fresh obligations?

Why should this be unless ceremony promotes a performance of these obligations — is, in other words, *a means of control?* Note that it is *symbolic*. The picturesque, dramatic, or sensational would serve to impress an event upon the memory. But the ceremony that modifies the feelings is full of meaning. It calls up that which would be overlooked, reminds of that which would be forgotten, and so reveals the full significance of what is being done. Thus in marriage the carrying away of the bride, the pretended payment for her, the "giving" her away, her whipping by the groom, etc., are ways of signifying that the girl's allegiance to her family has ceased. The *confarreatio*, the drinking together of *saké*, the joining of hand, the exchange of bracelets, the tying together of garments symbolize the intimacy of the new relation. The service of ceremony, therefore, consists in so stimulating the imagination by appropriate gestures, actions, and words as to call up the conception of something vaster in power, life, or numbers than the here and now — God, society, the dead or the unborn.

Again, ceremony is *solemn;* this, not in order to be remembered, but in order to leave a moral impress. A coronation or a knighting is a miniature drama intended to produce an effect upon the feelings of the principals or spectators. Anything in the way of abridgment or disturbance or interruption or caprice would break the spell and destroy the value of the whole. Hence ceremonies must be guarded from distracting sights or sounds, the parts must be arranged beforehand, the details must be precise, and the minutiæ must be so archaic as to be "taboo" to the inroads of a critical rationalism.

Just as proverbs lose their value because of the growing variety of judgment upon life, so ceremonies lose their impressiveness because of the growing diversity of taste. When the lines of individual development are so divergent that there is no form or rite that affects all in the same way — when that which moves one is meaningless to another and ridiculous to a third — the age of symbol is over. The building up of a complex culture and the intellectual differentiation that goes on in society ushers in the era of speech-making. As language presupposes no such agreement of taste and imagination as does the symbol, the occasion once signalized by ceremony is now marked by the oration.

But the appeal that leans so much on reason cannot be sure of sweeping away reason in a tide of sentiment. We must recognize that the age of ceremony is nearly over and we have nothing so effective to put in its place. It behooves society, therefore, to guard with care the little valuable ceremony yet remaining to it in church sacraments or public inaugurals. Ceremonies are not exposed so much to disintegration as beliefs, but still they suffer in a critical, rationalistic age like the present, that cannot divine their virtue. And what is lost is not replaced. It is as hard for a sophisticated age to make new ceremony as to make new myths or new epics. We Americans, with our detachment from the past, our reliance upon the rational, and our hypertrophied sense of the ridiculous, have little ceremony left, but that little we should keep, for it has been well winnowed by time.

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SOME DEMANDS OF SOCIOLOGY UPON PEDAGOGY.

AT the risk of seeming to reopen a closed incident of ancient history, this paper will take its departure from some passages in the report of the "Committee of Ten." The present aim is to define a point of view quite different from that of the committee. In emphasizing the ends to be gained in education, rather than the means to be employed, the writer wishes to be understood as having in mind the whole school career. Methods must of course be varied to meet the learner's needs at different stages of mental growth.

"*The principal end of all education*," says the Conference on History, Civil Government and Political Economy, "*is training*" (p. 168).

The sociologist develops this noncommittal response of the oracle into the following: *The end of all education is, first, completion of the individual; second, implied in the first, adaptation of the individual to such coöperation with the society in which his lot is cast that he works at his best with the society in perfecting its own type, and consequently in creating conditions favorable to the development of a more perfect type of individual.*

The Committee of Ten seems to have stopped at conclusions which tacitly assume that psychical processes in the individual are ends unto themselves. To be sure there are signs of a vague looking for of judgment, from the tribunal of larger life, upon the products of this pedagogy, but the standards of a real test seem to have had little effect upon the committee's point of view. We are told (p. 168) that the mind is chiefly developed in three ways: "(*a*) by cultivating the powers of discriminating observation; (*b*) by strengthening the logical faculty . . . . (*c*) by improving the process of comparison, *i. e.*, the judgment." We are further told that "studies in language and the natural sciences are best adapted to cultivate the habits of observation;

mathematics for the training of the reasoning faculties; history and allied branches to promote the mental power which we call the judgment." The naïvely mediæval psychology behind all this would be humorous if it were not tragical. I need not label the pedagogical philosophy with which my sociology allies itself when I declare that sociology, in common with the most intelligent pedagogy of today, refuses to classify educational material along these lines. In the first place education is not an affair of perception, reflection, and judgment alone. Education connotes the evolution of the whole personality, not merely of intelligence. In the second place, if I am not mistaken, a consensus is rapidly forming, both in pedagogy and in sociology, to the effect that *action in contact with reality*, not artificial selection of abstracted phases of reality, is the normal condition of maximum rate and symmetrical form of personal development. Sociology consequently joins with pedagogy in the aim to bring persons, whether in school or out of school, into as direct contact as possible with the concrete conditions in which all the functions of personality must be applied and controlled. In these conditions alone is that balanced action possible which is the *desideratum* alike of pedagogical and of social culture.

Once more, the Committee of Ten was content to remain in the dismal shadows of the immemorial misconception that *disjecta membra* of representative knowledge are the sole available resource for educational development. I do not find among the fundamental concepts of the report any distinct recognition of the coherence of the things with which intelligent pedagogy aims to procure personal adaptation. The report presents a classified catalogue of *subjects good for study*, but there is no apparent conception of the cosmos of which these subjects are abstracted phases and elements. Nowhere in the report do I find recognition that education when it is finished is conscious conformity of individuals to the coherent cosmic reality of which they are parts. Until our pedagogy rests upon a more intelligent cosmic philosophy, and especially upon a more complete synthesis of social philosophy, we can hardly expect curricula to

correspond with the essential conditions to which human action must learn to conform. A graduate of a leading eastern university, who is now making an impression upon American pedagogy, said recently that when he took his diploma, about ten years ago, history, to his mind, was a collection of material which he had studied under Professor A; political economy, another independent body of information which he studied under Professor B; psychology, another isolated subject which he had studied under Professor C, and so on through the curriculum. Not until six or seven years after graduation did it dawn upon him that each of these details of representation is an aspect of one reality, which the pedagogy of the college had concealed in making the fragments prominent. The most serious consideration about this pedagogical perversion is not that it limits knowledge alone. It distorts the whole attitude of men toward the world. Instead of introducing men to reality it tricks them into belief that an unorganized procession of pedantic abstractions is reality.

The report of the Committee of Ten presents to the sociologist, therefore, this anomaly. It is a whole made up of parts every one of which may possibly be accepted by sociology, but the totality, as presented by the committee, sociology must peremptorily reject. It is hot on the trail of pedagogical and sociological truth, without actually coming within sight of the truth. Human personality is not doomed to struggle forever *seriatim* with a long list of detached groups of facts, in order to get its psychic and social development. The world of experience is one, not many. Pedagogy and sociology are discovering this unity by different processes, and as a consequence of their perception that educational material is essentially one, not many, pedagogy and sociology are bound to combine their demands for a complete change of front in education. The proper educator is reality, not conventionalized abstractions from reality. Hence the demand of the new pedagogy, supported heartily by the new sociology, that schooling, particularly in its earlier stages, shall be changed from an afflictive imposition upon life to rationally concentrated accomplishment of a portion of life itself. Hence

the correlated demand of the new pedagogy, also seconded by the new sociology, that so far as conscious effort is made by instructors to supplement the education of action by the education of information, the objects of knowledge shall be kept real by being viewed constantly as organic parts of the one reality. They must no longer be made unreal, through analytic segregation which leaves them standing apart as independent realities.

Having thus by negation challenged some of the implicit concessions of the Committee of Ten to the old dogmatic pedagogy, and to pre-sociological conceptions of reality, I pass to a positive definition of the outlook of sociology. I believe it to be also in line with the pedagogy that will prevail.

Human experience is concerned with three knowable elements: first, man's material environment, inanimate and animate; second, man himself as an individual, in all his characteristics, from his place in the animal kingdom through his special physiology, psychology, and technology; third, man's associations or institutions. Sociology is the systematic attempt to reduce the reactions of these three elements — nature, man, institutions — to scientific form and expression. The inclusive reality which sociology finds comprehending both the processes and the products of these reactions is society,—*i. e.*, individuals in association within the conditions imposed by the material environment and modified by human achievement. The task set for each individual, when he finds himself participant of this reality, is to accommodate himself to prevailing conditions in such manner that he may both accomplish and enjoy a maximum share of the development which his stage in social evolution is empowered to accomplish.

This life task of men consequently sets the pedagogical task of teachers. The prime problem of education, as the sociologist views it, is how to promote adaptation of the individual to the social conditions, natural and artificial, within which individuals live, and move, and have their being. It would not be in point to discuss here the relative place of action and information in progress toward this end. That belongs to pedagogical technology.

I assume that both action and information are unchallenged means of modern pedagogy. With their proportions and with their appropriate sequence at different stages of culture, sociology is not directly concerned. Sociology has no tolerance, however, for the pedantry that persists in carpentering together educational courses out of subjects which are supposed to exercise, first, the perceptive faculty, then the memory, then the language faculty, then the logical faculty, etc. On the contrary, every represented contact of a person with a portion of reality sooner or later calls into exercise every mental power of that person, probably in a more rational order and proportion than can be produced by an artificial process. Our business as teachers is primarily, therefore, not to train particular mental powers, but to select points of contact between learning minds and the reality that is to be learned. The mind's own autonomy will look out for the appropriate series of subjective mental processes. In the second place, our business as teachers is to bring these perceptive contacts of pupils' minds with points of objective reality into true association with all the remainder of objective reality, *i. e.*, we should help pupils first to see things, and, second, to see things together as they actually exist in reality. In other words, the demand of sociology upon pedagogy is that it shall stop wet-nursing orphan mental faculties and find out how to bring persons into touch with what objectively is, as it is. The mind itself will do the rest.

In pursuance of this demand, sociology necessarily becomes an active partisan upon one of the pedagogical doctrines over which educators are divided: viz., sociology denies that the rational center for the concentration of studies is any science or group of sciences. The rational center is the student himself. Personal adaptation to life means the given person's organization of his contacts with reality. In other words, pedagogy should be the science of assisting youth to organize their contacts with reality; and by this I mean to organize these contacts with reality *by* both thought and action, and *for* both thought and action. Relatively the world stands still during the school age of any

person. The pupil himself changes visibly almost every day. The reality with which the pupil can have conscious contact is defined, therefore, by the pupil's own powers and opportunities. At each stage, however, himself on the one hand, and nature, men, institutions, on the other hand, are the subject and object of adjustment. A changing self has the task of adaptation to a surrounding frame of things which daily displays new mysteries and complexities. The teacher's task is to help the individual understand this environment, of which the pupil for a long time seems to himself to be the center. It is the teacher's business to help the pupil understand this whole environment as it is related to himself. Presently, if the pupil's perceptions grow more penetrating and comprehensive, his own personal interests cease to seem the pivot on which the world of experience turns. His personality becomes extended, and at the same time his egoism gets balanced with the personal equation of others whose interests appear. The child finds the complement of his egoism in the family, the school, the group of playmates, the community, and at last, if his education is complete, in society at large. Yet, at each varying diameter of comprehension, life, of which the child is at first to himself the center and circumference, and later life as a whole, of which to the last the individual is to himself in the final resort the most interesting part—life, either individual or social, is the ever present reality which summarizes all that men can positively know. This central and inclusive reality varies, in re-presentation, from socially unrelated individual life to a conception of individual life enlarged by evolved social consciousness into a function of the more abiding reality—social life. This human career, either as pursued for himself by the socially unconscious individual, or as a mingling of the individual with others associated by force of circumstances in pursuing purposes which none perfectly comprehend; this life of men alike in nature, within conditions imposing common limitations upon nature, is the whole of man's range of positive experience and scientific observation. Sociology consequently demands of educators that they shall elaborate available aids

first, to perception by the individual of the relation of part to part in this inclusive reality — the life of men in society; second, that educators shall perfect influences to promote adjustment of individuals to their appropriate functions within this whole.

The part of the problem which I have at present in mind is the proper direction and organization of the pupil's perceptions. So far as the subject-matter of sociology is concerned, everything knowable and worth knowing is a fact or a relation helping to make up this complexity which we call society or social life. The important claim of sociology in this connection is that this reality, like poverty, we have always with us. This reality as a connected whole, related to the pupil, is always the natural and rational means of education. A sequence of studies, in the sense that the pupil is to be enjoined from intelligent contact with portions of reality until other portions have had their turn, is a monstrous perversion of the conditions of education. All reality, the whole plexus of social life, is continually confronting the pupil. No "subject" abstracted from this actual whole is veracious to the pupil unless he is permitted to see it as a part of the whole. It is a misconstruction of reality to think and accordingly to act as though one kind of knowledge belongs to one age and another to another. The whole vast mystery of life, in all its processes and conditions, confronts the child as really as it does the sage. It is the business of the educator to help the child interpret the part by the whole. Education from the beginning should be an initiation into science, language, philosophy, art and political action in the largest sense. When we shall have adopted a thoroughly rational pedagogy, the child will begin to learn everything the moment he begins to learn anything.

Am I demanding a pedagogy which presupposes one philosopher as teacher and another as pupil? Certainly. Every teacher ought to be a philosopher. Every child already is one until conventionality spoils him. More than that, he is also scientist, poet, and artist in embryo, and would mature in all these characters if we did not stunt him with our bungling. I would

revive Rousseau's cry, "Return to Nature!" but in a sense of which Rousseau never dreamed,— not nature in the burlesque of our ignorant preconceptions, but nature scientifically explored, nature, the immanent law of which is to own the sway of rational mind.

I am not asserting that grammar and geometry and geography and geology and history and economics and psychology and ethics as such should be taught in the nursery. I am asserting that in the cradle the child begins to be in contact with that nature and society of which all these are phases and products and reports. Sociology demands for the child, from the cradle to his second childhood, opportunities for such frank contact with life that its various aspects will confide to him their mystery in its real relations with the other elements of life. Sociology demands of the tutors and governors who lead the child through the formal part of education, that they shall so discreetly pilot Wilhelm Meister through his apprentice years that he may learn his world at the smallest expense, and with least cause for regret, both to others and to himself. Whether this citizen of the world shall ever learn to construe life in terms of the conventional sciences is an entirely secondary matter. The main thing is that, from the beginning, he shall learn to know himself and his world truly,— so far as he knows at all,— in all essential relations. This involves the learning of such sciences as he does acquire, in the character of excerpts from the whole book of knowledge, not as self-sufficient knowledges.

I repeat that sociology values subjects of study for reasons quite different from those traditionally alleged. Physical, biological, and social science, with the products of human thought deposited in literature, are worthy of study not because they are assorted tonics for corresponding kinds of mental impotence, but because they are, and only in so far as they are, revealers of man himself and of the life of which he is both creator and creature.

Without alluding further to other departments of knowledge, I may apply what I have said to the subject-matter of the social sciences in particular.

Sociology demands with equal confidence, first, that for everybody the study of *society* shall begin with the nursing bottle, and continue so long as social relations continue; second, that for most people the study of *sociology* shall never begin at all. If the argument thus far has provoked expectation that I shall recommend the introduction of sociology into the curriculum of the lower schools, as the needed corrective of educational defects, the inference is decidedly at fault. Only exceptional pupils should study sociology earlier than their senior year in college, and probably these few would do better to defer the study till after taking the bachelor's degree. While sociology proper is not a desirable subject for young pupils, our educational methods will be miserably inadequate to their social function till every teacher, from the kindergarten on, is sufficiently instructed in sociology to put all his teaching in the setting which the sociological view-point affords. This implies, of course, that the function of education must one day be taken so seriously that only men and women who have more than the bachelor's preparation will be entrusted with its direction.

The study of society which we may reasonably demand in our schools and colleges today must and should be chiefly in connection with the subjects physiography, political geography, anthropology, ethnology, history, civics and economics. The sociological demand with reference to these subjects is that instruction in them shall be rationalized in the same way that the teaching of geography has been reformed during my recollection. I was not the boy who discovered after several years' study of "geography" that the ground on which he walked between home and school was the "earth's surface," but my most lasting recollections of the study of geography cluster around some cabalistic representations of the plane of the ecliptic. To this day I am not perfectly clear about the meaning of those ghostly figures which lent weird interest to the earlier pages of the book. They produced in my youthful mind vague imaginings of uncanny gyrations among celestial bodies, presumed by the author to be the proper medium for introducing youth to a knowledge of the earth's

surface. This was not intelligent correlation of whole and part. It was arbitrary creation of a whole to which the pupil's experience did not correspond ; or in another view it was thrusting forward a part which pupils had not differentiated from the whole, and did not need to. I presume that every parent, and every teacher who has liberty to use his own judgment, now begins the teaching of geography with that spot of *terra firma* which is next to the home or the schoolhouse. Whether the plane of the ecliptic ever gets mentioned is a matter of very slight concern. A similar change in the social sciences is well in progress, but it is not yet a prevalent policy. At my graduation from college I passed a respectable examination on the constitution and by-laws of the government at Westminster, but I knew virtually nothing, and was never told that it was worth while to know anything, about the government of the town in which the college was located. My knowledge of the British constitution has never yet found any practical application, but for a decade, as citizen and petty office-holder in that college community, I was subsequently obliged to study and use the town charter and ordinances, which were not worth the notice of my former instructors. Sociology, like charity, ought to begin at home, but, like charity, it ought not to stay at home. The rational method of observation, recognizing the real concentration of life around each member of society, explores the concentric circles of social activity from the actual standpoint of the observer. The child should begin to study economics,—literally, the law of the household,—he should learn the civics and ethics and history of the household, in the practice of normal household relations. The economy and politics and ethics and history of the school, and then of the parent's shop, and then of the neighboring factory, and later of the whole town, are the best educational material that the sociologist can recommend. In other words, the social *desideratum* is that the developing member of society shall become analytically and synthetically intelligent about the society to which he belongs.[1]

[1] SMALL AND VINCENT'S *Introduction to the Study of Society* is the first attempt to furnish a laboratory guide for this sort of study. It is not a text-book in sociology, but

The precision of his social intelligence in general depends upon the exactness of his knowledge of details in the life which he most intimately shares.

Observation of the structure, functions, and forces of life in one's own community is the normal beginning of true and large social intelligence and action. Even history should begin with the present, not with the past. Just as Gibbon interpreted the tactics of the Roman legions by the knowledge he gained in the British militia, so every student of history is prepared to reconstruct the past only as he possesses correct and adequate conceptions of the present. Sociological analysis of the anatomy, physiology, and psychology of society furnishes the alphabet to spell out the lessons of history.

The only change in school methods which I am urging is the introduction of this laboratory study of the social facts, processes, and forces nearest at hand, as exhibiting typical social relations in all nations, times, and places. This not as a substitute for present subjects in the social sciences, but as a method of approaching present subjects.

One more demand is urged by sociology upon pedagogy, viz., that all direct or indirect observations of society shall be organized under at least three great categories: first, interdependence; second, order or coöperation; third, progress or continuity.[1] Unless social information can be construed in at least these three forms nothing can save it from frivolity and barren-

a path-maker in methods of observing and arranging societary facts. Variations of the method are possible to fit different needs, from the kindergarten to the seminar. The University of Chicago Press has just issued a typical study of the City of Galesburg, upon this plan, an adaptation of the method of Schäffle, by MR. A. W. DUNN. Professor C. R. Henderson's *Catechism for Social Observers* elaborates the categories of observation. *Vide* also the Le Play method explained March 1897 in this JOURNAL. Such work can neither displace nor be displaced by another kind of work upon societary material, as represented for example by two recent text-books on sociology, GIDDINGS' *Principles of Sociology* (with the syllabus, *Theory of Socialization*) and FAIRBANKS' *Introduction to Sociology*, noticed in this JOURNAL, September 1896.

[1] I hope it is superfluous to add that the use of these terms, or of any verbal substitute, is not what I am contending for, but the arrangement of ideas in conceptual form for which philosophers may find above designations convenient.

ness. The categories are not logically exclusive—the fault of the things themselves!

By the first category, interdependence, I mean the universal fact that every act or event in a human life has been made possible or necessary by other acts or events connected with other lives both past and present, and that it helps to make or mar the lives of others. Beginning with the family and extending to the compass of the race, society is a network of interdependences. One of the discoveries which pupils should be aided to make, in their study of any time or nation or human process, should be that the particular men concerned exemplified the truth "No man liveth unto himself."

By the second category, order or coöperation, I mean the machine-like interplay of actors and actions in every minute social group as well as in large societies. The relation is so clear that Mother Goose reported it genially, yet it is so obscure that society is daily dissipating its resources because the relation is not understood. From the factory whistle that rouses the workmen at five o'clock, to the curfew bell at the close of day, the waking and the working and the resting of a town tell the truth of human welfare resting upon some form of established order. Wherever men have been associated, even in the most temporary society, the measure of stability in their relations has been preserved by an institutional order, as real while it lasted as though it were defined by the iron decrees of Medes and Persians. A mode of temporary equilibrium is one of the forms in which human association must be thought, if thought truly whether in the society of Ivan the Terrible or of Grover the Inscrutable. When the learners read of any epoch of the past, one of the forms in which they must be helped to represent it, if it is to reveal truth to them, must be the reconstructed balance of influence and action in which the lives of that past time preserved their motion.

The biographical method of teaching history frequently violates this canon. Instead of being made to appear as one of the workers among whom the labor of their generation is

divided, the great man in whom the story of his age is told seems to fill a sphere apart from ordinary men, affecting their destinies by some undetermined process of long-distance induction.

By the third category, progress or continuity, I mean the conception of men and events as always working out new individual conditions and social arrangements,—the truth on the one hand that "the roots of the present are deep in the past," on the other hand that the present cannot escape responsibility for the future. When historical acts are recalled they should always be considered at last in this third aspect. What motives and impulses led to them? What consequences and effects did they set in motion? This is the scientific attitude of mind toward the past. It is the genuinely social attitude toward the present and the future. It is the purely intellectual condition of the constructive temper which is the last and best product to be demanded of education. Yet I have known courses in history to be conducted under the highest institutional sanction, with no discernible reference to historical cause and consequence. Search and emphasis were entirely for the facts. Specialization of that sort is falsification. Facts cannot be told truly except in their relations.

Sociology demands of educators, finally, that they shall not rate themselves as leaders of children but as makers of society. Sociology knows no means for the amelioration or reform of society more radical than those of which teachers hold the leverage. The teacher who realizes his social function will not be satisfied with passing children to the next grade. He will read his success only in the record of men and women who go from the school eager to explore wider and deeper these social relations, and zealous to do their part in making a better future. We are the dupes of faulty analysis if we imagine that schools can do much to promote social progress until they are motived by this insight and this temper.[1]

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

[1] This paper was read at the Buffalo meeting of the National Educational Association, July 10, 1896, and appears in published reports of same.

A PROGRAMME FOR SOCIAL STUDY.

THE present widespread discontent in regard to social conditions, the dawning recognition that not anybody in particular but everybody in general is to blame for them, and the growing belief that better conditions may be realized if we set about it intelligently, make the study of the actual facts of society one of the chief demands of the times. I say the actual facts of society, for the investigation by the people themselves of actual local social conditions, and the development of local civic pride, will do more toward bettering social conditions than the consideration by isolated students of theoretical social ideas. Theoretical study should not be discouraged, of course, but the formation in a few cities of study clubs to pursue local social investigations marks the beginning of a movement which also deserves the encouragement of everyone interested in social reform. With the hope of stimulating this movement by encouraging the formation and by facilitating the work of such clubs, I desire to present a few suggestions in regard to a method of social study, and to follow those suggestions with a working programme which, with slight modifications, may serve for a club in any locality. My suggestions are addressed mainly to those who have had no special training in sociology.[1]

In beginning the investigation of any class of phenomena or conditions, physical or social, the first thing one stands in need of is a method of study. Without method all study is likely to be fruitless, or, to say the least, fragmentary. The student without a definite method will only lose himself in a wilderness of particulars. In all scientific study it is necessary to arrange and classify the material collected and thus avoid confusion. To the

[1] The suggestions offered are practically adapted from SMALL and VINCENT'S *Introduction to the Study of Society*. No originality except in the manner of presentation is claimed by the writer.

student of society, therefore, a method of study is as necessary as an outline of what he wishes to say is needful to a writer of a composition. And not only to the scientific student of society is a method of social study necessary but also to every citizen in the land. For in these days when the spirit of humanity is moving everywhere, and the desire to be of social service is felt by persons in almost every walk of life, almost everyone is called upon at some time or other to perform some social service. It may be nothing more than to engage in charitable work, but even this kind of work should be preceded by a knowledge as exact as possible of the conditions of those who are to be served. If a family, for instance, is to be relieved, more harm than good may be done if no attempt is made to learn the causes of its dependence, and to find out the elements which exist in it or its environment which may be utilized to lift it to a higher plane of living. If indiscriminate charity is not, as some maintain, the greatest curse of our time, it has been at least a prolific source of evil. One of the first lessons which well-disposed persons must learn, is that to do good to other people requires an expenditure of thought as well as an outlay of money. "He gives nothing but worthless gold," says Lowell, "who gives from a sense of duty," and again,

> "Not what we give, but what we share,
> For the gift without the giver is bare."

So slight a social service, then, as the assistance of a family, to say nothing of the reform of a community, requires social knowledge. To acquire that knowledge accurately and with economy of time, a method of study is necessary.

The first step in the study of society or of any social group is to conceive it as a unit. This is not difficult if the object of study is a family, for in a family the relation of parents and children, brothers and sisters, etc., are so intimate that even to the superficial student its unity is apparent. This is not the case, however, with a larger social group. It may require some effort of observation and thought to discover the essential unity of a neighborhood, village, town or city, or of a society. Neverthe-

less the unity of these groups, though not so obvious, is as real as that of the family. Each group may, of course, be only a part of a larger unit, but the relations which its own factors sustain to each other are of such a nature that for purposes of study it also may be described as a unit. Take, for example, a city, town, or village community. In each case the people for industrial and social reasons have been brought together in one locality. They have taken advantage of the economy of division of labor, the miller grinding flour for the community, the grocer providing sundries, the merchant clothing, etc. This division of labor brought about a system of mutual dependence. They have established relationships manifested by the church, the school, the theater, etc., which have increased this dependency. They are thus held together by material bonds and by bonds of mutual self interest in a single group, a unit. If we take a society, the same relations of interdependence will be found. As members of a society we have only to consider the sources of our ideas, the influences physical and moral, by which these ideas are affected, or even so simple a matter as the various articles of food which enter into the composition of our bodies, to see how dependent we are upon each other. We can see too how the various parts of society represented by different groups, the agricultural, manufacturing, etc., coöperate in supplying our wants, and that completeness of social life varies with the degree of this coöperation. Now this interdependence and coöperation are the radical ideas in what is known as the organic conception of society, and this conception is, I take it, the initial step in all fruitful social study.

Having conceived our family, group, or society, as a unit, our first task is to analyze it into its constituent elements. This should be done in order that each part may be studied separately with a view of discovering its condition and its influence upon the whole. Let us take for the purpose of illustration a society, for by so doing we shall include the analysis of all smaller groups. A society then may be divided into three parts: first, the land, which may be conceived in its original state as a raw bit of nature;

second, the material objects which have been provided by the members of the society for the satisfaction of their wants (wealth), and, third, the people themselves (population). Now land, the first element, which in its economic sense has come to mean all natural resources, may be divided into soil, climate, flora, and fauna, and each of these may be studied with reference to its relation to and effect upon wealth and population. Wealth, the second element, may be classified in accordance with the various purposes it serves, as wealth for sustenance and protection (food, clothing, shelter, etc.), for production (all forms of capital), and for the satisfaction of intellectual, æsthetic, and religious desires. Finally, population, the third element may be roughly divided into three great classes, first, those who engage in the various industries, extracting and transforming, such as agriculture, mining, manufacturing and the like, which support the existence of a population; second, those who are engaged in transporting persons from place to place, or in carrying commodities from the place where they are produced to the place where they are consumed, such for instance as railway employés and all other persons engaged in what we call the carrying trade, and third, those who "coördinate and render efficient the activities" of the former classes and "discipline and develop the psychical powers of individuals in society," as, for instance, the press, the school, the church, the government, etc. These three classes cannot, of course, be studied apart from their physical environment. With that environment they have been appropriately denominated the sustaining, transporting, and regulating systems, and each of them may be found more or less highly developed in any social group. Each system is composed of a number of smaller systems or groups which the sociologist describes as organs. Take, for instance, the sustaining system. It is composed of as many groups, or organs, as there are extracting and transforming industries. Organs, again, may be divided into families, since the personal factor of each organ is made up of family representatives, and families are separable into individuals, the ultimate social units. We have thus completed our

analysis, a rough one of course, but sufficient for our purpose Arranged in schematic form it will appear as follows:

SOCIETY.
- I LAND
  - 1. Soil
  - 2. Climate
  - 3. Flora
  - 4. Fauna
- II WEALTH
  - 1. For sustenance and protection
  - 2. For production
  - 3. For promoting sociability
  - 4. For advancing knowledge
  - 5. For æsthetic enjoyment
  - 6. For religious purposes
- III POPULATION
  - 1. *Systems*
    - 1. Sustaining
      - 1. Organs
        - 1. Families
          - 1. Farmers
          - 2. Miners
          - 3. Lumbermen
          - 4. Millers
          - 5. Manufacturers, etc.
    - 2. Transporting
      - 1. Organs
        - 1. Families
          - 1. Railway employés
          - 2 Street-car employés
          - 3. Steamboat men
          - 4. Sailors, etc.
    - 3. Regulating
      - 1. Organs
        - 1. Families
          - 1. Teachers
          - 2. Lawyers
          - 3. Ministers
          - 4. Editors, etc.

The sole purpose of this analysis is to gain a conspectus of social relations and to systematize our study. Its value will be

more apparent perhaps if we take up now some of the chief divisions and consider the influence they exert upon each other. We will suppose that our object of study is a society.

"Every society," says Herbert Spencer, "displays phenomena that are ascribable to the character of its units and to the conditions under which they exist." Let us consider briefly the effect of these conditions.

That land, and by land I mean all natural resources, exerts a great influence upon the character and organization of a people, must be obvious to everyone who has the slightest knowledge of history and geography, for by land chiefly do we explain the difference between the inhabitants of the cold regions of the North, and those of the hot countries near the Equator. Both the physical and mental nature of men are affected by their natural environment. Criminologists have shown, for instance, that there is a close relation between crime and climate. The contour of the land affects the size and isolation of a social group, and determines the lines of its movements. Some writers go so far as to declare that physical conditions are the chief factors in social development. Buckle, for instance, lays great stress upon the effect which the general aspect of nature exerts upon the people. By the general aspect of nature, he means "those appearances which, though presented chiefly to the sight, have through the medium of that or the other senses directed the association of ideas, and hence on different occasions have given rise to different habits of national thought." Buckle enforces his proposition by great wealth of illustration. Ireland, Greece, India, Egypt, Central America, Mexico, Peru and Brazil are all cited to illustrate his principle. The aspect of nature in India, for instance, he says, stimulated the imagination of the people, which found expression in their forms of religion. "To them every object of nature was a source of awe . . . . They never dared to assimilate their own actions with the actions of their deities." It is thus, he thinks, that the hideous nature of the Hindoo gods may be explained. With Europe, however, he maintains, the case is very different. All the conditions of

existence are changed. Dangers are less numerous, the climate more healthy, earthquakes less frequent, hurricanes less disastrous, and wild beasts and noxious animals less abundant. Everything tended to exalt the dignity of man, while in India everything tended to depress it. Europeans, therefore, had more respect for human powers. "Human beings, less humble," says Mr. Buckle, "as it were less eclipsed by the external world, thought more of their own powers, and human nature did not fall into that discredit into which it elsewhere sank." It is thus that he accounts for the deification of mortals as a part of the national religion of Greece.[1]

We need not, however, commit ourselves to extreme theories in regard to the influence of land on population. The fact of this influence will be shown in any group we may undertake to study. It is illustrated in the location of almost every city, town, and village. The site of a city is not often a matter of chance. Water courses, natural products, all physical conditions have something to do with its choice, and the contour of the land upon which a city is built helps to determine the direction of its streets; physical conditions locate its residence portion, its manufacturing districts, and its slums, and all these things have their effects upon the character of the population.

That land exerts an influence also on the production of wealth is no less obvious, and this fact must not be lost sight of in any social investigation. Among the causes affecting the efficiency of production Mr. Mill mentions the following: fertility of the soil, the influence of climate, the abundance of mineral productions, and the advantages of situation. "It is evident," says Buckle, "that among an entirely ignorant people the rapidity with which wealth is created will be solely regulated by the physical peculiarities of their country. At a later period, and when wealth has been capitalized, other causes come into play." As a matter of fact the character of the land practically

[1] See *History of Civilization in England*, chap. 2, *passim*. Compare also CROZIER'S *Civilization and Progress*. "The industrial and social conditions of men," he says, "are, if not the sole cause, at least the controlling factor in civilization and progress."

sets a limit to the number of people which a given area will sustain. However productive the soil may be, and however carefully cultivated, it cannot be made to yield an indefinitely increasing amount of that form of wealth which serves as food. This is due to the well-known law of diminishing returns which may be stated as follows: In certain industries, of which agriculture is perhaps the best example, a point will by and by be reached beyond which an increased expenditure of labor and capital will not bring a proportionate return. That is to say, a farmer, although by doubling the labor and capital which he applies to his land might succeed in doubling the amount of produce once, twice, or thrice, could not go on doing so indefinitely. Now, since food is derived chiefly from the soil, this fact of diminishing returns from land practically places a limit on population, and this is an important consideration in social study. For it is plain that the population can by no means increase beyond the food supply, that is, beyond the amount of that form of wealth which is used to sustain life. The effects here described of land upon population and wealth, so obvious in society at large, are always present in any social group however small, and consequently must always in every attempt at social study be a subject of investigation.

Turning now to wealth, the effects of its character and amount upon the welfare of a society are in a general way evident to all. I have already referred to the fact that wealth, in the form of food, and population bear a certain relation to each other. This relation is formulated in the following law, known the world over as the Malthusian law of population: Population tends to increase more rapidly than food is capable of being increased. The importance of this law cannot easily be overestimated. Notwithstanding all its so-called refutations, it must be taken account of in every scheme for social reform. The struggle for existence is not limited to the lower animals. Man, wherever he has been found, has been engaged in conflict. This conflict is for the means of satisfying his desires, one of the most important of which is the desire for physical comforts.

The intensity of this struggle varies with the relations of the population to the food supply. In some manner, whether by the so-called positive checks, as war, pestilence, famine, and the like, or by negative checks, like vice and prudential restraint, the equilibrium must be maintained. Among the lowest classes the checks on population are chiefly positive. It is only the intelligent, the thoughtful, the prudent, who act upon the advice of Matthew Arnold. Matthew Arnold, it is said, was upon one occasion, in company with a good man, overlooking a multitude of children in one of the most miserable parts of London, children eaten up with disease, half size, half fed, half clothed, neglected by their parents, without house, without home, without hope. "The one thing really needful," said the good man, "is to teach these little ones to succor one another, if only with a cup of cold water; but now from one end of the country to another one hears nothing but the cry for knowledge, knowledge, knowledge." But Mr. Arnold replied that so long as the multitude of these poor children is perpetually swelling, they must be charged with misery to themselves and us, whether they help one another with a cup of cold water or not. The knowledge how to prevent them accumulating is what we want.[1] "A man's children," says the same writer, in *Culture and Anarchy*, "are not really sent no more than the pictures upon his wall, or the horses in his stable are sent; and to bring people into the world when one cannot afford to keep them and one's self decently, or to bring more of them into the world than one can afford to keep, is by no means an accomplishment of the divine will, or a fulfillment of nature's simplest laws, but is contrary to reason and the will of God."[1]

Aside from this relation of population to food, it is clear that wealth, notwithstanding the evils connected with its production, distribution, and consumption, is essential to the gratification of all our higher desires. Without wealth society could not exist. Its accumulation is the prerequisite of all great social improvements. Railway systems, large manufacturing concerns,

[1] Quoted by JANE HUME CLAPPERTON in *Scientific Meliorism*, p. 85.

the utilization of the powers of nature, all of which themselves increase the production of wealth, are the results of previous accumulations. Wealth is also essential to all intellectual and æsthetic development. The study of a social group may reveal the fact that the chief necessity is a sufficient amount of wealth to support existence and allow leisure for self-improvement. The man or the class of men who have to work twelve hours a day are not likely to be greatly interested in literature, science, or art. It is all very well to tell such men that they must cultivate their minds and familiarize themselves with the great thoughts of the world, but such homiletic advice might well be spared. "To those who have neither time nor taste for intellectual or æsthetic culture," says Clapperton, "it is to me pure irony to tell them that they want perception, and require to know the best that has been thought and said in the world, when they know their real want is happiness; and happiness with them means more of the necessaries of life, and more of life's sweet humanities; some freedom from anxiety and care, some leisure from constant and too monotonous toil." Well-meaning persons sometimes carry to the poor the thoughts of Shakespeare and the wisdom of Emerson when they would far better provide the opportunity to earn a side of bacon or a sack of flour. Above the door of one of the New York missions is the sign "Soup, Soap, and Salvation," and this to my mind expresses the rational order of reformative effort. Much more might be said of the influences of wealth upon population, but it is beyond my purpose. I desire simply to call attention to its obvious influence, and to the fact that whatever may be our object of study — family, group or community — these influences may be discovered.

We have now the third element, population, which we may briefly consider, and for our present purpose it will be better to begin with the final elements in our analysis, namely, individuals. It needs no acute observer to discover that no two persons are exactly alike. Differences of race, temperament, age, sex, etc., must be carefully considered in any thought concerning the

improvement of a social group. By way of illustration let me refer to the question of sex. In society at large the question as to how far the fundamental distinction between man and woman affects the psychical life is an extremely important problem. Whether the chief difference lies in the realm of the feelings or in the intellect, it cannot be denied that the difference exists. Some go so far as to insist with Von Hartman that the distinction of sex separates men and women by an impassable gulf. "Man," he says, "is by nature active, woman, passive, and this difference has a profound effect on the occupation of both parties." "Hard manual labor," he declares, "consumes the feminine capacity for work much sooner than the masculine. It leads to premature old age and exhaustion. It weakens the power to resist the insidious influence of disease, and in this way considerably curtails life's duration. Immoderate mental work is often more harmful to women, for the female brain and nervous system cannot bear nearly as much strain as the male. It is on this account that the education and training of both sexes must always remain different." He is even of the opinion that in the "domain of social morality, the demand for equality and equal judgment of the sexes is not less untenable than in politics and employment." I present this view, not to agree with it, but in order to suggest the problem which arises from individual distinctions, and to make it clear that in every contemplated change of social conditions or institutions due regard must be paid to them.

But something more than a knowledge of individual differences is necessary in social study. Everyone should have a knowledge as complete as possible of the individual himself. This knowledge may be obtained from the various natural and social sciences, some acquaintance with which on the part of anyone who would enter deeply into social study is presupposed. Physiology and anatomy tell us of the structure of the individual and his physical needs. History, political economy, and political science tell us of his social nature and its results. In view of the importance of this kind of knowledge it will be profitable, I think, for me to summarize the study of the indi-

vidual which may be found in Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society*.

In the first place, then, man is an animal. That is a fact which must never be left out of account. Many of his needs are animal needs. No new order of society or new adjustment of a social group is practicable or desirable that does not provide for these needs. Man is also a social being. He loves the companionship of his fellows. It is obvious that his socialization is not yet complete. There are even those who seem to resist the socializing tendency and demand greater liberty, apparently understanding by liberty freedom from law, but such persons might well learn from the following lines of John Stuart Blackie:

> "Some men by liberty swear — not I;
> The beasts of the forest are free;
> The wild tornadoes that sweep the sky;
> The tempests that harrow the sea;
> But man is a thing more divine;
> With reasoned subjection,
> He makes his election,
> And bends with awe
> To sovereign law,
> And limits that wisely confine."

Man is also a being desiring æsthetic enjoyment. This is seen in the tattooing of the savage as well as in the adornment of the lady of fashion. He is also an intellectual being, having a desire for knowledge. This desire is manifested in every member of the human race. It is as obvious in the child, whose curiosity is proverbial, as in the aged, who are still anxious to learn something new; in the gossip earnestly gathering bits of scandal as in the philosopher eager in his search after truth. Finally, man is a moral being, having a knowledge of right and wrong. These characteristics of man seem to justify the following classification of his desires: the desire for health, the desire for wealth, the desire for sociability, the desire for knowledge, the desire for beauty, the desire for righteousness. These desires, it is claimed, are common in latent or variously

developed forms to all men and women, their strength and the conceptions of their satisfaction varying of course in different persons. Now, in an ideal society all the desires of each individual would be proportionately developed and find appropriate satisfaction, and here is an important suggestion for social reform. If some of the desires manifested in the group we are studying are too strong while others are too weak, the obvious need is the restraint of the former and the cultivation of the latter.

The suggestion contained in this study of the individual applies not only to a study of society, but to a study of the family as well. A member of a philanthropic committee or a friendly visitor of a charity organization who undertakes the reform of a family is on the lookout, if he is wise, for manifestations of what we call the higher desires. In this way he learns what to appeal to. Sometimes he finds that the desire for beauty, manifested perhaps by a sickly flower in the window, rightly addressed will lead a family from the ugliness of vice to the beauty of holy living. It is plain then that in the study of whatever group we may choose, one set of our inquiries must be in regard to the relative development of desires, and the abundance or lack of means appropriate to their satisfaction.

In the same study of the individual it is pointed out that he has certain combining properties. These are the capacity for affection and friendship, and for coöperation, which have enabled him to accomplish such remarkable achievements in society. It is these combining qualities which enable him to unite with others to form the various social groups. The first of these groups in logical order of formation, and perhaps of importance, is the family. It may not be the first historically. That is a question which is yet to be settled. It is often said that the family, the molecule of society, is the earliest form of social organization. But if the evolutionary theory is correct, we cannot assume that society began its organization with the family, for among the lower animals we find those whose matrimonial relations do not exhibit the least permanence or organization. We find

instances, however, of economic and political association. "Wolves, for instance, pressed by hunger, form vast coöperative societies for robbery, with a division of labor remarkably far advanced, although we find no family life among them."[1] It is not necessary, however, to discuss the origin of the family. The essential thing is to see that it is a constituent element in the structure of society, and that it should be the object of careful study, and must necessarily be considered in all schemes of social reform, both with reference to its own structure and also with reference to the effect upon itself of any proposed institution.

The combinations next above the family are organs and aggregates, the organ being a combination of persons and property for the performance of some social task, illustrations of which have already been given, and an aggregate being a group of individuals or families loosely associated.[2]

We have already prolonged our suggestions beyond the possibility of speaking of the mutual effect and influence of organs and systems. Enough has been said perhaps to indicate the method of study, and that is all with which we are at present concerned. Each group, system or organ may be analyzed in a manner similar to our analysis of society and studied in exactly the same way.

While the design of the writer is to furnish assistance to local study clubs, it is obvious that the suggestions of this paper may be followed with profit by any person wishing to engage in social study on his own account. The writer would indeed urge everyone to try the method of study here suggested, whether he belong to a study club or not. Choose for instance a family; study its physical surroundings, the disposition and taste of its personal elements, the influence of heredity, and other causes of its inferior condition.[3] Then on the basis of this knowledge seek

[1] LEON METCHNIKOFF, in *Contemporary Review*, 1886.

[2] As the study of aggregates, which differ but slightly from organs, is not likely to be of great importance in local study, they were omitted from the analysis on p. 856.

[3] As an illustrative study of this sort, *vid.* BLACKMAR, "The Smoky Pilgrims," AM. JOUR. OF SOCIOLOGY, January 1897.

to develop in your chosen family the desire for knowledge, beauty, and righteousness. Many persons find pleasure in cultivating a tiny plant, in watching it put forth its tender leaves, in measuring from day to day the rapidity of its growth in order to detect the influence of their care; and finally, when they are rewarded by seeing it burst forth into blossom and fragrance they experience great delight. But there are those who will testify that this delight is far surpassed by another, and that is the joy and satisfaction which may be derived from cultivating the germs of the higher life which may often be found in an unfortunate individual or in a family of the poor and dependent; from watching the nobler desires quietly develop into activity and strength under sympathetic and intelligent care; and from discovering by and by that out of unfavorable conditions have blossomed forth the virtues necessary to usefulness and happiness.

While the suggestions thus far made are chiefly in regard to the study of the *structure* of a social group, it must be plain that they will also apply to the study of the *functions* of the agencies and institutions studied. While engaged in considering the structure of the family or group, many things in regard to function will be brought to light which will suggest methods of reform, and which unsystematic study would perhaps never reveal. The study of structure, while it cannot be complete without it, naturally precedes the study of function, and the method of study need not be different; the same analysis will apply to both.

In accordance with the analysis already given, though not closely following it, I now present, after providing a provisional constitution for a club, a programme of study with provisions for twenty-four meetings. As it may be difficult to maintain interest in a club without the discussion of general social questions, provision is made in the programme of each evening for the discussion of both general and special topics. Emphasis, however, should always be placed upon the special report, making the results of the special local investigation the basis of the discussion. Each special report should be as thorough as it can be

made, a map being used whenever it will add to clearness, and that will probably be in almost every case. Outline maps of the district studied may often be secured from real-estate agents or from the local press. In the hope that many will wish to consult the literature of the subjects discussed, a brief bibliography is subjoined to each topic:

CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL STUDY CLUB OF ————————.

Name and Object.

1. This organization shall be called ————————.

2. Its object shall be the actual investigation of the social conditions and institutions in ———————— and the study of social questions, with a view to the improvement of local conditions and the advancement of the members of the club in the knowledge and art of true social life.

Officers.

3. The officers shall be a president, vice president, and secretary and treasurer, elected by separate ballots at each annual meeting.

4. The executive board shall be the president and four members appointed by him and confirmed by the club.

5. The secretary and treasurer shall record all proceedings and those present at each meeting of the club, have charge of its books, papers and correspondence, and notify members of election, appointments or other matters requiring personal attention, and shall have charge of and record all receipts and disbursements.

6. The executive board shall prepare the programme, provide places for meetings, assign topics to members, receive and propose the names of all candidates for membership, and act for the club in the intervals between meetings, subject to the approval of the club at the next regular meeting.

7. Such committees as are required may be appointed in the usual manner.

Members.

8. Any citizen of ———————— interested in social study shall become an active member of this club when he or she has been elected and has signed the constitution and by-laws, by signing which he or she agrees to support and abide by the constitution and rules of this club, and to perform all duties assigned by the executive board, or to provide a substitute unless excused by the same. A two-thirds vote of members present is necessary for the election of an applicant for membership, which vote shall be taken by ballot.

Amendments.

9. This constitution may be amended or suspended only by a two-thirds vote of the entire membership, or a unanimous vote of those present at a legal meeting.

By-Laws.

1. The regular meetings of this club shall be held on ———————— beginning at 7 : 30 P.M. during the autumn and winter, and 8 : 00 P.M. during the spring and summer.

2. The first regular meeting in ———————— shall be a business meeting for the election of officers.

3. Order of business:

1. Call to order. 2. Roll call. 3. Reading of the minutes of preceding meeting. 4. Unfinished business. 5. New business. 6. Reports of officers and committees. 7. Balloting upon candidates for membership. 8. Regular programme. 9. Adjournment.

4. A majority of the active members shall constitute a quorum for transacting business, but the members present at any meeting duly called shall be a quorum for carrying out its programme of exercises.

5. All business shall be done in accordance with the parliamentary rules of Cushing's Manual (or Roberts' Rules of Order).

6. A by-law may be suspended or amended by a two-thirds vote of the members present.

PROGRAMME.[1]

FIRST MEETING.

The first meeting should be given to the explanation and discussion of the work proposed, the election of officers, assigning of topics, etc. As it is desirable to have as many as possible present, some special feature looking to that end should be provided. The character of the first meeting will have much to do with the success of the club.

[1] For the selection of most of the references in this programme and for the characterization of all of them, the writer is indebted to Mr. C. H. Hastings, librarian in the Social Science Departments of The University of Chicago. The books selected are intended for the average reader with a fair amount of time at his disposal, and not for the specialist. They are almost all of recent date and can be obtained through any first-class bookstore. The explanatory matter, necessarily brief, is designed to furnish those who cannot read all the books some basis for a selection.

The thanks of the writer are also due to Mr. C. J. Bushnell for suggestions and for some assistance in making up references. Mr. Bushnell is the organizer and vice president of a social study club in Englewood, Ill., which is following successfully a programme similar to the one here proposed.

SECOND MEETING.

1. General topic: The Influence of Land on Population.

References:

Buckle, History of Civilization in England (N. Y., Appleton, 1892), Vol. I, ch. 2.

A brilliant attempt to found a philosophy of history on natural forces.

Draper, Civil War in America (New York, Harper, 1867), section 1.

Theory much like Buckle's.

Fairbanks, Introduction to Sociology (New York, Scribners, 1896), chap. 2.

Natural influences illustrated by historical and geographical observations.

Giddings, Principles of Sociology (New York, Macmillan, 1896), bk. ii, ch. 1.

Illustrations drawn from zoölogy, anthropology, and history.

Marshall, Principles of Economics (New York, Macmillan, 1895).

A good general discussion.

Mayo-Smith, Statistics and Sociology (New York, Macmillan, 1895), bk. iv.

Distribution of population compared with topography and climate, with statistics.

Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws (Cincinnati, Robert Clark, 1871).

An anticipation of Buckle and Draper, especially emphasizing climate.

NOTE.— On many of the topics the new edition of *Johnson's Encyclopædia* may be consulted with profit. The files of the *Review of Reviews*, easily consulted by the full index in each volume, contain a great deal of information along the line of these topics. One who has time and easy access to a public library may find unlimited literature in the periodicals by consulting *Poole's Index*. For thorough study of the topics relating to charities and corrections Henderson's *Dependents, Defectives, and Delinquents* is an invaluable guide; and for such a study the annual reports of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections are the most valuable single source.

2. Special Report on The Physical Features of the District Studied and their Effects upon the Population.

The member making this report should prepare a map showing the boundaries of the district, its natural and artificial divisions, variations of surface, location of creeks and rivers, etc., and should be prepared to point out how any of these have affected the location of homes, industries, etc., the direction of the streets, health of the inhabitants, etc. He should also study the character of the soil, noting its effects upon wells, cisterns, basements, etc., and should give attention to the climate, seasons, rainfall, changes of temperature, etc., with their effects upon the life and comfort of

the people. In the preparation of this as well as of some of the following reports assistance may be obtained from Dr. C. R. Henderson's *Catechism for Social Observation.*

3. General discussion. This may be upon the special report or upon the general topic. In either case illustrations of the main point, the effect of land on population, should and doubtless will be contributed.

THIRD MEETING.

1. General topic: Land Ownership.

References:

Cobden Club Systems of Land Tenure (London, Macmillan, 1870).
A most valuable collection of essays on land tenure and land laws in different countries.

De Coulanges, Origin of Property in Land (London, Swan, 1892).
A historical study with conclusion representing quite fairly the present aspect of the controversy as to the origin of landed property in communal ownership, or in private ownership.

Godwin, Political Justice (London, Swan, 1890), bk. viii.
A classic among writings favoring communism.

Lafargue, Evolution of Property (London, Swan, 1890).
Arguments based largely on anthropological data, with conclusion favoring communal holding.

Mill, Principles of Political Economy (New York, Appleton, 1893), bk. ii, chs. 1 and 2.
A clear, fair statement in short space of the leading aspects of the question.

Spencer, Principles of Sociology (New York, Appleton, 1892), Vol. II, ch. 15.
Conclusion regards land nationalization as a possibility.

2. Special Report on the Ownership of Land in the District Studied.
Use a map to illustrate as far as possible the distribution of land among the people. Show the relative number of the population owning land. Study the causes preventing the number from being larger. Show the values of land, the increase or decrease over former values and the causes to which it is due. Study also the method of taxing real estate, and in every way possible try to get at the actual facts in regard to the ownership of land in your own community.

3. General discussion, topic: Collective *vs.* Private Ownership of Land.

References:

Bosanquet, Aspects of the Social Problem (London, Macmillan, 1895), ch. 17.

Favorable to private ownership, but with restrictions as to inheritance.

George, Progress and Poverty (New York, Lovell, 1879), bk. vii.
Argues for the justice of communism and the securing of it in practice by the single tax.

Naquet, Collectivism (London, Swan, 1891).
Examines collective ownership in some detail and rejects it.

Wallace, Land Nationalization (London, Swan, 1892.)
Studies present status of the land question and declares in favor of land nationalization.

Weeden, Social Law of Labor (Boston, Roberts, 1882), ch. 1.
A good discussion with conclusion in favor of private property.
(See also the references under the general topic.)

FOURTH MEETING.

1. General topic: The Distribution of Wealth.

References:

Commons, Distribution of Wealth (New York, Macmillan, 1893).
In addition to the discussion of the economic side, has valuable statistics as to the distribution of wealth.

Hobson, Problems of Poverty (London, Methuen, 1896), ch. 1.
Concise statement as to inequality with emphasis on its significance.

Holmes, Concentration of Wealth, *Political Science Quarterly*, Dec. 1893.
Presents the facts as a statistical expert.

Mallock, Classes and Masses (London, Black, 1896).
Almost a direct contradiction to Hobson, Strong, and Spahr.

Marshall, Principles of Economics, bk. vii.
Discusses fully the economic aspects of the distribution of wealth.

Sidgwick, Principles of Political Economy (New York, Macmillan, 1887), ch. 7.
Favors extension of governmental control, but calls attention to the social service of the rich.

Spahr, Distribution of Wealth (New York, Crowell, 1896).
Finds great and increasing inequality in wealth, and favors a progressive income tax as a corrective.

Strong, Our Country (New York, Baker, 1885), ch. 10.
Discusses concentration of wealth and its perils.

2. Special Report on The Local Distribution of Wealth.

Get from the assessor's book statistics in regard to the subject. Note the effect of the distribution on the formation of classes. Do you find any idle rich? Note the probable causes of the condition of those who are

in poverty. Study the relation of the employing class to the employed. Give attention to the wages in different employments and the causes of their variation. Prepare a wage map. For a suggestion in regard to its preparation see *Introduction to the Study of Society*, p. 166, or the maps in *Hull House Maps and Papers*.

3. General discussion, topic: Should Fortunes be Limited by Special Legislation?

References:

Bastable, Public Finance (London, Macmillan, 1892), bk. iv, chs. 4 and 8.

Discusses from the side of taxation with no definite conclusion.

Ely, Taxation in American States and Cities (New York, Crowell, 1888), pt. iii, chs. 7 and 8.

Conclusion in favor of income tax and inheritance tax.

Gladden, Applied Christianity (Boston, Houghton, 1892), p. 1.

Favors income tax, but opposes special repressive legislation.

Hurd, Limitation of the Amount one may Take by Will (*Am. Law Register and Review*, April 1896). Paper read at World's Fair Congress of Jurisprudence.

Able discussion. Favors limitation in order to divide among as many as possible. Opposes income tax.

Pomeroy, The Concentration of Wealth (*Arena*, December 1896).

Favors a rapidly progressive income tax.

Review of Reviews, American Millionaires and their Public Gifts (*Review of Reviews*, February 1893).

Editorial based on the *New York Tribune's* list of 4047 millionaires and containing various practical suggestions.

(See also references under general topic.)

I. W. HOWERTH.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

(To be continued.)

REVIEWS.

Genius and Degeneration. A psychological study. By Dr. William Hirsch. D. Appleton & Co., 1896.

Genius and Degeneration is the title of a book opposed to the teachings of the alarmist school. Lombroso, Nordau, and the others who form this school have startled the public by elaborating the idea that civilized communities are largely composed of degenerate individuals. With facile pens, large vocabularies, and fragmentary citations these writers have set out to stigmatize the intellectual leaders of the world as more or less degenerate.

The laity has been rather overawed by the vigor of their accusations, so that a book presenting the other side of the question was needed. Dr. Hirsch writes as a psychiatrist and is at pains to show that the argument for degeneration lacks positive evidence; that its logic is faulty and that its leading terms are employed without exact definition. Furthermore, in comparing the present with the past, the authors in question are wanting in a sense of historical perspective.

It must be kept in mind that the fraction of the community which any author calls healthy or normal depends upon the narrowness of his definition of health. This will vary with different writers, but the definition once chosen must be rigidly applied, and it is by no means fair to describe as stigmata in geniuses what would pass for mere peculiarities in individuals unknown to fame. Moreover, the term genius is used by these writers even more loosely than the difficulties of defining it would warrant. Dr. Hirsch points out that, psychologically, geniuses do not form a homogeneous group, and that the same deviations from the normal would therefore have different values in different cases. Furthermore, in properly diagnosing mental ailments, groups of symptoms are used as indices of disease, and their significance depends largely on their grouping. To take one symptom out of the group and consider it as indicative of that disturbance for which the entire group stands is a patent error, yet this has been done time after time by those seeking to prove degeneracy.

Degeneracy, too, is a term to be scrutinized. It implies a condition resulting from imperfect growth, and hence when we are asked to admit that an individual has suddenly become degenerate in his maturer years, having previously been normal, we have a right to ask whether such a fact squares with terms employed. The manner in which these authors run their fingers down the annals of history and from time to time attach uncomplimentary labels to those who have figured as the world's great men finds an historic parallel in the method of making witches once used in Salem. Before a solemn but credulous court an "afflicted girl" pointed to a person who did not please her, called her "witch," and the case was closed. Without doubt some "common scolds" and other obnoxious persons were thus eliminated from the community, but the method failed of general approval.

No one denies that pathological individuals have at times claimed the world's attention, but this does not make true the inverted statement that those who gain this attention are probably pathological. Dr. Hirsch combats in detail some things which Nordau has to say on art and literature as expressing the degeneracy of authors and artists, and there is also a special defense of Richard Wagner. By way of preface there is given an account of Wagner's artistic productions, as an expression of his mental development, which cannot fail to interest many readers apart from the bearing that it has on the main argument. This book therefore goes far towards neutralizing the influence of the alarmist school by putting the laity in a position to test critically such productions. H. H. DONALDSON.

Rich and Poor. By MRS. BERNARD BOSANQUET. Macmillan & Co., 1896. Pp. 216. $1.50.

THE author prepared herself for this work by living among the poor in East London. Her observations are all at first hand, fresh and vivid. We are directed by her method and attracted by her style of presentation. She insists that relief of poverty is essentially an affair of character and education far more than mere change of physical environment. Her attack on the church for its bribery of doles, its giving premiums to promote hypocrisy, the neglect of its high spiritual mission, its materialism, its want of confidence in its peculiar ministry and in the spiritual capacities of the poor, is one of the most important parts of the volume.

There is a measured sanity and balance in the descriptions which are in sharp contrast with the lurid, sensational articles which misrepresent the industrial situation and really defame the poor. The dark and discouraging facts are not hidden or toned down. The author is entirely faithful in dealing with the obstacles to progress, both in character and environment. But constant friendly relations with the struggling poor have revealed to her those remedial forces which give hope of success in all educational enterprises on behalf of the working people. C. R. HENDERSON.

La Population et le Système Social. Par FR. S. NITTI. Avec une préface de René Worms. Paris, V. Giard et E. Brière, 1897. Pp. 276.

IN the preface M. Worms discusses the question of the relation of demography to sociology. The problem of population was first discussed by economists as a chapter in political economy. Recently it has been taken up by the statisticians as a part of their science. But statistics is not a science; it is a method of counting applied to social phenomena. There are two conditions for the existence of a state—territory and population. The study of the former is social geography; that of population is demography, one of the parts of social anatomy, and this includes social histology and even ethnography. But demography must deal with functions and growth as well as with parts and organs, and so it has intimate relations with social physiology.

The work of Nitti was published in Turin in 1894. The French translation has some important additions from the pen of the author. The dedication is addressed to Loria. The work is divided into two books, the first of which is historical, the second gives an exposition of the author's doctrine of population.

In the historical part (pp. 9–112) there is a treatment of the historical causes of the principal economic doctrines of population. The author gives a brief summary of the positions taken by various writers from the ancients down to our own day. The economic doctrines are regarded as reflections of the economical conditions of each period and of the optimistic and pessimistic *Weltanschauung* of each writer.

The second book is the argument of the author. A table is given to show the "progressive abandonment" of the teaching of Malthus, and a survey presents the central ideas of Bodin, Suessmilch, Malthus,

Darwin, Spencer, Guillard, Marx, Loria, Dumont, who are selected as types. The author concludes that nothing of value is left of the system of Malthus. The defenders of Malthus and of the form of his doctrine now taught will object to the statements of their position. There is an absence of a complete and sharply defined definition of that position.

The first argument of Nitti turns on the experience of Europe. He claims that it contradicts the "law of Malthus" who predicted that population would double itself in twenty-five years. The fact is that population has not increased at any such rate in Europe or in the United States.

The means of subsistence have grown far more rapidly than the population. Unproductive consumption and pauperism are the necessary consequences of our vicious form of distribution of wealth and do not arise from the excessive multiplication of the human race. Statistics of wealth and population are given to illustrate this idea.

The chief error of Malthus is that he sought the law of population in the world external to man, whereas he should have sought it in man himself. *Population has always an organic tendency to adapt itself to the means of subsistence.* This italicized phrase is central in the argument, but it does not seem to add anything to Malthus. It is no great discovery that population and subsistence will somehow come to equilibrium, even if, as in India, it requires the death by famine of 12,000,000 people to secure the balance.

The author shows that there is a relation between the price of grain and the number of marriages and births, which simply shows that the instincts of the people accord with the teaching of Malthus as to "moral restraints." He also shows that when there is a high birth rate there is also a high death rate, which again confirms a teaching of the Malthus school that if man will not voluntarily and intelligently balance births and food there are natural forces which will correct his error at enormous cost of life.

The author very properly shows that many famines in the past were due to a defective organization of transportation and taxation, not to excess of population, and that with international commerce these evils may be greatly diminished.

Taking up the question of "subsistence" he shows that luxury grows with the capitalist class and is copied by the poorer people who are borne on to extravagance by the necessary law of imitation.

But for this wasteful and injurious consumption the land could support a much larger population. Much is made of this "fatal law of imitation," as if a man with ten dollars a week were compelled to buy broadcloth and wines because his employer enjoys them. The budgets of workingmen, collected by Engel, Gould, and the Le Play people, are cited in proof of this terrible law which is declared to be a decree of fate in stronger terms than Malthus ever applied to his law.

Levasseur's analysis is employed (p. 143) to illustrate the flexibility of the average density of population which can be supported at various stages of civilization. In the period of barbarism this average is very low, at most only two or three to the square kilometer. In the pastoral state the rate remains low,—as in Turkestan 0.5—2.7 to the square kilometer. In an agricultural community 40; in an industrial community 160; in a commercial nation there is no limit. As only a few races have reached this last stage the earth seems far from full. Previsions of a future rate of population depend on too many unforeseen elements to be of any value.

Births vary between 20 and 50 to the thousand of inhabitants, and the oscillations between these points are not due to mere biological causes but to an economical and social law which varies with the civilization and the economic system. Then follows (p. 147) a discussion of these causes which deserves attention. They are classified under these categories: psychical and moral, religion, morality and æsthetic influences; social causes,—political organization, social classes; economic causes, chiefly the mode of dividing wealth. Many points in the discussion of pessimism, the French literature of lubricity, and of the degenerates generally remind one of Max Nordau. Pessimism itself is explained by the psychological influence of an industrial system which leaves the workingman no hope of rising by individual effort.

The excessive birth rate of India is ascribed to "political" oppression; by which is meant the hopeless wall of caste. Nothing is said of the religious beliefs connected with ancestor-worship as a cause of early marriages in India, although this is noticed in relation to the Chinese family. From the preceding discussion and induction a "law of capillarity" is formulated. A high birth rate is possible only when the phenomenon of social capillarity does not exist or exists in a feeble degree. Countries which have an absolute government, and which eliminate or restrict this phenomenon, have, other things being equal, a birth rate much higher than countries under a democratic rule.

The economic causes of excessive population are regarded as most important. Loria is followed closely at this point. So long as there was unoccupied land population and subsistence was in equilibrium, either because the earth yielded plenty or because its infertility determined a low rate of procreation. The author does not mention the balancing weights of famine, hardship, infanticide and war which figure so greatly in savage life. The emphasis is laid on the assertion that capitalists urge on the production of children in order to have a surplus of laborers, thus keeping up the rate of profit and depressing the rate of wages. Whatever criticism may do with Loria's subtle argument it will always seem entirely superfluous to offer inducements to the proletariat to produce more children. What should be said of this sentence (p. 185)? "Nothing is neglected by the capitalist class — counsels, incitements, relaxation of morals — to push the poor to bear more children."

The misfortunes of the poor are not due to their improvidence and to the excess of the birth rate among them, but the excessive production of children is caused by the demand of manufacturers for more hands (p. 189). The employment of women and children (p. 200) is spoken of as a necessary consequence of capitalism. The man who receives a low salary is compelled to have more children to work for the family support (p. 208). English trades unions and legislation have proved that the employment of children is by no means a fatal necessity.

Two corollaries are drawn from the economic argument (p. 222): (1) The lower the economic situation and the moral sentiments of the working classes, the more surely are they impelled to seek purely sensual enjoyments, and thus an excessive fecundity follows. (2) Every amelioration in the general diffusion of wealth acts favorably on fecundity, that is, reduces it to reasonable limits. His explanation is that people who have higher pleasures are not so sensual. Then he cites the United States and the small landowners of France as illustrious examples of the virtue of moral restraint, the very people whom he seems to charge elsewhere with using detestable means of preventing births. In the corollaries he admits low moral sentiments as causes of fecundity, whereas his argument seems to require him to ascribe the low morality to low wages. He inclines to accept Spencer's theory of high individuation as a check on fertility, but does not adequately and clearly show how it can be of any service within that part of the future which is of any practical interest to living men.

The final formulation of the law of population Nitti states as follows: "In every society where individuality is highly developed, and where the process of socialization has not destroyed all individual activity; in every society where wealth is highly subdivided, and where the social causes of inequality are eliminated by an elevated form of coöperation; fecundity will be kept in equilibrium with subsistence, and the rhythmic variations of demographic evolution will give no cause of terror to humanity."

After saying that this "scientific law of population" gives the mortal stroke to Malthus' treatise and to the theory of the classical economists, he writes: "But we hasten to add that, even when Malthusianism has been completely abandoned; when his principles, which appear to be as solid as granite, have been destroyed and reduced to powder under the dissolving action of the truth; when the doctrine we have just described shall be recognized by all as true; and when society shall have accepted the principle of coöperation, even then the work of Malthus will appear worthy of the highest admiration." The grounds for this admiration of an empty bubble are not stated.

Fr. Nitti's book is very learned and clearly written, and reading it is rendered a pleasant task on account of its interesting style.

Nitti makes a valuable contribution to the discussion of causes of extreme poverty. Proletarian excesses are by no means the only causes of distress. Parasitic children of extravagance and luxury must bear their share of the responsibility, and the unequal distribution of the product of industry is admitted by all economic writers who advocate coöperation. In placing emphasis on the defects of the economic system, and in calling attention to the vices of luxury Nitti has brought a neglected and unwelcome truth into strong light.

C. R. HENDERSON.

The New Obedience. A plea for social submission to Christ. By WILLIAM BAYARD HALE, Mission Priest of the Church of Our Savior, Middleboro, Massachusetts. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897. Pp. 191.

A FASCINATING, trenchant, searching volume. The ideals and modes of reasoning are mediæval, monastic, and scholastic; the illustrations have the freshness, vividness, and force which keen observation and a sympathetic heart give to the author's style. The chapters will

evoke, as the preface suggests, interest, doubt, distress, and enthusiasm. The interpretations of Tolstoi are followed; the words of Jesus are taken quite literally in respect to non-resistance, the sin of accumulating wealth, living from day to day without care for the morrow, refusal to receive interest on loans, the approval of poverty as itself a good. This peculiar method of interpretation furnishes the basis of his social theory.

By some mental dialectic not easily followed Henry George's doctrine of the iniquity of ownership in land is deduced from a conception of theology.

Interest and usury are identified; the Fathers are quoted, but Ashley's account of the later church teaching and the historical reasons for the change are not noticed.

We might be disposed to ask what substitutes for royalties, rents, interest and profits are possible; whether a few self-denying ascetics could achieve any modification by accepting his counsels; what mode of selecting competent leaders of industry and government could, even under socialism (p. 148), be devised without competition; but all this questioning is useless in this case, since "Christians are not bound by considerations of practicability."

The statement (p. 84) that "Christianity is not an individual matter," but is entirely social, is but one side of an important truth. The representation (p. 54) that self-sacrifice is the sum of morality needs to be corrected by the consideration that self-regard is a duty: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself; a saying which Harris' *Moral Evolution* wisely applies to social ethics. Herbert Spencer's familiar vindication of self-preservation is required to give real contents to altruism. The attempt to be more generous than the Golden Rule virtually implies suicide. We read this book, as we read all strong poetic and sermonic appeals to altruism, with profound respect when, as in this case, the author is sincere. We feel that selfishness may be partly corrected by eloquent portraiture of heroic virtue and martyr zeal. But if we are seeking a reasonable method of interpreting the New Testament, or a healthy and sane view of life, or a rule by which men in our century can ordinarily best further character and welfare, we shall receive but little practical help in this volume. It presents an economic method immediately practicable in a monastery supported by a competitive society outside, but not a guidebook for men who are to promote progress.

C. R. HENDERSON.

NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

CONDUCTED BY J. D. FORREST, A. T. FREEMAN, AND H. A. MILLIS.

Social Christianity.—Social Christianity differs from Christian socialism in its point of view. Its end is not merely amelioration of the material condition of men, but especially their moral and religious progress. The practice of morality is an essential factor of religion. Neither individualism nor socialism can attain this end —the *moralization* of the individual and of society through religion. The two principles, individual liberty and the superior influence of society upon the individual, taken separately, are destructive to each other. Only their simultaneous application permits rational action toward social progress. They are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. Christians employ both methods of action. The exclusively individual method of religious propaganda is to be criticised as attaining results not in proportion to the effort expended. It saves some souls, but does not touch the social classes. A rational method of evangelization ought to take its departure also from the scientific fact of the influence of environment and heredity on the individual. It is necessary to modify the environment as well as to preach the gospel. The active Christian must be an active politician. The social Christian movement must adapt itself to the new economic and social ideas, must impregnate them with a high ideal, must transform them.—W. VIOLLIER, *Revue du Christianisme Social*, March 1897. Fr.

How to Attain the Eight-Hour Day.—The eight-hour day is the greatest benefaction which can now be bestowed upon the wage worker. An adequate method is a vital necessity to the shortening of the working day. This adequate method must be such that in its nature and working every interest shall be protected. This suggestion is offered to meet this demand, namely, that all organized bodies of capitalists engaged in manufacturing industries form an agreement that on the Monday following the first Thanksgiving day after the agreement is made they will all take off permanently one-quarter of an hour from the working day, and that each year thereafter on the corresponding day they will take off another quarter of an hour until the eight-hour day is reached. The eight-hour day in itself gives no occasion for anxiety on the part of the capitalist. The proposed scheme meets the practical difficulties, because of the regularity and small amount of the change and because of the favorable time in the year when the change is made.—REV. JESSE H. JONES, *Gunton's Magazine*, March 1897. Fr.

Workers' Insurance Legislation in Germany.—Germany was the pioneer in that part of social legislation which has to do with obligatory insurance for workers, and the experiment has proved a marvelous success. This Workers' Insurance Legislation falls under three heads, each fund being under separate administration but with growing coöperation between them. I. The Sick Fund embraces in its operation all workers in factories, workshops, mines, salt works, on railways, in navigation, in the building trades, as well as clerical workers in general, of both sexes, with an income not exceeding 2000 marks. It is legally bound to provide the following benefits at least: (1) medical attendance; (2) medicine and other remedies; (3) if unable to work, a weekly payment of not less than 50 per cent. of the member's wages for at least thirteen weeks; (4) in case of death a funeral benefit of not less than twenty days' wages. In 1894 there were 21,552 legal sick funds in Germany with 7¼ millions of members, an income of 136 million marks, an expenditure of 128 millions and reserve funds of 94⅓ millions. II. Accident Insurance embraces agricultural as well

as industrial workers. The liability for accidents is borne solely by the employer, but as he also has the administration of this insurance, it has suffered from one-sidedness. Its most valuable result has been in furnishing employers an efficacious material motive for humane actions preventive of accidents. III. Old Age and Invalid Insurance is administered exclusively by the government. It embraces 11 millions of persons, including two more classes than the preceding, namely, home workers and domestic servants. Employer and employé make equal weekly deposits to this fund through the purchase of stamps. This insurance attempts to provide only a substantial addition to the means of support in old age. The Old Age pension is intended for every member over seventy years old. The Invalid pension is to be granted to every member who, during the period of one year, is disabled from earning more than one-third of his or her average wages. Imperfect as the German insurance legislation is, in the short time of its operation it has already had a far-reaching beneficial influence on the domestic, social, moral and intellectual conditions of the working population. It is deeply connected with the great labor movement in Germany. It has decreased pauperism and is developing a spirit and system of coöperation.—HENRIETTE JASTROW, *Fortnightly Review*, March 1897. Fr.

Juvenile Criminals — the School and the Press.—(1) Criminality in France has tripled in fifty years, with but slight increase in population. Criminality among the young between six and twenty-one years quadrupled from 1826 to 1880, while that of adults tripled. Since 1880 the former has increased even more rapidly proportionally, increasing by one-fourth in ten years to an adult increase of one-ninth. A similar growth has taken place in the number of juvenile prostitutes and suicides. (2) The more societies are raised in civilization, the more are they subject to the law of variation. Civilization produces more numerous human varieties, and, with more occasions for wrongdoing, it provokes an increasing number of certain delinquents. But variability does not necessarily imply immorality. The normal laws of evolution for criminality do not sufficiently explain the actual state, especially juvenile criminality. (3) In the case of 80 per cent. of young criminals the moral condition on the side of the parents is deplorable. Vice, debauchery, drunkenness, in parents, becomes criminality in the child. Obligatory instruction is not *directly* responsible for increasing juvenile criminality. But it has failed to prevent this, owing to defective organization of the school. The general defect of our system of instruction has been the predominance of the rationalistic conception, which attributes to knowledge, especially scientific, an exaggerated rôle in moral conduct. It is not general enough in its great principles, not practical enough in its details. Education is a moral and social mission. (4) With ability to read almost universal among the young, the press becomes the great primary school. Its rôle, in our democracy, is the moral and political education of a people. It has not filled this rôle. The complete political, scientific, and religious liberty of the press has degenerated into defamation, excitation to crime, and obscene publications. A portion of the press having become the principal agent of demoralization and one of the sources of juvenile criminality, it is time to suppress it with severe punishment under the common laws of justice. (5) Criminal sociology should reach the social causes of crime and insist on preventive more than on curative measures. Thus the principal points to be attacked are: drunkenness in parents, leading to crime in offspring; lack of assistance for the young in securing opportunity for normal activity, leading to professional criminality; diminution of marriage, leading to license and illegitimate births. As for criminals from passion, besides better education and indefatigable repression of the provocative press, nothing is more efficacious than the sanction of rigorous laws, unweakened by exaggerated indulgence of judges or the public.—ALFRED FOUILLÉE, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, January 15, 1897. Fr.

An Economic and Social Programme.—(1) Moral reform and change of heart must be put in the first rank of influences toward a social state conformable to the will of God. (2) Faithful to protestantism, liberty is the basis of the solution of the social question. But individual initiative alone cannot be counted upon to secure the

reign of justice, and in the economic order the intervention of the law appears to be an indispensable factor. (3) The final end is coöperative association — association in consumption, freeing from the yoke of middlemen; association in credit, from that of usurers; association in production, from that of entrepreneurs. (4) Individual property is to be defended because it is an element of good which it would be imprudent to remove as a human motive. But individual property is not irreconcilable with a large development of collective property in public institutions for the common good. (5) Interest and rent on the one side, and wages on the other, with their contracts of forfeiture by one party of share in profits, should be progressively displaced by association, which would insure solidarity of interests and remove the prevailing sentiment of hostility between the two factors in production.— CH. GIDE, *Revue du Christianisme Social*, January 1897. Fr.

Professional Risk.—The laws on this subject are always insufficient. It takes years to get one passed, and by that time it is useless, conditions having changed. Some general principles of law should be settled, upon the justice of which most citizens would agree. Then the judges should be left to apply these principles to the facts in any case. Article 1382 of the civil code says: "Any act whatever which causes damage to other persons obliges the man by whose fault it happened to repair the damage." This would be sufficient as a general principle, but by restricting the word fault to a a narrow sense, the employer has been held free, when he could claim that the act was due to chance, or to even a momentary forgetfulness of the workman. The modern industries, so powerful are the chemical, physical and mechanical forces used that the danger is far greater than of old. The profit in them is for the employer, the workman is no better off than of old. The employer then should bear the cost of the risk. Some industries by the nature of the chemical agents involved bring an early death to the workmen. Such industries should be forbidden by law. Were this done, invention would probably devise ways to make them safe. Now there is not sufficient motive, for employers profit as things are and do not have to compensate the workers for the injury to them. Other industries are dangerous, because of the engines, machinery, etc. Accident is not certain, but possible. If accident comes through a moment's hesitation of the workman, or a misstep, or through chance, the manufacturer is not held responsible. In railways, however, the company is held responsible. All employers should be. Even if the accident is due to a moment's imprudence or weariness, or to pure chance, to a defect in the machinery which could not be known, or to some combination of circumstances which could not be foreseen, still the workman should be compensated; for in placing him in abnormal and dangerous conditions and in exacting from him constant skill and attention one commits a primordial fault. To exact compensation would not put an end to manufacture. One accident might ruin an employer if he stood alone. But as the risk would threaten all manufacturers, they would combine by a system of insurance pro rata to the number of workmen employed. Thus the cost would be small to each and would enter into the general expenses and be no more prohibitive of business than fire insurance is. Law should render such insurance on the employer's part obligatory.—PIERRE DENIS in *Revue Socialiste* for October 1896. Fr.

The Political Structure of Society.—Social law is the end; political law the means, not the foundation of law, but its procedure. In the social-political organization there are two extreme points, equally necessary. On the one side is society, on the other the individual. The extreme expression of the former is collectivism, of the latter anarchy. The two forces are enfeebled each by the other, when they ought to be utilized in their full vigor. The following order of change from one extreme to the other is possible: (1) Political individualism; (2) mixture of individualism and collectivism, (*a*) empirical mixture and confusion, (*b*) rational coördination without waste, (*c*) subordination of individual to the group; (3) political collectivism. The political elements are primarily, like cells, undifferentiated and amorphous. Gradually the elements are differentiated to discharge different functions. The division of labor carries each part to the highest perfection. So we have: (1) the amorphous

state; (2) the differentiated, polarized, or organic state. Or, from another point of view, (1) the chaotic state; (2) the state of coördination; (3) the state of subordination or of hierarchization. It is rarely the case that one of the elements which constitutes a social function does not predominate over others. So, another order of change is: (1) Absorption of one of the elements by another; (2) equilibrium of the elements; (3) predominance of the contrary element. The functions of society correspond to the physiological functions of an animal. The functions of nutrition and reproduction pertain not to political but to economic government. Those of the relations of society correspond to the cerebral operations. The social functions are the legislative, the judicial and the administrative. The one who is best qualified to discharge these is not the savant: for his science is wholly theoretical, and he loses himself in his speculations. Nor the practical man; for his interests may conflict with the general interest, and he is incapable of taking the widest view. Under universal suffrage, the most illiterate is the equal of the most intelligent. But the most illiterate is not able to frame wise laws in all their details, corresponding to the point of evolution. This is the rôle not of interest, nor of capacity, but of *action*. During long periods, it is the force of *movement* which rules. The absence of will, of intention, has been most disastrous in sociology. Sociology is the reflex of psychology, the social functions corresponding to the cerebral functions. The cerebral functions of sensibility, intelligence, and will correspond to the social functions of good sense, science and action. Collective groups in the order of complexity are — commune, province, state, confederated states, allied states, universal federation. Individual groups in the same order are — individuals, family, forced groups, voluntary groups. A synthesis will follow this analysis of the social structure.—RAOUL DE LA GRASSERIE. "De la structure politique de la société," *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, November, 1896. F.

The Political Structure of Society.—(Part II). I. Political structure of the collective society. It is not alone society as a whole which can have a social structure but also the individual. Race characteristics influence the choice between different modes of government. With certain peoples, *e. g.*, Germans, the independence of character is strongly marked. In nations of such a temperament, the family life is strongly developed. Besides the race influence there is the influence of climate, soil, religion, etc.

The collective government alone constitutes the society of the state apart from the individual. The distinct existence of this society has been questioned, that is, it is held that it is simply a collection of individuals. But society is distinct from the individuals which compose it, as the human individual is something more than the atoms and molecules of which he is composed.

The bond of union between the different concentric societies is the federal bond, the absence of which means warfare.

A. The State. (*a*) The direct exercise of political functions by the assembly. But direct government does not exist solely where the power is exercised by the whole nation by virtue of the sovereignty of the people, but also under an absolute monarchy. (*b*) Indirect exercise of political functions. This is more complex in that it establishes an equilibrium and reaches a differentiation which did not before exist. The governmental function may be divided into legislative, judicial, and executive. (*c*) The combination of direct and indirect government. This secures the most perfect system; for all interests and capacities thus best find their satisfaction. (*d*) The evolution to this form of government. The direct government approaches most nearly the purely individualistic form. Then comes the transition to the social state in which the functions are differentiated.

B. Submultiples of the State. (*a*) The province or department is a reduction of the state, and as such has the same organs. (*b*) The commune is an inferior unit and governs through the three functions.

C. The Multiples of the State. (*a*) Confederation. (*b*) Alliance. (*c*) Universal federation.

D. The Federal Bond.

II. Social Structure of Individual Government. *A.* Absence of Groups. (*a*) The direct, individualistic government has as its national function solely the declaration of

war. (*b*) Mixed individual government is a step towards collective government. (*c*) Indirect individual government.

B. Family Group. This is not a social but an individualistic group. It is the continuation of the individual.

C. Extra-family Groups, *e. g.*, professional groups.

D. Voluntary Groups. These develop industry, commerce, etc.

E. International Groups. These represent the unity between nations, and have legislative, judicial, and executive functions.

In the midst of collective governments there is found the débris of individualistic governments. Individualistic rights are found as (*a*) the genesis of new rights; (*b*) survivals; (*c*) results of the deficiency of collective governments; (*d*) a defense of the individual against the collective rights; and (*e*) as the evolution of individualistic and collective rights. Three great principles are found in the movement. (*a*) The individualistic right represents rarefaction; the collective represents condensation. (*b*) The functions, at first in an amorphous state, differentiate. (*c*) Some social forces are subordinated to others.—RAOUL DE LA GRASSERIE, "La Structure de la Societe" (suite et fin), *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, December 1896. F.

The Criminal in the Open.—The criminal has usually been studied behind the prison bars. A decade's experience with tramps and "professional criminals" "in the open" may tell us something more about them. Are "professional criminals" (not instinctive criminals," of which there are very few) peculiar physically, intellectually, or morally? No, they are not naturally so, but may become so from long imprisonment. There is no such thing as a "criminal cranium." Many in later life do have a peculiar "countenance," which is the result of long imprisonment. Naturally they are far shrewder than ordinary men, and would be able to win their way in the natural course of life if they tried. They see an easier way of living and choose it. Morally they are not obtuse. They are not unmindful of duties, and are subject to remorse. The "professional criminal" is not deficient in physique, intellect, morals, or will, and so is perfectly responsible for what he does. His treatment should be such as to make him feel that such a life is hard and costly.—JOSIAH FLYNT in the *Forum*, February 1897. M.

The Relation of the Liquor Traffic to Pauperism, Crime, and Insanity.—(Taken from an investigation made by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of Massachusetts.) (1) Pauperism.—Of 3230 paupers examined, 2108, or 65.26 per cent., were addicted to the use of liquor; 866, or 26.81 per cent., were total abstainers; while in regard to the other 256, or 7.93 per cent., no information could be secured. Of the total abstainers 41 per cent. were minors. Out of 2701 cases, 1274, or 47.17 per cent., attributed their pauperism to their own intemperate habits. In 1542, or 64.82 per cent., out of 2379 cases, one or both parents were addicted to drink.

(2) Crime.—Of 26,672 convictions for crime during twelve months, 17,575, or 65.89 per cent., of them were for drunkenness, and 657, or 2.46 per cent., for drunkenness in combination with other offenses. Intemperate habits were said to have led to 22,514 out of 26,656 crimes, while in the other 4142 cases such influence was denied; 94.24 per cent. of the criminals used intoxicating liquors; 5.76 per cent. were total abstainers, almost one-half the latter being minors. Of the parents 57.89 per cent. of the fathers and 20.49 per cent. of the mothers drank.

(3) Insanity.—Of 1836 insane, 671, or 36.55 per cent., were intemperate; 677, or 36.87 per cent., were abstainers; while in the other cases the facts could not be secured. Of the 1281 adults concerning whom definite information could be secured, 659, or 51.44 per cent., were intemperate, and 622, or 48.56 per cent., abstainers.—In *Bulletin of the Department of Labor*, January 1897. M.

Railway Relief Departments.—Railway men belonging to associations and brotherhoods have the benefit of the relief and insurance there afforded. Many railroads furnish medical attendance, hospital service, and some temporary relief to their employés. Six have established "relief departments," by which is meant provision

for "systematic and comprehensive relief, covering sickness, accident, old age, and death." These are the Baltimore & Ohio, the Pennsylvania Railroad, the Pennsylvania Company, the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, the Philadelphia & Reading, and the Plant System. The Pennsylvania Railroad established its "department" in 1886, the Plant System, in 1896, the other four established theirs in 1889. Membership on the part of the employés of the Baltimore & Ohio, the Philadelphia & Reading, and the Plant System is compulsory; of the others voluntary. These six systems include one-seventh of the railway mileage of the United States, and employ one-fifth of the railway men. The membership of these "departments" in 1895 (before the Plant System established its "department") was something over 100,000. In 1895, 18,382 injured received benefits of from (averages for different roads) $12.30 to $24.91, while 33,228 sick received from $9.73 to $28.65. Death benefits averaging from $427 to $1125 were paid in 799 cases. The benefits are graded according to classes based upon wages received. The funds are created partly from membership dues, varying with wages received, and partly by contributions from the companies. In 1895, the "dues" amounted to $1,745,114.36, while the contributions from the railroads (including some interest paid by them on funds in trust) were $346,259.88. This work is directed by a manager appointed by the directors of the railroad company, who is advised by a board composed of an equal number of representatives appointed by them and of representatives elected by the employés from among themselves. Through these "departments," the Baltimore & Ohio has given in benefits almost five million dollars, the Pennsylvania Railroad, $5,170,000, the Burlington, $1,760,000, the Philadelphia & Reading, $1,448,000, and the Pennsylvania Company (the Pittsburg & Erie), $1,917,000.

The railroads established these departments partly to furnish safe insurance to their employés, but chiefly to secure for themselves better employés, and to bind the interests of the employés more closely to the interests of the railroads.— DR. EMORY R. JOHNSON in the *Bulletin of the Department of Labor*, January 1897. M.

Condemnation of Criminals not Punishment.— A bitter spirit will continue to dominate the people as long as the notion prevails that our courts of justice are to mete out retribution. Society has not the right to inflict pain. The spirit of vengeance must be eliminated from our courts. When the idea of punishment is abolished, then the emotional attitude toward the criminal will disappear. As organized society we have the right to protect ourselves against the criminal as against the person afflicted with a contagious disease, but this right should not be deemed the right to punish. The simple term justice or condemnation will convey the idea that the good of society is the consideration of the court, while the term punishment conveys the idea that the individual alone is the factor, and, as long as it remains on our statute books, the criminal cannot be blamed for imagining that the whole force of our courts is to cause him bodily pain.—EDWARD F. BRUSH, M.D., *Appleton's Popular Science Monthly*, February 1897. Fr.

Evidences of Health throughout the Industrial World.— In 1870 the property of the United States was valued at 24 billion dollars in gold; in 1890 at 65 billion dollars. In 1870 the population was 38 millions; in 1890, 62 millions. Thus, during these twenty years there was saved, on an average, over forty dollars per annum for every person in the nation. The distribution was as follows: The census of 1850 showed 6.47 per cent. of the population and 35.95 per cent. of the families in the country possessed of real estate; that of 1890, 47.90 per cent. of the families and 9.69 per cent. of the population — a gain of 33 and 50 per cent. respectively. In 1890 on an average only 5.01 per cent. of the total number engaged in gainful occupation were unemployed. In 1891 the purchasing power of wages was about 40 per cent. more than in 1873. The saving and spending power of the masses was improved to that extent. These are the best possible evidences of health in the economic and social life of the nation. The general prosperity, interrupted by the panic of 1893, is being recovered. The needed employment of labor in constructing railroads or in other enterprises hinges upon the profitable return for labor on the farm

and in the workshop. The outlook in these two domains is favorable, as shown by the recent advance in the prices of agricultural staples and by the great increase in value of the domestic manufactures exported in 1896 over those exported in 1895.—L. G. POWERS, *Engineering Magazine*, January 1897. Fr.

In Praise of Charity.—We often wonder why so much money and charitable effort do not regenerate the world. The reason is that they are so often unwisely and ignorantly applied. "The great mass of distress is due to moral defects of some kind." Most of our effort does harm because we disregard this fact. Individual responsibility is weakened and the problem is made more serious. What we need first in charity work is a clear understanding of the facts in the particular case. Then every effort must be made to induce self-help, for in self-help alone is the solution to be found. "Material relief," "friendly visiting," everything must be carefully used to make character, to make a man feel "responsible for maintaining himself and his family," for "the end of charity is to civilize," and "civilization implies a certain regularity and foresight in life."—C. S. LOCH, in *Charity Organization Review*, October 1896.

The Relation of Sociology to Philosophy.—Sociology assumes that natural laws of social progress can be ascertained. Philosophy has entered upon the study of man in society with the assumption that it is possible to read in society the larger expression of what individual man has it in him to become. The philosopher investigates the social whole, as he investigates other expressions of the human mind in order to learn what the mind really is. Sociology deals with the laws of aggregation and the behavior of aggregates as such, and has no primary reason for regarding one society as of greater interest than another. According to Bernès, sociology is not an art devoted to immediate action, but a philosophy which divines the impulse and the indications of a partially unrealized unity in the world which demands realization. If this is the case, the line which separates sociology from philosophy is in all essentials done away. Sociology may be compared with psychology in its relation to philosophy proper. The laws of association, with which modern psychology began, might serve for a designation of the general problem of abstract sociology. Psychology, in dealing with the mere course of psychical events, makes abstraction from the relations of reality which constitute the essence of logic, ethics, etc. As sociology acquires command over its material and its conceptions, it will recognize a gradation and a tendency, and find means to distinguish on its own grounds the social forms in which development is fullest from those in which it is most meager. In as far as it succeeds in this, it will assume towards the philosophy of society the same general attitude which psychology holds towards logic, ethics, and æsthetics. The force of facts appears to be determining sociology to the position of a psychological science. The psychology of crowds, the idea of imitation, and the conception of consciousness of kind bring us into contact with ideas with which political or social philosophy has long been accustomed to work. Such conceptions as the unity of science and the influence of sociology on scientific method are not new in principle. For Plato politics was a science, and the political forms corresponded to types of mind.—B. BOSANQUET, *Mind*, January 1897. F.

Public Employment Offices in Belgium.—During September 1404 persons asked employment, and places were found for 420.—*Revue du Travail*, October 1896.

Public Assistance (Paris).—Indigents receiving regular relief—July, 47,490; August, 47,299. Necessitous persons receiving irregular relief—July, 19,547; August, 16,723.—*Bulletin de L'Office du Travail*, October 1896. F.

Insurance against Unemployment in St. Gallen.—In November 1896 St. Gallen repealed her law of 1894 providing for compulsory insurance against unemployment. The opposition to it seems to have become quite general, including not a few laborers. The law provided that all persons receiving not more than five francs

per day and who did not avail themselves of the insurance afforded by organizations and associations must become insured. The dues varied according to the wages received. Under the law, 4220 men had insured, most of them being the less skilled workmen. The compulsory feature of the law was distasteful to many. But the real trouble was that very few except of the lowest class of laborers were ever out of work, and so the lower classes were insured largely at the expense of the higher. To this, very naturally, the latter objected.— THEODOR CURTI, Regierungsrat in St. Gallen, in *Archiv fur Soziale Gesetzgebung und Statistik*, December 1897. M.

The Old Generation of Economists and the New.— Thirty years ago economic science in England was more confident than it is today. Few of its general propositions flourished in France, and almost none in America. It is now patent that no practical problems can be settled offhand by an appeal to general doctrines. Nature's facts are more diverse than used to be thought. We cannot predict results from a mere knowledge of fundamental forces, without making a full investigation of the particular circumstances under which they act. A small change in those circumstances may alter the action of the fundamental forces beyond recognition. The pursuit of particulars has become more eager, but there is little tendency to dissociate it from the study of general principles. A further advance is the recognition that in economics we deal with the whole of man's nature. Social science, or the reasoned history of man, is working its way towards a fundamental unity, which is to be found in the forces of human character. Our first duty as economists is to make a reasoned catalogue of the world as it is, and never to allow our estimates as to what forces will prove the strongest in any social contingency to be biased by our opinion as to what forms ought to prove the strongest. Economists must admit instances of social discord. They are the result of natural laws which it is their business to help to counteract. They must dare to oppose the multitude for the good of the multitude, taking an attitude of reserve towards movements that are already popular. The coming economists will have no more urgent task than to inquire how far social approbation and sympathy may take the place of the cruder force of the pursuit of private material gain, which is being weakened by the growth of large businesses, and especially those under public control.— ALFRED MARSHALL, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, January 1897. F.

Economic Morality.— The great question which divides thinkers is the possibility of an economic science independent of the general study of social facts.

The Manchester school believes that it is possible to found practical conclusions upon an analysis of economic phenomena. The sociological school declares that no solid edifice can be constructed on such a narrow basis. Wuarin says social problems do not arise from political economy, but from a more general science.

Gide, who is an economic specialist, also contends for the possibility of an independent economic science. Again, Pareto holds that it is a natural science, as psychology, or physiology. He claims the independence of political economy as a pure science, and denies it the office of giving practical precepts, this being reserved to the social sciences.

The question then seems to be, Is economics a moral science? To this I say No. Economics is the science of the laws of development and decay. As all sciences of laws, economics has two usages. The first is to serve as an explanation of passing events, *e. g.*, Spain is today poorer than many other European nations.

Sciences of laws are composed of abstract formulas. These ought to receive the uniform name of theorems. Economics would be an example of these theorems; *e. g.*, Gresham's law. This law has assuredly no moral tone. Good and bad money are here used with a purely economic consideration. If one argues that the depreciation is due to acts which are blameworthy, that is a very important question, but has no concern for the economist.

The second usage of the science of laws is to furnish a solid basis in a theory of means for future activity. Every practical programme ought to be moral. But to apply morality successfully one has to know the natural laws. In other words, eco-

nomics ought to furnish the answer to such questions as this: Given such a situation, such a combination of circumstances, such psychical habits of the agent, what will be the economic results of such an enterprise?

Unless all such questions as these are discussed, such a science is impossible. For pure economics, the terms moral and immoral have no more meaning than the term beauty to mathematics. It is a psychological science, and not a moral one. Moral sciences can give categorical precepts. Morality, however, is not the science of conduct, or of the rules of conduct. A good practical programme cannot be established on a double basis — the one a good theory of the value of ends, the other an exact knowledge of the means. The general knowledge of means is furnished by the sciences of the natural laws; morality does not deal directly with the ends, but with the hierarchy of their values.— A. NAVILLE, "Economique et Morale," *Revue Philosophique*, January 1897. F.

The Restoration of Economics to Ethics.— At one time economics was recognized as a part of moral philosophy. There is now a movement, as seen in Marshall, Hadley, Smart, and the Austrian economists, back toward this old view, and regardless of the fact that many economists assert that there is a system of "positive economics" independent of any system of ethics, the close relation of ethics to economics is being more and more recognized.

Moral philosophy, or ethics, may be divided into "general ethics," "unfolding the general theory of moral action, the notions and principles of the entire moral order," and "particular ethics," "applying the general theory to the concrete relations of men, and from the general notions and principles drawing conclusions for the actions of men in the various conditions of life." "Particular ethics" may be divided into "natural theology" and "the social and political sciences," the latter including "economics" and "politics." Is this not the true place of economics? An examination will show that it is.

It is asserted that economics in the "stricter sense" "does not seek to determine ideals, but is a positive science, concerned exclusively with the investigation of uniformities; being, like all such sciences, a body of systematized knowledge concerning what is." It is asserted "that it is possible and desirable to discuss economic uniformities independently of economic ideals, and without formulating economic precepts." This is true of statistics and the "prolegomena" of economics, but it is not true of economics as a science. The truth of this statement is attested by the fact that those who believe in the "positive science" cannot write without using ethical terms, implying "duty," "responsibility," "ideals." In these unsuccessful attempts to avoid ethical terms and ethical ideals, economists set up an "imaginary man" in an "imaginary world" "and reason about what is not"— and this may be good exercise, but it is not *fact*, it is not *science*.— CHARLES S. DEVAS, Royal University of Ireland, in the *International Journal of Ethics*, January 1897. M.

Representative Institutions in British Trade-Unionism.—Representative institutions are most highly developed in the associations of coal miners and cotton operatives, who now comprise one-quarter of the total trade-union membership and have developed the best expert civil service. In the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton Spinners the legislative power is vested in a meeting comprising representatives from the various provinces and districts included in the association. This body is elected annually in strict proportion to membership, and consists of about 100 representatives. The actual government is conducted by an executive council of fourteen, of whom seven at least must be working spinners. The actual executive work is performed by the general secretary, who is elected by the representatives. There is no provision for the referendum or initiative, and rotation in office is discountenanced. The delegate idea is completely abandoned. The Miners' Federation of Great Britain, established in 1887, adopted from the outset a completely representative constitution. The supreme authority is vested in a conference, summoned as often as necessary, which consists of representatives elected by each country or district association. This conference appoints the executive officers. Rotation in office is

not observed. The actual carrying out of policies is left unreservedly to the executive committee. The discredit into which such expedients as the mass meeting, rotation of office, referendum and initiative, and restriction of delegates by imperative mandate have fallen is leading to the gradual adoption of the representative form of government throughout the trade-union world. A representative body having its own cabinet can sufficiently check the executive, but a representative executive affords no such advantages. The cotton operatives and miners enjoy special advantages in having their membership within a small radius; but a union extending throughout the kingdom cannot have a large representative body which can meet frequently. But with the increasing uniformity of working conditions throughout the country, the growing facilities of travel, and the steady multiplication of salaried local officials, the geographical difficulty is not insuperable. The function of the representative is still to express the mind of the average member, but unlike the delegate he is not a mechanical vehicle of votes on particular subjects. The representative acts as an interpreter between the people, who have little facility in expressing their desires and no conception as to how they can be satisfied, and the expert officials who tend to grow away from the unions. To secure representatives adequate to the task is much more difficult than it would be among bankers or merchants; for as the labor representative becomes equipped for his duties he gets out of touch with the manual workers. Failure on the part of a union to specialize the executive function leads to extinction; and failure to specialize the legislature leads to the domination of an irresponsible executive. The referendum fails because of the inability of the ordinary man to estimate what will be the effect of a proposal. For example, many unions have persistently voted themselves into bankruptcy. The referendum may be valuable, not as a legislative act, but as an index of the probability that all members will do what is required of them, as when a decision to strike is made. Any effective participation of the wage-earning class in the national legislature involves the establishment of the professional representative; for the facts that confront a representative in parliament are foreign to his whole experience and training. The tendency will be to exalt the real power of the representative, and to differentiate his functions from those of the ordinary citizen on the one side and of the expert administrator on the other.—SIDNEY and BEATRICE WEBB, *Political Science Quarterly*, December 1896. F.

On Changes in Trade Organization.—The effect of trade combinations upon prices is twofold: direct, so far as the primary object of the combination is to obtain higher prices; indirect, inasmuch as they affect the cost of production. A distinction must be observed between the effect of trades unions and of syndicates or capitalistic organizations. The direct object of the former has been to raise wages or shorten hours, or improve conditions; the general effect is increase of cost, though not always of price. No trades union has ever professed to concern itself with reduction of cost, though this has sometimes resulted from the discipline and corporate feeling fostered in the best unions. The direct object of syndicates is to make a profit. This desire tends to reduction of cost; while the desire for a large trade frequently tends to reduction of prices. Not only is the organization of a syndicate less expensive than the sum of the organizations of small firms of the same aggregate potentiality, but it is more effective and tends to economy in production. The larger quantities of raw materials used by a syndicate induce sellers to compete more keenly to supply them. The statistical experience in a very large business leads to further economy. In a small firm there is no standard of comparison except such as is gathered by hearsay from competitors. The small manufacturer attempts to be an expert in everything, whereas the syndicate can employ an expert in each department. There is also economy in labor when production attains a certain magnitude, both in the better organization of labor and in the lower average of inspection and control required. The advantages of large organizations also appear in distribution. They tend to place themselves in more direct contact with their markets. The cost of transportation is lessened, especially when ships are employed. There are also advantages in advertisement and commercial traveling. No small firm can afford to

travel even the whole of one country; hence its markets are very limited. A large syndicate can travel the whole world. The small manufacturer must receive information as to the views of consumers from merchants who may often be interested in misrepresenting. A syndicate comes in immediate contact with all of its markets, and receives illumination from markets using similar products from other sources. In fine, the syndicate in the world of business is a new and larger organism with larger eyes, more complex brain, wider knowledge, and greater powers. Upon these forces which tend to economies in production and distribution depend the permanence of syndicates and the chance of avoiding the evil tendency to make profit by raising prices. Great advances of price, except under extraordinary circumstances, are suicidal to an industry. But the inclination to raise prices moderately is more insidious. Hitherto the commercial world has not consciously considered price in relation to cost; for the price both from maker and to consumer has been ruled as much by the ingenuity and caprice of the middleman as by the cost of production. With syndicates a larger knowledge of cost in the productive department, of prices in the distributive department, and of foreign cost of production, synthesized in the governing brains, brings finer accuracy in estimation of profit, and creates more steady and moderate prices. The average number of governing minds over a period will be more powerful in consideration and more moderate in action than the average individual. Large organizations also afford opportunity of creating and treating large and trustworthy bodies of statistics. One of the chief evils of large organizations is the greater opportunity given for manipulation of the stock on exchange. Syndicates can raise prices only temporarily; for the average of price over some period is dependent upon factors which control syndicates as much as individuals. There are four stages in the evolution of syndicates; first, complete tentative monopoly; second, competition, but with some tacit combination of all competitors; third, thorough competition; fourth, a death struggle and survival of the fittest by ultimate economy.—H. J. FALK, *The Economic Journal*, December 1896. F.

Proposed Belgian Law Governing Labor Contracts.—The law concerns only laborers who are engaged to labor under the direction of a superior. A married woman is allowed to engage her labor without the consent of her husband. The amount and nature of payments shall in all cases be determined by agreement. The workingman is obliged to execute his work at the time, place, and under the conditions determined by agreement or custom; to work conformably to rules and orders given to him by the head of the company or his representatives; and to observe good manners during the execution of his contract. He is obliged to return in good condition tools and materials belonging to his employer, but shall not be liable for deterioration due to normal wear and tear. The employer must have labor performed under conditions determined by contract or custom; see that it is performed under conditions suitable to security and health; and maintain decency during the execution of work. He must pay wages in the manner determined by contract or custom. He cannot hold tools belonging to workmen. When the engagement is for an indefinite time, it may be ended by either party notifying the other. If the laborer breaks his engagement without previous notice or before the expiration of his contract, for certain causes, his rights and interests are not to be prejudiced. Under other circumstances the party breaking the contract is liable for damages, proportioned to the wages.—*Revue du Travail*, December 1896. F.

Crime and the Census.—The number of prisoners per one million population is given by the census as 290 in 1850, 607 in 1860, 853 in 1870, 1169 in 1880, and 1315 in 1890. It is assumed that the number of prisoners at a given epoch is indicative of the amount of crime at the same period. In 1880 and 1890 the enumeration included all prisoners, while in 1870 those in houses of correction were not reported. Omitting those in houses of correction in 1880 and 1890, we have, per one million population, 853 in 1870, 1012 in 1880, 1155 in 1890. The return to civil life after the war, and the making of three million negroes citizens capable of committing crime, inevitably disturbed social relations. Omitting prisoners in houses of correction and

those in the southern states, we have, per one million, 913 prisoners in 1870, 962 in 1880, and 1072 in 1890. The statement of the populations of penal institutions on a single day is sufficiently near to the average populations at the period in question. But it is clear that the number of prisoners at any time depends not only upon the number that has been sent to prison, but also on the length of the sentences imposed; for if in a given prison 100 convicts are received annually, with a uniform sentence of two years each, there will be in two years after opening the prison and in subsequent years 200 individuals in prison; while, if in another prison 100 are received annually, with a uniform sentence of three years, there will be at the end of the third year and subsequently 300 individuals in that prison. Therefore the reported population does not represent the crimes of a year. In 1890 the average sentence of those sentenced for definite terms was 3.88 years; in 1880 it was 4.14 years. As the census gives the sentences in detail a calculation may be made showing that whereas the prisoners reported in 1890 as committed for terms of one year and over were 45,115, the actual number committed was probably 15,295; and whereas 18,538 were reported as committed for less than one year, the actual number so committed was probably 181,134. The former represent the serious offenders. The number of long-term prisoners, according to the census reports, increased 48.84 per cent. from 1880 to 1890, while, according to our calculation, the increase was 64.20 per cent. In 1890 there were relatively more short sentences given. If in one section long sentences prevail, prisoners will be relatively more numerous than in another where short sentences prevail. The census reports 6405 female prisoners, or 7.78 per cent. of the total number; but since the average sentence for males was 4.07 years, and for females 1.59 years, the estimated percentage of female commitments would be 16.07. This accords with the experience of foreign countries. By elements of population, according to the census of 1890, 50.41 per cent. of the prison population was native white, 19.53 per cent. foreign-born white, 28.78 per cent. negroes, 1.28 per cent. other elements. The estimate of commitments would be 49.96 per cent. native white, 29.42 per cent. foreign-born white, 19.12 per cent. negroes, 1.50 per cent. other elements. If ratios to the population are calculated, they should be with the adult population, not with the general population. The census gives an altogether incorrect idea of the relative frequency of different classes of crime. Homicide, which brings a long, usually life sentence, is represented by a large number of persons whose crimes were committed oftentimes many years before the date of the census. As a picture of crime at a given time the census report paints the situation too darkly. Crimes against the person and against property are not in any given year nearly so numerous as the census would lead us to infer, while crimes against society, receiving sentences averaging one-fifth as long as the former, are much more numerous than the census indicates.—R. P. FALKNER, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January 1897. F.

An Unemployed Census.—The German government has taken advantage of the opportunity afforded by its "Industrial Census" of June and its "Population Census" of December 1895, to make a census of the unemployed. The results of this investigation are to be found in the *Vierteljahrshefte zur Statistik des deutschen Reichs*, 1896. The term "unemployed" was intended to include those dependent upon wages who were out of work for other cause than sickness. The number of such work-people found engaged in agriculture, industry, commerce, transport and domestic and other service was 15,497,632. Of these on June 14, 1895, 118,605, or 77 per cent., were not in work because of sickness, while 174,073, or 1.12 per cent., were not in work for causes other than sickness,—that is were "unemployed." This shows that in June the unemployed were 77 per cent. of the wage-earners, while in December it was 3.5 per cent. An examination of the problem in different industries shows that the most of this increase came from the building trades and so was clearly due to seasonal unemployment. The report says that if the statistics given are in error, they are in being an overstatement of the number of the unemployed.—In the *Labour Gazette*, March 1897. M.

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[A selection mainly from the American periodicals for March and April and the foreign periodicals for February and March.]

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Months: Ja. F. Mr. Ap. My. Je. Jl. Ag. S. O. N. D.

A. Arena.
AA. American Anthropologist.
AAC. Archives d'Anthropologie Criminelle.
AAE. Archivo per l'Antropologia e la Etnologia.
AAP. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
AC. L'Association Catholique.
ACQ. American Catholic Quarterly Review.
AE. Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen.
AGP. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
AH. Archive für Hygiene.
AHR. American Historical Review.
AIS. Annals de l'Institute de Science Sociale.
AJM. American Journal of Medical Sciences.
AJP. American Journal of Psychology.
AJS. American Journal of Sociology.
AK. Arbeiter-Kolonie.
ALR. American Law Review.
ALRR. American Law Register and Review.
AMC. American Magazine of Civics.
AMP. Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, Séances.
AN. American Naturalist.
Ant. L'Anthropologie.
AOR. Archiv für öffentliches Recht.
Ar. Arbeiterfreund.
ASA. American Statistical Association, Publications.
ASAr. Allgemeine Statistisches Archiv.
ASG. Archive für Sociale Gesetzgebung und Statistik.
ASP. Archiv für Systematische Philosophie.
BDL. Bulletin of the Department of Labor.
BG. Blätter für Gefängnisskunde.
BML. Banker's Magazine, London.
BMN. Banker's Magazine, New York.
BOT. Bulletin de l'Office du Travail.
BR. Bond Record.
BS. Bibliotheca Sacra.
BSt. Bulletin de Statistique et de Legislation Comparée.
BUI. Bulletin de l'Union Internationale de Droit Penale.
ChOR. Charity Organisation Review.
ChR. Charities Review.
CoR. Contemporary Review.
DR. Deutsche Revue.
DRu. Deutsche Rundschau.
DZG. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft.
EcJ. Economic Journal.
EcR. Economic Review.
Ed. Education.
Ed.R. Educational Review.
EHR. English Historical Review.
EM. Engineering Magazine.
EMo. La España Moderna.
F. Forum.
FR. Fortnightly Review.
GEc. Giornale degli Economisti.
GM. Gunton's Magazine.
HLR. Harvard Law Review.
HR. Hygienische Rundschau.
HZ. Historische Zeitschrift.
IAE. Internationales Archiv für Ethnographie.
IJE. International Journal of Ethics.
IR. Investor's Review.
JAI. Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.
JEc. Journal des Economistes.
JFI. Journal of the Franklin Institute.
JGV. Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirthschaft.
JHS. Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science.
JMS. Journal of Mental Science.
JNS. Jahrbücher für National-Oekonomie und Statistik.
JPE. Journal of Political Economy.
LG. Labor Gazette.
LH. Lend a Hand.
LoQR. London Quarterly Review.
LQR. Law Quarterly Review.
M. Monist.
MHM. Mansfield House Magazine.
Mi. Mind.
MIM. Monatsschrift für innere Mission.
NA. Nuova Antologia.
NAR. North American Review.
NC. Nineteenth Century.
NS. Natural Science.
Nt. Nature.
NW. New World.
NZ. Neue Zeit.
PhR. Philosophical Review.
PSM. Popular Science Monthly.
PSQ. Political Science Quarterly.
PsR. Psychological Review.
QJE. Quarterly Journal of Economics.
QR. Quarterly Review.
RCS. Revue Christianisme sociale.
RDI. Revue de Droit internationale.
RDM. Revue des deux Mondes.
REA. Revue mensuelle l'Ecole d'Anthropologie de Paris.
Ref.S. Réforme sociale.
ReS. Revue Socialiste.
RH. Revue historique.
RHD. Revue d'Histoire diplomatique.
RIF. Rivista italiana di Filosofia.
RiS. Rivista di Sociologia.
RIS. Revue internationale de Sociologie.
RISS. Rivista internazionale di Scienze Sociali.
RMM. Revue Metaphysique et de Morale.
RP. Revue de Paris.
RPe. Revue pénitentiaire.
RPh. Revue philosophique.
RPP. Revue politique et parliamentaire.
RRL. Review of Reviews, London.
RRN. Review of Reviews, New York.
RSI. Revisita Storica italiana.
RSP. Revue sociale et politique.
RT. Revue du Travail.
S. Sanitarian.
Sc. Science.
SP. Science Progress.
SR. School Review.
SS. Science Sociale.
VSV. Vierteljahrschrift für Staats- und Volkswirthschaft.
VWP. Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie.
YR. Yale Review.
ZE. Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
ZGS. Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaften.
ZPK. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik.
ZPO. Zeitschrift für das private und öffentliche Recht.
ZPP. Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane.
ZVR. Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
ZVS. Zeitschrift für Volkswirthschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung.

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

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

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

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This is precisely what Mr. Warner's new library does in the fine, critical articles which preface the master-works of the greatest writers.

Think what is here accomplished. In the case of Emerson himself, the general voice has proclaimed his two volumes of "Essays" a requisite for every library. But if we have the wish to go farther and know more of the work of our greatest man of letters, what volume shall we select? There are ten or eleven others to choose from. Looking into Mr. Warner's Library we find that Dr. Richard Garnett, of the British Museum, a life-long student and biographer of Emerson, has written a critique that gives us exactly what we wish to know.

Again, take the case of the man who occupies in German life the same place as the Sage of Concord in American life. All told, Goethe's writings comprise seventy compact volumes. Emerson himself, in one of those delightful letters he wrote to Carlyle, tells how, after years of effort, he has "he has succeeded in getting through thirty-five," and despairs of the other half! But who, even among those who call themselves well read, have despatched thirty-five volumes of the great German, or even half or third of thirty-five? Nevertheless,

we do not like to remain without at least a general and historical view of Goethe's tremendous activity, and, furthermore, if we go beyond "Faust" or "Wilhelm Meister," we are—the most of us—lost in a sea of conjecture as to which of the remaining sixty-eight volumes we shall attack.

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Professor Evans, of Munich, performs for us a like service with Schiller. Prof. Maurice Francis Egan does the same with Calderon. Prof. Charles Eliot Norton of Harvard with Dante. Prof. Santayana with Cervantes. The historian Lecky with Gibbon. Charlton T. Lewis with Bacon, and so on. Never, it seems to us, was so much talent, such an array of eminent names pressed into service for the production of such compact and pregnant exposition and criticism.

It would be a great mistake, however, to believe that the new Library which Mr. Warner and his associates have prepared has to do with nothing but the "classics." Here, for instance, is Dumas the elder. Who is there that has not fallen a victim to the stirring romances of "The Three Musketeers" and their extensive kin? Many of us, when we have once got into their companionship, hardly know where to stop. But we do not want to be misled into reading an immense number of worthless and mediocre stories that Dumas, in the burst of his fame, was led to palm off as his own, though they were in reality the work of others. There never was a more delightful "professor of books" than Andrew Lang, and we doubt if there is any one living who could tell us so much as he has told us in the Library of what is interesting and what we wish to know of Dumas.

We cross from the field of romance over into that of poetry, and the first name we chance upon is that of Wordsworth, one of the greatest poets who ever lived—no one questions that. And yet what great poet ever left so much fine wheat mixed with so much chaff? Dr. R. H. Hutton, the editor of the London *Spectator*, and one of the sanest and most appreciative of living critics, has chosen for this Library the best of Wordsworth's poetry, and has planned such further journeys through the poet's writings as the reader may wish to take.

And so we might go on. But we think we have made clear to the reader that which struck us so forcibly when we looked into the Emerson section, namely, how finely Mr. Warner has, in his Library, succeeded in satisfying the great want which Emerson there so well voiced—that of a "professor of books." Exactly as the professor of chemistry or physics or astronomy or biology gives the student a view of the whole field of his seience, the summary of its achievements, its great names and its great works, so Mr. Warner and his associates have given us the distillation not merely of the whole world's literature, in itself a colossal attempt, but, in addition, its history, biography, and criticism as well. It is only when we grasp its full import that we realize the truly vast and monumental character of the Library. It must assuredly rank as one of the most notable achievements of the century.

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

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